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ed.) (‘Milich’) (discussing the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence).” 2. “‘In general, evidence of independent offenses committed by a defendant is irrelevant and inadmissible in a trial for a different crime.’ Pareja v. State, 286 Ga. 117, 119, 686 S.E.2d 232 (2009). However, evidence of an independent bad act committed by the defendant may be admissible if the evidence is ‘“substantially relevant for some purpose other than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial”’ because he has a criminal character. Mullins v. State, 269 Ga. 157, 158, 496 S.E.2d 252 (1998) (citation omitted). ‘“[P]roof of a distinct, independent, and separate offense”’ is admissible if there is ‘“some logical connection”’ between the separate offense and the crimes charged ‘“from which it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish the other.”’ Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641–642, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991) (citation omitted). See also Young v. State, 281 Ga. 750, 751–52, 642 S.E.2d 806 (2007) (finding that the trial court went ‘astray’ by concluding that there was no similarity between the prior crime and charged crime, explaining that the correct rule is that there must be a sufficient connection between the prior act and the crime charged).” 3. Admission of the similar transaction evidence here was error due to the lack of notice and hearing, but harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt and the fact that the similar transaction evidence was not “particularly compelling or prejudicial.” Hunstein, writing for Thompson and Benham, dissents. “As we have recognized, evidence of an independent act committed by the accused is ‘highly and inherently prejudicial’ because it raises ‘an inference that an accused who acted in a certain manner on one occasion is likely to have acted in the same or in a similar manner on another occasion.’ Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641(2)(a), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).” “Under the majority's analysis, I question when an error for failure to comply with Rule 31 would ever not be harmless.” Argues that the evidence here, which tied defendant to the murder weapon, was far more significant than majority concludes. Mills v. State, 319 Ga.App. 131, 735 S.E.2d 134 (November 30, 2012). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; similar transactions were properly admitted though defendant was never prosecuted thereon. “The fact that the charges arising from the other incidents were never prosecuted does not affect the admissibility of the evidence. ‘[I]t is well settled that there need not be a criminal charge or conviction relating to a similar offense for it to be admissible.’ (Citations omitted.) Whitman v. State, 316 Ga.App. 655, 729 S.E.2d 409 (2012).” Accord, Roberson v. State , 327 Ga.App. 804, 761 S.E.2d 361 (July 1, 2014). Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 709 S.E.2d 239 (March 25, 2011). Murder conviction and death penalty affirmed; trial court properly allowed similar transaction evidence regarding prior assault on another woman in the same area. “There is no merit to Ledford's argument that the evidence used to prove the actual occurrence of this similar transaction was inadequate. See Gardner v. State, 273 Ga. 809, 810-811(2) (546 S.E.2d 490) (2001) (‘The state is only required to prove the accused committed a similar transaction by a preponderance of the evidence.’) .” McDaniel v. State, 289 Ga.App. 722, 658 S.E.2d 248 (February 22, 2008). At defendant’s burglary trial, similar transaction evidence was admissible though defendant pled guilty to lesser offense of theft by receiving; “rather than the name of the prior offense, it is the circumstances surrounding it that determine its admissibility. See Moss v. State, 275 Ga. 96, 99(4), 561 S.E.2d 382 (2002) (guilty plea to theft by receiving stolen property as lesser included offense of burglary charge properly admitted as similar transaction evidence at trial for murder).” Williams v. State, 285 Ga.App. 190, 645 S.E.2d 676 (April 27, 2007). In defendant’s prosecution for driving on a suspended license, no error in admitting evidence of seven prior occasions when he drove while his license was suspended, despite defendant’s objection that “this was an ‘excessive number’ to show course of conduct and raised an improper inference about Williams’s character.” Watley v. State, 281 Ga.App. 244, 635 S.E.2d 857 (August 23, 2006). “The conduct of an accused in other transactions is generally irrelevant and inadmissible. OCGA § 24-2-2. Evidence of similar transactions may be admissible, however, contingent upon three affirmative showings: ‘(1) the evidence must be admitted for a proper purpose; (2) there must be sufficient evidence to establish the accused committed the independent act; and (3) there must be a sufficient connection or similarity between the independent offense and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter.’ (Citation omitted.) Gardner v. State, 273 Ga. 809, 810(2) (546 S.E.2d 490) (2001), citing Williams v. State, [261 Ga. 640, 642(2)(b), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991)]. ‘The rules regarding the use of similar transaction evidence are construed most liberally in cases involving sexual offenses.’ (Footnote omitted.) Ingram v. State, 280 Ga.App. 467 (2), 634 S.E.2d 430 (June 26, 2006). Before admitting similar transaction evidence, the trial court must hold a hearing where the State bears the burden of showing that the evidence of similar transactions is admissible under the three-prong test. Myers v. State, 256 Ga.App. 135, 141-142(3) (567 S.E.2d 742) (2002). See Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3.”