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similar transactions).

15. NOTICE – FORM/CONTENT Long v. State, 324 Ga.App. 882, 752 S.E.2d 54 (November 20, 2013). False imprisonment and related convictions affirmed; similar transaction notice was sufficient to admit evidence of the numerous offenses charged in the prior incident, though only one was mentioned in the State’s pleading. In both incidents, defendant falsely imprisoned, beat, and threatened his girlfriend. Similar transactions notice only mentioned “false imprisonment” as the “similar crime or transaction,” and defendant objected to mentioning any of the other offenses therein. Held, the notice gave defendant adequate warning, as “the State attached a copy of the conviction that included other charges for which Long was convicted and also provided copies of the incident report, the victim's statement, and an investigator's summary. … In this case, we conclude that even if the State's notice could have been more specific, it substantially complied with the notice requirement and Long has not demonstrated how his defense was harmed as a result of the State's failure to provide a more complete notice. See id.; Collier v. State, 266 Ga.App. 345, 350(1)(c), 596 S.E.2d 795 (2004); Sweatman v. State, 181 Ga.App. 474, 475(1), 352 S.E.2d 796 (1987).” Bright v. State, 314 Ga.App. 589, 725 S.E.2d 327 (March 5, 2012). Burglary conviction affirmed; deficiencies in similar transaction notice didn’t require “automatic reversal or exclusion of the similar transaction evidence,” absent harm to the defendant not shown here. 1. Lack of victims’ names wasn’t harmful “because the victims of the similar transactions were corporate entities that owned all of the newly constructed homes in their respective subdivisions … . [T]he corporations could not be interviewed or called to the stand. And although a representative from the corporate entities could have testified, at trial there was no testimony from any representatives.” 2. Failure to attach indictments. “The trial court found it was undisputed that at the time the state served notice of its intent to introduce evidence of similar transactions, neither the Fulton County case nor the Forsyth County case had been indicted, so there were no indictments to provide to the defense. … The court found, and the record showed, that the state's motion provided as much information as the state possessed at the time.” 3. Incident numbers are not required by USCR 31.3(B). Smith v. State, 296 Ga.App. 608, 675 S.E.2d 310 (March 12, 2009). Defendant’s convictions for kidnapping, aggravated assault and burglary reversed; trial court erred in admitting evidence of a similar transaction without prior notice required by USCR 31.3, or hearing thereon. Evidence showed that defendant came to victim’s apartment looking for his roommate-to-be, Milledge, intending to steal Milledge’s drug stash, but Milledge and his drugs weren’t there. State then presented evidence that defendant had stolen Milledge’s drugs before in a similar transaction. “In light of the foregoing, evidence of Smith's bad character was improperly placed before the jury.” Query: why isn’t the similar transaction here simply a prior difficulty between defendant and his intended victim, Milledge? See cases on transferred intent under Evidence – Intent – Transferred Intent, above. Bell v. State, 291 Ga.App. 294, 661 S.E.2d 649 (April 24, 2008). Defendant’s theft and related offenses reversed; trial court improperly allowed similar transaction evidence without notice . “‘Notice of intent to offer [similar transaction] evidence is not optional. Under Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 the plaintiff must give a defendant notice of its intent to present evidence of similar transactions or occurrences and seek the prior approval of the trial judge before presenting such evidence.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Baker v. State, 193 Ga.App. 498, 499(2)(b) (388 S.E.2d 402) (1989). Here, as the State acknowledges, the notice was untimely, and ‘[s]erving a similar transaction notice on day three of a trial, when the similar witness was prosecuted by the same office, is just not excusable.’ The serving of a witness list on the eve of trial did not cure this deficiency. See Story v. State, 196 Ga.App. 590, 591 (396 S.E.2d 547) (1990).” Ellis v. State, 282 Ga.App. 17, 637 S.E.2d 729 (October 2, 2006). “‘[T]he failure of the State to attach copies of the indictment ... to fully comply with USCR 31.3(B) does not require automatic reversal or exclusion of the similar transaction evidence, but is subject to testing for harm.’ Ellerbee v. State, 247 Ga.App. 46, 48(1)(a)(ii) (542 S.E.2d 146) (2000). … In this case, any error in failing to attach the indictment to the notice was harmless because it was otherwise provided in discovery long before trial.” Accord, Taylor v. State , 305 Ga.App. 748, 700 S.E.2d 841 (August 30, 2010). Eaton v. State, 273 Ga.App. 494, 615 S.E.2d 576 (June 2, 2005). State filed notice of intent to introduce evidence of three similar transactions, then days later filed another notice listing a fourth similar transaction. Held, law does not require that all similar transactions be listed in the same notice, nor does filing of second notice invalidate first. “[N]othing on either notice claimed that it was the only notice or that the state was withdrawing any other notice. ”