☢ test - Í

(April 12, 2007); Johnson v. State , 322 Ga.App. 612, 744 S.E.2d 903 (July 2, 2013). Turley v. State, 265 Ga.App. 385, 593 S.E.2d 916 (February 2, 2004). Trial court does not have to make express finding that probative value of similar transaction evidence outweighs prejudicial impact. “[A] trial court is not required to fully articulate its reasoning in this regard.” Accord, Walker v. State , 265 Ga.App. 449, 594 S.E.2d 678 (February 5, 2004) ( “Walker also claims that the trial court failed to make the three express findings required by Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642 (409 S.E.2d 649) (1991), prior to admitting the similar transaction evidence. However, as held in Morales v. State, 210 Ga.App. 414, 416 (436 S.E.2d 528) (1993), such is not harmful error where the State presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to have concluded affirmatively that each of the requirements had been satisfied.”). See also Rowe (September 11, 2003), below. Accord, Collier v. State , 266 Ga.App. 345, 596 S.E.2d 795 (March 18, 2004). Turley v. State, 265 Ga.App. 385, 593 S.E.2d 916 (February 2, 2004). Trial court does not have to make express finding that probative value of similar transaction evidence outweighs prejudicial impact. “[A] trial court is not required to fully articulate its reasoning in this regard.” Accord, Walker v. State , 265 Ga.App. 449, 594 S.E.2d 678 (February 5, 2004) ( “Walker also claims that the trial court failed to make the three express findings required by Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642 (409 S.E.2d 649) (1991), prior to admitting the similar transaction evidence. However, as held in Morales v. State, 210 Ga.App. 414, 416 (436 S.E.2d 528) (1993), such is not harmful error where the State presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to have concluded affirmatively that each of the requirements had been satisfied.”). See also Rowe (September 11, 2003), below. Accord, Collier v. State , 266 Ga.App. 345, 596 S.E.2d 795 (March 18, 2004). Rowe v. State, 263 Ga.App. 367, 587 S.E.2d 781 (September 11, 2003). Trial court was not required to make an “express finding that the probative value of the similar transaction evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect on the jury. Such a finding need not be express but is implicit in a trial court’s decision to admit the evidence.” See also Turley (February 2, 2004), above. Parker v. State, 244 Ga.App. 419, 535 S.E.2d 795 (June 12, 2000). “Hearsay testimony to establish the similarity of other transactions is allowed when given by a law enforcement official who actually investigated and has personal knowledge of the other transactions. Jackson v. State, 217 Ga.App. 485, 458 S.E.2d 153 (1995); Castellon v. State, 240 Ga.App. 85, 522 S.E.2d 568 (1999). Also, prosecuting attorneys are permitted to state directly to the court what evidence they are prepared to produce. Such a statement by the prosecuting attorney alone is sufficient in a pretrial hearing regarding the admissibility of similar transactions evidence.” Accord, Terry v. State , 262 Ga.App. 654, 586 S.E.2d 357 (August 5, 2003). Clarke v. State, 241 Ga.App. 186, 526 S.E.2d 395 (December 1, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for theft by taking while engaged in telemarketing affirmed, but remanded to conduct similar transactions hearing. While similarity of offenses was shown by evidence admitted at trial, “this case must be remanded to the trial court for a Rule 31.3(B) hearing, however. First, the court did not make the two remaining findings critical to the admission of [victim] Schmeig's other crimes evidence and did not consider whether the probative value of the testimony outweighed its possible prejudicial effect. Second, additional other crimes evidence was presented without appropriate findings being made. [Second victim] McGinn testified to being preyed upon by certain companies other than [defendant’s enterprise] UCD; Sergeant Kessler of the DeKalb County Police testified almost exclusively about the criminal activity of [defendant’s earlier enterprise] UA, the companies that developed from it, and the persons involved; [co-defendants/defendant’s employees] Henry Key and Earnest Curry testified in person about the criminal operations of these companies; and recorded testimony of Kashma Porter, another person involved, also dealt with the criminal operations of the other companies.” Nelson v. State, 240 Ga.App. 454, 521 S.E.2d 593 (August 9, 1999). Motion for new trial was properly denied; trial court’s failure to explicitly find pre-trial that similar transaction evidence was offered for proper purpose was cured by making such finding post-trial. Citing Harris v. State, 222 Ga.App. 52, 473 S.E.2d 232 (1996), where “we explicitly held ‘that the procedural requirements of Williams [ v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642(2)(b), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991), requiring a pre-trial hearing on admission of similar transactions] can be substantially complied with by issuance of a timely post-trial nunc pro tunc order.’ Id. at 56, 473 S.E.2d 232. The trial court in this case did not expressly indicate that its post-trial order was issued nunc pro tunc to the time of trial. But here, as in Harris, permitting the order to serve as an order substantially complying with Williams would be ‘the only result consistent with the prior rulings’ of this court directing that an appeal be remanded for the purpose of conducting a proper hearing. Id. at 56, 473 S.E.2d 232.” Talmadge v. State, 236 Ga.App. 454, 512 S.E.2d 329 (February 12, 1999). 1. “[T]he defendant … asserts that the trial