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court erred in failing to make an express finding that the probative value of the similar transaction evidence outweighed its prejudicial value [sic; effect]. ‘Notwithstanding [the defendant’s] contention to the contrary, the trial court was not required to conduct an on the record balancing test.’ [Cits.] The fact that the trial court decided to admit the evidence indicates that it so found. [Cit.]” Accord, Futch v. State , 316 Ga.App. 376, 730 S.E.2d 14 (June 25, 2012); Thomas v. State , 318 Ga.App. 849, 734 S.E.2d 823 (November 28, 2012). 2. Pre-trial hearing on similar transactions may provide for admission of evidence, but is not required to do so. “As to the sufficiency of the pre-trial similar transactions hearing, we note that during such hearing, the trial court ‘ may receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to determine [the issue of admissibility]. The burden of proving that the evidence of similar transactions or occurrences should be admitted shall be upon the prosecution.’ (Emphasis supplied.) USCR 31.3(B). ‘A hearing in which the State relies upon the statements of the prosecuting attorney to make the required showing for the admissibility of similar transaction evidence is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of USCR 31.3(B). … USCR 31.3 clearly grants the trial court the discretion as to the reception of evidence. There is no per se right to an evidentiary hearing, only to a hearing, nor any mandatory obligation to produce testimonial evidence. The statement in place as to what was expected to be shown revealed facts so as to constitute sufficient similarity between the prior acts and the offenses on trial to permit the admission of such evidence.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) McClarity v. State, 234 Ga.App. 348, 354-355(4), 506 S.E.2d 392 (1998).” Accord, Sheppard v. State , 300 Ga.App. 261, 684 S.E.2d 397 (September 29, 2009) (prosecutor’s proffer at hearing was sufficient; no denial of right to confrontation where defendant able to cross- examine witnesses at trial); Parker v. State , 244 Ga.App. 419, 535 S.E.2d 795 (June 12, 2000); Brittain v. State , 329 Ga.App. 689, 766 S.E.2d 106 (November 17, 2014). 14. JUVENILE OFFENSES Ledford v. State, 313 Ga.App. 389, 721 S.E.2d 585 (December 1, 2011). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of similar acts committed against his young cousin when defendant was 11 or 12 years old. “‘[Y]outh at the time of the similar transaction should be considered when deciding if the testimony should be admitted to show lustful disposition and inclination, i.e., bent of mind.’ Stephens v. State, 205 Ga.App. 403, 404(1) (422 S.E.2d 275) (1992). The age of the defendant when the similar transaction occurred is relevant when balancing the probative value of the evidence against its potentially prejudicial impact. Id. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the defendant's age can act to diminish the probative value of the evidence, resulting in the exclusion of the evidence as more prejudicial than probative. To that end, the State must show a ‘probative connection’ between the similar transaction and the crime for which the defendant is presently being tried. Lee v. State, 306 Ga.App. 144, 146(2) (701 S.E.2d 582) (2010); see Gilham v. State, 232 Ga.App. 237, 239(1) (501 S.E.2d 586) (1998) (defendant was 12 or 13 at time he committed sexual battery, but given his obvious understanding of sexual acts committed, his age did not render similar offense inadmissible).” Adams, writing for Blackwell, dissents, citing “no evidence to show that 1l- year-old Ledford understood the nature of the acts he allegedly committed against his young cousin.” Lee v. State, 306 Ga.App. 144, 701 S.E.2d 582 (September 17, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated sexual battery affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of similar offense, committed when defendant was 12 years old. “ Although Lee contends that he lacked the capacity to form criminal intent as a 12-year-old, (see OCGA § 16-3-1 (‘[a] person shall not be considered or found guilty of a crime unless he has attained the age of 13 years at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime’)), we have held that a defendant's youth at the time of the prior offense is a relevant consideration ‘when deciding if the testimony should be admitted to show lustful disposition and inclination, i.e., bent of mind.’ Stephens v. State, 205 Ga.App. 403, 404(1) (422 S.E.2d 275) (1992). Evidence that Lee bragged about his sexual prowess; demanded that the victim perform oral sex on him; and committed sexual acts with her demonstrated his lustful disposition. These actions were not the ‘faultless act[s] of an innocent child.’ Id.; Gilham v. State, 232 Ga.App. 237, 239(1) (501 S.E.2d 587) (1998) (even though defendant was 12 or 13 at time he committed sexual battery, given his obvious understanding of sexual acts committed, his age did not render similar offense inadmissible).” Accord, Dean v. State , 321 Ga.App. 731, 742 S.E.2d 758 (May 7, 2013); Arbegast v. State , 332 Ga.App. 414, 773 S.E.2d 283 (June 3, 2015) (acts of child molestation when defendant was 16 years old properly admitted as similar transactions). Edwards v. State, 282 Ga. 259, 646 S.E.2d 663 (June 4, 2007). At defendant’s murder trial, admission of similar transaction evidence of his prior violent offense as a juvenile was “not clearly erroneous.” “In this case, both the charged crime and the similar transaction involved violent assaults committed by [defendant] with the support and assistance of young, unarmed accomplices; both involved [defendant’s] use of a firearm and demand for valuables; and both targeted business people, within the same five-mile area, during morning work hours.” Accord, Jackson v. State , 291 Ga. 54, 727 S.E.2d 454 (May 7, 2012) (actions of defendant as a juvenile may be admitted if otherwise qualifying as