☢ test - Í

Crouse v. State, 271 Ga.App. 820, 611 S.E.2d 113 (March 1, 2005). Misnomers in similar transaction notices (“Jr.” instead of “Sr.”) did not require exclusion of evidence of acts which were, in fact, those of defendant. “The misnomers in the State’s notices appear to have been typographical errors, and nothing in the record shows that Crouse was confused, misled, or otherwise harmed by those errors.” Collier v. State, 266 Ga.App. 345, 596 S.E.2d 795 (March 18, 2004). Aggravated assault convictions reversed. “The statement of intent to introduce evidence of similar crimes should clearly specify the proper purpose for which introduction of such evidence is sought. A statement of purpose advances two aims. First, it allows the defendant the opportunity to investigate the validity, relevancy, and other aspects of the prior offenses. Second, it assists the court in making the essential preliminary determination of whether the State is seeking to introduce the evidence for an appropriate purpose. Reversible error does not automatically accrue from the absence of a purpose declaration, however. [Cit.] … Although the state’s notice should have been more specific, Collier has not shown how his defense was harmed as a result of the state’s failure to comply fully with the notice requirements.” Appropriate purpose was shown at pre-trial hearing. Accord, Perry v. State , 314 Ga.App. 575, 724 S.E.2d 874 (March 5, 2012) (information missing from State’s notice was contained in indictments from prior cases referenced in notice). Conflicts with Roberts (December 3, 2000), below (notice isn’t required to state purpose of evidence). Ellerbee v. State, 247 Ga.App. 46, 542 S.E.2d 146 (November 9, 2000). Defense objected to similar transaction evidence on grounds that the state had failed to attach copies of the indictment and conviction to the notice of intent to introduce the evidence. Held, this error was harmless because the defense was given actual notice of the particulars and the disposition of the earlier offense. Allen v. State, 242 Ga.App. 367, 533 S.E.2d 401 (February 15, 2000). Convictions for child molestation and enticing a child affirmed; no prejudice to defendant where State failed to state a purpose for similar transaction evidence in its written notice, but stated appropriate purposes at the Rule 31.3(b) pretrial hearing. “ Reversible error does not automatically accrue from the absence of a purpose declaration in the notice. … Allen has never stated that he was surprised by the purposes articulated by the State. Upon hearing the purposes for which the evidence would be offered, he did not move for a continuance to investigate the validity, relevancy, or other aspects of admissibility of the prior offense. Although the State's notice should have specified the proper purpose for which introduction of the evidence was sought, Allen has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the State's failure to include a statement of purpose in its notice of intent to present similar transaction evidence.” Smalls v. State, 242 Ga.App. 39, 528 S.E.2d 560 (January 21, 2000). Burglary conviction affirmed; similar transaction notice was not insufficient because it recited several purposes for the evidence. Distinguishing Rodriguez v. State, 211 Ga.App. 256, 439 S.E.2d 510 (1993), which cautions against “[a] rote recitation of any and all permissible purposes.” “Contrary to Smalls' argument on appeal, the obvious significance of Rodriguez to this case is its emphasis that the State must keep the trial court informed of why it is offering the similar transaction evidence and, once the decision is made to admit the evidence, the trial court must apprise both the defendant and the jury of the specific, limited purpose(s) of such evidence. Id. Rodriguez does not prevent the State from listing multiple purposes in its similar transaction notice, as long as the trial court subsequently determines whether those purposes are appropriate under the circumstances. In this case, the State notified Smalls of the purposes for which it intended to utilize the similar transaction evidence. The trial court had the opportunity to consider arguments from both sides in order to make the ‘essential preliminary determination’ as to which, if any, of these purposes were ‘appropriate purposes’ under the circumstances. Hawks v. State, [223 Ga.App. 890, 891, 479 S.E.2d 186 (1996)]. The fact that, in making such determination, the trial court rejected some of the proposed purposes for the evidence and limited its admissibility to the issue of intent does not retroactively invalidate the State's notice. For this Court to so rule would chill the State's efforts to introduce similar transactions for any and all relevant, appropriate purposes.” Roberts v. State, 241 Ga.App. 259, 526 S.E.2d 597 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine possession affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s prior conviction for sale of cocaine as a similar transaction. State wasn’t required to state purpose of evidence in written notice required by USCR 31.3. Accord, Sandifer v. State , 318 Ga.App. 630, 734 S.E.2d 464 (November 19, 2012). Talmadge v. State, 236 Ga.App. 454, 512 S.E.2d 329 (February 12, 1999). Not error to admit evidence of similar transaction where state’s notice referred to it as an obstruction charge when it was, in fact, a charge of escape. “[T]he trial court noted that a copy of the indictment for the [prior] charge had been attached to the similar transaction