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notice; a copy of the defendant’s plea agreement also was attached. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly determined that the defendant had been given the required notice of the State’s intention to introduce the similar transactions.” Arnold v. State, 236 Ga.App. 380, 511 S.E.2d 219 (January 27, 1999). No error in admitting certified copy of defendant’s prior conviction, despite defendant’s contention that the similar transaction notice only attached the indictment, not the conviction. “[T]he purpose of the statute is not to insist upon a technical requirement for its own sake. It was designed to ensure sufficient notice to defend against the charges.” The notice recited that the conviction would be tendered, and counsel was aware of the conviction. 16. NOTICE – TIMING Williams v. State, 298 Ga. 208, 779 S.E.2d 304 (November 2, 2015). Felony murder convictions affirmed; late notice of similar transaction evidence was waived by failure to object at pretrial hearing, citing Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 884, 886(4), 546 S.E.2d 511 (2000). Jones v. State, 329 Ga.App. 478, 765 S.E.2d 657 (November 5, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in admitting similar transaction evidence despite less than ten days’ notice. “Here, the record demonstrates that Jones' bench trial on the similar transaction occurred only a few months before the current trial and that he had the same trial counsel for both trials. Thus, Jones' counsel was well aware of the evidence contained in the similar transaction. Given these facts, the trial court found the absence of any real prejudice to Jones in shortening the notice period, and we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion here.” Peoples v. State, 295 Ga. 44, 757 S.E.2d 646 (April 10, 2014). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in admitting similar transaction evidence of defendant’s involvement in another armed robbery and shooting without notice and hearing pursuant to USCR 33.1 and 31.3(A). Admission of the similar transaction evidence here was error due to the lack of notice and hearing, but harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt and the fact that the similar transaction evidence was not “particularly compelling or prejudicial.” Hunstein, writing for Thompson and Benham, dissents. “As we have recognized, evidence of an independent act committed by the accused is ‘highly and inherently prejudicial’ because it raises ‘an inference that an accused who acted in a certain manner on one occasion is likely to have acted in the same or in a similar manner on another occasion.’ Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641(2)(a), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).” “Under the majority's analysis, I question when an error for failure to comply with Rule 31 would ever not be harmless.” Hanes v. State, 294 Ga. 521, 755 S.E.2d 151 (February 24, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; prior incident involving possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was properly admitted as similar transaction to the current charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant received timely notice of State’s intent to introduce similar transaction evidence under first indictment, but then that indictment was dismissed and new indictment issued to correct errors. Held, new notice and hearing weren’t required under the second indictment where given under the first. Felder v. State, 286 Ga.App. 271, 648 S.E.2d 753 (July 3, 2007). Notice of similar transaction was sufficient where, during hearing on one similar, “the State notified Felder’s counsel that it intended to present evidence that, within two days of the offense at issue in this case, Felder” committed another similar offense (jailer taking bribes to provide contraband to jail inmates). Unclear whether State ever gave written notice of the second similar transaction, or whether the notice was only given verbally. “Under the circumstances, Felder has not shown that the State failed to give timely notice of the similar transactions or that, even if it did, he was prejudiced by the delayed notice. Therefore, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Bryant v. State, 226 Ga.App. at 138(3), 486 S.E.2d 374(a); see Quinn v. State, 221 Ga.App. 399, 403(4), 471 S.E.2d 337 (1996) (court did not abuse its discretion in allowing similar transaction evidence, even though the State did not give notice until after the trial began).” Caraway v. State, 286 Ga.App. 592, 649 S.E.2d 758 (July 2, 2007). At defendant’s DUI trial, trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence of other recent DUIs – one just three days earlier – which prosecutor only learned of the day before trial. “While the state did not give 10-days notice as required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1, that rule authorizes the trial judge to shorten the time required for giving notice of a similar transaction. Quinn v. State, 221 Ga.App. 399, 403(4) (471 S.E.2d 337) (1996). ‘The trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard is particularly appropriate where the State cannot give notice of its intention to introduce evidence ten days prior to trial