☢ test - Í

Estes v. State, 279 Ga.App. 394, 631 S.E.2d 438 (May 15, 2006). No error admitting similar transaction evidence defendant elicited from his own witness (mother of the victim in the current case, hoping her testimony would sound incredible and thus cast doubt on the current victim’s story). Woods v. State, 275 Ga.App. 340, 620 S.E.2d 609 (September 1, 2005). Defendant need not have been prosecuted for the prior offense for it to be admissible as a similar transaction. “[T]here is no requirement that the state prosecute Woods for the incident prior to its admission as similar transaction evidence.” Accord, Sims v. State , 275 Ga.App. 836, 621 S.E.2d 869 (October 13, 2005); Mikell v. State , 281 Ga.App. 739, 637 S.E.2d 142 (October 4, 2006); Dean v. State , 321 Ga.App. 731, 742 S.E.2d 758 (May 7, 2013); Johnson v. State , 322 Ga.App. 612, 744 S.E.2d 903 (July 2, 2013); Arbegast v. State , 332 Ga.App. 414, 773 S.E.2d 283 (June 3, 2015). Smith v. State, 275 Ga.App. 60, 619 S.E.2d 694 (July 27, 2005). Defendant complains “that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial when the State failed to introduce all the similar transaction evidence of which it had notified him. We review such a contention for abuse of discretion. Tuggle v. State, 211 Ga.App. 854(2) (440 S.E.2d 740) (1994). Prior to the start of the trial, Smith was served with notice of the State’s intent to introduce similar transactions to prove bent of mind and course of conduct. His attorney questioned potential jurors as to whether they were familiar with the stores or employees involved in the similar transactions. At trial, however, the State successfully introduced only one similar transaction. The State’s failure in this regard, Smith claims, caused him prejudice during jury selection. Smith cites no authority that would require the State to call every witness it lists in its pre-trial notifications, and we have found none. There was, therefore, no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling.” Serrate v. State, 268 Ga.App. 276, 601 S.E.2d 766 (July 1, 2004). “The presentation of character witnesses opens the door to similar transaction evidence regardless of the State’s compliance with notice requirements.” Odom v. State, 267 Ga.App. 701, 600 S.E.2d 759 (June 7, 2004). Defendant, a female, was convicted of aggravated child molestation by performing sex acts with a certain man in presence of a minor child, and encouraging the child to perform oral sex on the man. At trial, another woman testified that she committed the same sex act on the same man to get drugs from him. Held, this evidence was not a “similar transaction” requiring notice pursuant to USCR 31.1. “[S]imilar transaction evidence contemplates acts involving the accused. Williams v. State , 261 Ga. 640, 641-643, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).” Starks v. State, 240 Ga.App. 346, 523 S.E.2d 397 (October 13, 1999). “[T]he determination that the probative nature of similar transaction evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect is implicit in the trial court's ruling allowing its admission.” Wells v. State, 237 Ga.App. 109, 514 S.E.2d 245 (March 18, 1999). Prior offenses could be admitted as similar transactions notwithstanding that the charges had been nolle prossed. “‘The mere entry of nolle prosequi does not indicate an absence of the commission of a criminal act or forever clear one of the charges brought against him.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Richards v. State, 222 Ga.App. 853, 855(2), 476 S.E.2d 598 (1996). Accordingly, the mere fact that the charges against Wells had been nolle prossed did not bar the State from using them as similar transactions. Id.” 13. HEARING ON MOTION Peoples v. State, 295 Ga. 44, 757 S.E.2d 646 (April 10, 2014). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in admitting similar transaction evidence of defendant’s involvement in another armed robbery and shooting without notice and hearing pursuant to USCR 33.1 and 31.3(A). Admission of the similar transaction evidence here was error due to the lack of notice and hearing, but harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt and the fact that the similar transaction evidence was not “particularly compelling or prejudicial.” Hunstein, writing for Thompson and Benham, dissents. “As we have recognized, evidence of an independent act committed by the accused is ‘highly and inherently prejudicial’ because it raises ‘an inference that an accused who acted in a certain manner on one occasion is likely to have acted in the same or in a similar manner on another occasion.’ Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641(2)(a), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).” “Under the majority's analysis, I question when an error for failure to comply with Rule 31 would ever not be harmless.” Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga.App. 197, 739 S.E.2d 682 (March 8, 2013). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; similar transaction evidence was properly admitted based on defense counsel’s stipulation. “Contrary to Littlejohn's claim, … there is no merit to Littlejohn's claim that the stipulations were invalid since the record did not reflect his personal, express authorization of the stipulations. See Martin v. State, 251 Ga.App. 149–150(1) (553 S.E.2d 827)