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because it is not aware of the existence of such evidence at that time.” (Citations omitted.) Id. It is undisputed that the state did not learn of the existence of Caraway’s two recent DUI arrests – one of which had occurred just three days earlier – until the day prior to trial. The state immediately contacted Caraway’s attorney and gave notice of its intent to use that similar transaction evidence at trial. At the similar transaction hearing the following day, Caraway had the opportunity to challenge the admissibility of such evidence, and his counsel declined offers by the court to continue the case so he could fully investigate the charges. The two witnesses for those similar transactions did not testify at trial until the following day, and Caraway’s counsel fully cross-examined them. Under the circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in shortening the time for the similar transaction notice . See Chemielowiec v. State, 250 Ga.App. 66, 67(2) (550 S.E.2d 120) (2001).” Rudisail v. State, 265 Ga.App. 293, 593 S.E.2d 747 (January 26, 2004). Absent harm to defendant, no abuse of discretion shown where trial court shortened time for notice of similar transactions from 10 to eight days. Defense counsel “admitted at the hearing that he had actual notice of the allegations months before trial,” and effectively cross-examined the witness about the allegations. Accord, Habersham v. State , 289 Ga.App. 718, 658 S.E.2d 253 (February 22, 2008) (eight days’ notice sufficient where principal witnesses were available to be interviewed by counsel). Woodward v. State, 262 Ga.App. 363, 585 S.E.2d 687 (July 15, 2003). Trial court did not err in allowing similar transaction evidence where notice was filed immediately before trial: “[T]he victim’s name was on the witness list and the prosecutor had discussed this evidence and put counsel on notice several months before trial of the State’s intent to introduce this evidence.” Defense counsel acknowledged he knew about the similar transaction before the State did, and had discussed it with prosecutor, but assumed it wasn’t going to be introduced since no notice had been filed. Court determined there was no surprise and allowed defense counsel, on state’s offer, to review state’s file overnight before trial. Distinguished from Story v. State , 196 Ga.App. 590, 396 S.E.2d 547 (1990), where counsel was able to review state’s file, but never specifically told similar transaction might be introduced. Accord, Perry v. State , 314 Ga.App. 575, 724 S.E.2d 874 (March 5, 2012) (no abuse of discretion in allowing similar transaction evidence where notice filed four days before trial, but “the State had notified Perry's counsel of Perry's criminal history and its intent to introduce the similar transactions in aggravation of punishment several months prior to trial.”); Jones (November 5, 2014), above (“Jones' bench trial on the similar transaction occurred only a few months before the current trial and … he had the same trial counsel for both trials.”). Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 508, 570 S.E.2d 292 (September 30, 2002). Admission of evidence of prior convictions without complying with USCR 31.3, where defendant has not put his character into issue, is reversible error even if they are “fairly minor convictions.” “Generally in a criminal trial, proof that the defendant committed a distinct, independent, and separate offense is highly and inherently prejudicial, irrelevant and inadmissible.” Kight v. State, 242 Ga.App. 13, 528 S.E.2d 542 (January 20, 2000). Rape, child molestation, and related convictions affirmed. Court properly admitted evidence that defendant previously molested other victims despite state’s failure to give notice 10 days prior to trial, since “the State found out about the similar transactions while interviewing family members approximately five days before trial. The State immediately notified Kight's attorney, picked him up, and transported him to the witnesses' home. The witnesses were not there, but the State supplied the attorney with the names, phone numbers, and other information about the witnesses. Kight's attorney admitted to the trial court that ‘I have no doubt that he notified me as soon as he knew about it.’” There was apparently no criminal record of the similar transactions. Buice v. State, 239 Ga.App. 52, 520 S.E.2d 258 (June 29, 1999), affirmed on other grounds , 272 Ga. 323, 528 S.E.2d 788 (May 1, 2000). Similar transaction evidence properly admitted despite no notice where relevant to impeach testimony elicited by defendant from his witness on direct examination. At defendant’s trial for molestation of his daughter, defendant presented his wife and another daughter, Michelle, who both “testified on direct examination about Michelle's allegation that Buice had molested her as a child and claimed that the allegations were false. Thus, the trial court did not err in allowing the State to impeach the two with evidence of their prior statements about the molestation. See Chezem v. State, 199 Ga.App. 869, 871(3), 406 S.E.2d 522 (1991).” 17. OBJECTION Anthony v. State, S16A0059, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1290786 (April 4, 2016). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, no objection to other acts evidence was required where “the trial court ruled definitively at a pretrial hearing that evidence of the four acts would be admissible. ‘Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding any evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not