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(2001) (rejecting a defendant's claim that his defense attorney's stipulation failed because the record did not contain his personal waiver as to the stipulated facts). The record shows that Littlejohn did not repudiate the oral stipulations made in open court in his presence. Littlejohn therefore acquiesced in the stipulations, and the stipulations were binding upon him. Id. In light of the stipulations, any objection that Littlejohn had to the admissibility of the challenged evidence was waived. See Damerow v. State, 310 Ga.App. 530, 534(3) (714 S.E.2d 82) (2011).” Corbitt v. State, 301 Ga.App. 665, 688 S.E.2d 642 (November 9, 2009). No reversal based on failure to make Williams findings on record pre-trial, where record supported the admission of the evidence. Accord, Philpot v. State , 309 Ga.App. 196, 709 S.E.2d 831 (March 22, 2011). Evans v. State, 300 Ga.App. 180, 684 S.E.2d 311 (September 22, 2009). “‘[A] trial court's finding that ‘other transactions' evidence is relevant necessarily constitutes an implicit finding that the probative value of that evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact.’ Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 625(2) (458 S.E.2d 643) (1995).” Accord, Steele v. State , 306 Ga.App. 870, 703 S.E.2d 5 (September 16, 2010) (no express finding required that probative value outweighs prejudice). Sheppard v. State, 294 Ga.App. 270, 669 S.E.2d 152 (September 26, 2008). Where record doesn’t disclose whether trial court properly determined admissibility of similar transactions pre-trial, case remanded to trial court to make this determination post-trial. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642(2)(b) (409 S.E.2d 649) (1991); Hall v. State, 230 Ga.App. 741, 742 (497 S.E.2d 603) (1998). “Although Sheppard failed to object to the admission of some of the allegedly objectionable testimony, this Court has held that a defendant ‘bears no burden to initiate’ Rule 31.3(B) procedures and that a defendant's failure to object to the absence of such procedures ‘does not constitute a waiver.’ Riddle v. State, 208 Ga.App. 8, 10-11(1)(b) (430 S.E.2d 153) (1993).” “We therefore vacate the trial court's judgment of conviction and remand this case to the trial court with direction that it determine whether a Rule 31.3(B) hearing has already been held and, if not, to hold such a hearing. Hall, 230 Ga.App. at 743. ‘If the trial court determines that the State's [similar transaction] evidence does not meet the standards of Williams v. State, or if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, a new trial is required.’ Clarke v. State, 241 Ga.App. 186, 192 (526 S.E.2d 395) (1999). ‘On the other hand, if the evidence meets the standards of Rule 31.3(B) and Williams, a new trial is not required[,]’ id.” Accord, Brown v. State , 307 Ga.App. 99, 704 S.E.2d 227 (November 24, 2010); Moore v. State , 290 Ga. 805, 725 S.E.2d 290 (March 23, 2012). Mullis v. State, 292 Ga.App. 218, 664 S.E.2d 271 (June 25, 2008). At defendant’s child molestation trial, defendant was not entitled to a similar transaction hearing where defendant himself introduced the issue [of his own sexual history as a child] during his own testimony, opening the door for the State to cross-examine him on the subject. Bell v. State, 291 Ga.App. 294, 661 S.E.2d 649 (April 24, 2008). Dicta: “Failure to conduct a pretrial similar transaction hearing is not necessarily reversible error. ‘[W]hile it is preferable that the hearing be held before trial, it is not reversible error to conduct the hearing in mid-trial where ... [defendant] can show no prejudice suffered from the failure to have the hearing before trial.’ Thaxton v. State, 260 Ga. 141, 144(6) (390 S.E.2d 841) (1990).” Whether such prejudice exists here not reached, however, as State concedes it provided defendant no notice of similar transaction evidence, thus requiring reversal. Robertson v. State, 278 Ga.App. 376, 629 S.E.2d 79 (March 23, 2006). “Robertson … argues that the similar transaction evidence should have been excluded because the State did not inform the court exactly how it would prove the crimes presented to the court in its proffer. Rule 31.3 ‘clearly grants the trial court discretion as to the reception of evidence.’ Hall v. State, 181 Ga.App. 92, 93(1)(c) (351 S.E.2d 236) (1986). The State does not have a ‘mandatory obligation to produce testimonial evidence’ at the hearing, and the defendant has no corresponding right to an evidentiary hearing. Id.” Accord, Ellis v. State , 282 Ga.App. 17, 637 S.E.2d 729 (October 2, 2006); Harvey v. State , 284 Ga. 4, 660 S.E.2d 528 (April 21, 2008); Wright v. State , 302 Ga.App. 101, 690 S.E.2d 220 (January 25, 2010). High v. State, 271 Ga.App. 388, 609 S.E.2d 722 (January 25, 2005). “‘A hearing in which the [s]tate relies upon the statements of the prosecuting attorney to make the required showing for the admissibility of similar transaction evidence is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of USCR 31.3(B). Some cases differentiate a hearing in which the prosecutor simply states the evidence in her place from an evidentiary hearing. USCR 31.3 clearly grants the trial court the discretion as to the reception of evidence. There is no per se right to an evidentiary hearing, only to a hearing, nor any mandatory obligation to produce testimonial evidence.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Talmadge v. State, 236 Ga.App. 454, 457-458(1)(e) (512 S.E.2d 329) (1999).” Accord, Boileau v. State , 285 Ga.App. 221, 645 S.E.2d 577