☢ test - Í

(11 th Cir., 2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). See Bradshaw, supra at 658(3), 769 S.E.2d 892.” Dillard v. State, 297 Ga. 756, 778 S.E.2d 184 (October 5, 2015). Malice murder conviction affirmed. Under pre-2013 Evidence Code, similar transaction evidence was properly admitted. “The trial court properly admitted the evidence after finding in each of the transactions that, like the victim in this case, (1) the victims were young African–American women who were either sex workers or had substance abuse problems, or both; (2) the victims were sexually and/or physically abused—often by choking.” “ Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in this case because the sheer number of prior transactions overwhelmed the jury with evidence of appellant’s bad character. We disagree. The mere fact that the State proferred evidence of multiple similar acts did not render them inadmissible. The trial court properly weighed each similar transaction and determined that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Powell v. State, 332 Ga.App. 437, 773 S.E.2d 399 (June 8, 2015). Convictions for family violence battery and related offenses affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence. In the case on trial and the other acts, defendant threatened to kill a family member with a knife she was then holding. Defendant contends that the other acts are so similar as to be more prejudicial than probative. Court of Appeals finds the evidence properly admitted to show intent, especially here, where “Powell told the investigator that she just stood up with the knife in her hand while cutting onions, which would suggest a lack of intent that the State was entitled to rebut.” “Our Supreme Court has quoted with approval cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit holding that a trial court's discretion to exclude evidence of other acts because of undue prejudice ‘is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly since it permits the trial court to exclude concededly probative evidence.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bradshaw [ v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 658, 769 S.E.2d 892 (2015)]. Balancing the prejudicial effect against the probative value ‘lies within the discretion of the [trial] court and calls for a common sense assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic offense, including prosecutorial need, overall similarity between the extrinsic act and the charged offense, as well as temporal remoteness.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bradshaw, 296 Ga. at 657–658(3), 769 S.E.2d 892.” State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 773 S.E.2d 170 (June 1, 2015). Reversing 326 Ga.App. 658, 757 S.E.2d 261 (2014). Under 2013 Evidence Code, Court of Appeals erred by holding that evidence of defendant’s prior DUI wasn’t relevant to show knowledge and intent in defendant’s current DUI prosecution; remanded for determination of prejudicial effect under OCGA § 24-4-403. “Our holding … does not signify that evidence of other acts will be admissible in every criminal prosecution to prove intent and knowledge. We caution that the potential for prejudice caused by the introduction of other acts evidence is great and the often subtle distinctions between the permissible purposes of intent and knowledge and the impermissible purpose of proving character may sometimes be difficult to discern. … [A] trial court must undertake in each case a considered evaluation of the proffered justification for the admission of such evidence and make an independent determination of whether the probative value of the evidence ‘is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’ OCGA § 24–4–403.” For discussion of propriety of intent evidence in DUI prosecutions, see subheading PURPOSE – INTENT/KNOWLEDGE, below. Accord, State v. Brown , 333 Ga.App. 643, 777 S.E.2d 27 (July 30, 2015) (exclusion of other acts evidence vacated and remanded for application of principles outlined in Jones ). Pennington v. State, 323 Ga.App. 92, 746 S.E.2d 768 (July 16, 2013). Physical precedent only. Theft by conversion convictions reversed; admission of evidence of other offenses, whose prosecution was barred by running of statute of limitation, necessitated retrial on those counts not time-barred. Defendant was convicted on 11 of 12 counts of theft by taking and theft by conversion, however, Court of Appeals finds that seven of the convictions were time-barred. “We find that, under the circumstances of this case, the admission of evidence on Counts 3 through 10 was unduly prejudicial to the jury's independent consideration of Pennington's guilt on Counts 1, 2, 11, and 12. [We note that, even if the offenses charged in Counts 3 through 8 and 10 would have been admissible as similar transactions to the remaining counts, Pennington would have been entitled, upon request, for the court to instruct the jury ‘correctly and completely on the admissibility of similar transaction evidence and the specific limited purpose for which it may be considered.’ Sedlak v. State, 275 Ga. 746, 751(2)(e) (571 S.E.2d 721) (2002), relying upon State v. Belt, 269 Ga. 763 (505 S.E.2d 1) (1998). ] ” All of the offenses here involved taking client money held by defendant in his bookkeeping service. “We also find that a reasonable probability exists that the jury's verdict would have been different if the evidence on those counts had not been disclosed to the jury.”