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Newton v. State, 313 Ga.App. 889, 723 S.E.2d 95 (February 3, 2012). Conviction for criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine affirmed; trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence despite defendant’s contentions that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative and unnecessary to prove State’s “very solid” case. “Newton disclaimed any involvement with or knowledge of the methamphetamine laboratory contained in the outbuilding. Accordingly, the State needed the evidence of Newton's prior drug conviction to show his bent of mind and course of conduct with respect to the methamphetamine offense at issue. Moreover, Newton's concession that the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction, even without the jury's consideration of Newton's prior drug conviction, renders it ‘highly probable that its admission did not contribute to the judgment.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Porter [ v. State, 264 Ga.App. 526, 531(4) (591 S.E.2d 436) (2003)]. Thus, no reversible error has been shown. See id. (applying the harmless error test to the alleged erroneous admission of similar transaction evidence).” Parker v. State, 244 Ga.App. 419, 535 S.E.2d 795 (June 12, 2000). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; defendant waived claim that similar transaction evidence was more prejudicial than probative by failing to raise that objection at trial. “The trial court has broad discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if the probative value is outweighed by its tendency to cause undue prejudice, to confuse the issues, to unduly consume time, to mislead the jury, or unfairly surprise the opposing party. Candler v. Byfield, 160 Ga. 732, 739, 129 S.E. 57 (1925); Ludwig v. J.J. Newberry Co., 78 Ga.App. 871, 875(2), 52 S.E.2d 485 (1949) ( Ludwig points out that the mere fact that evidence will harm the case of the opposing side does not show undue prejudice); Frederick v. State, 226 Ga.App. 540, 542, 487 S.E.2d 107 (1997). Moreover, Parker waived any claim that the potential prejudice exceeded the probative value of the evidence because no objection was made on this ground when the evidence was introduced at trial. When this evidence was introduced, the sole objections were to the similarity of the offenses and as to the form of the jury instructions regarding similar transactions evidence. The matter of undue prejudice was not raised to the trial judge and was not passed upon.” Jones v. State , 243 Ga.App. 374, 533 S.E.2d 437 (April 6, 2000). Convictions for cocaine selling and distribution affirmed; no error in admitting similar transaction evidence. “Graham … contends that the trial court erred in admitting the similar transaction evidence without first balancing its probative value against its prejudicial impact. There is no requirement, however, that the trial court conduct an express balancing determination on the record. Byrd v. State, 236 Ga.App. 485, 488(6)(c), 512 S.E.2d 372 (1999). Accordingly, this claim of error lacks merit.” 19. PRIOR ACQUITTAL State v. Oliver, 326 Ga.App. 759, 755 S.E.2d 293 (March 13, 2014). Following defendant’s convictions for rape and related offenses, trial court erroneously granted defendant’s motion for new trial; admission of victim’s testimony, referencing defendant’s prior acquittal on an unrelated offense, was not error. Victim testified that she didn’t report these offenses sooner because defendant told her “about getting by” with similar offenses committed against a prior victim. “A state is collaterally estopped from ‘offer[ing] proof that a defendant committed a specific crime which a jury of that sovereign has concluded that he did not commit.’ Moore v. State, 254 Ga. 674, 675 (333 S.E.2d 605) (1985) (citation omitted); see Culliver v. State, 247 Ga.App. 877, 880(3) (545 S.E.2d 392) (2001) (where prior trial resulted in acquittal of defendant on false imprisonment charge and mistrial on two other charges, on retrial collateral estoppel precluded testimony that defendant had grabbed victim as she tried to get away from him). Nevertheless, ‘there is not a per se rule prohibiting any evidentiary use of an independent offense where an acquittal was obtained; instead, the doctrine of collateral estoppel requires an examination of what facts were in issue and necessarily resolved in the defendant's favor at the first trial.’ Faniel v. State, 291 Ga. 559, 562(2) (731 S.E.2d 750) (2012) (citation omitted). The state, however, did not offer proof that Oliver actually committed the specific crimes against P.M. of which he had been acquitted; it offered proof that Oliver made comments to F.W. that led her to think that he had committed those crimes and gotten away with them, which deterred her from contacting law enforcement when Oliver physically abused her. Whether Oliver actually committed the crimes against P.M. was not dispositive of the issues in this case. Whether F.W. was led to believe Oliver had committed those crimes, on the other hand, was relevant. Accordingly, the fact that the state sought to prove through F.W.'s testimony about the acquittal was not Oliver's guilt of the prior crimes, but F.W.'s belief regarding his guilt. Because the acquittal did not adjudicate the issue of F.W.'s belief, the state was not collaterally estopped from introducing this testimony.” Bell v. State, 311 Ga.App. 289, 715 S.E.2d 684 (July 5, 2011). Rape conviction reversed on other grounds; no error in admitting evidence of another alleged rape for which defendant was acquitted at trial. In the prior incident, defendant claimed sex with the alleged victim was consensual; in this case, defendant denied knowing or raping the victim. “‘[E]vidence of prior criminal misconduct on the part of a defendant which would otherwise be relevant and admissible to prove identity, motive, bent of mind, or course of conduct is rendered inadmissible under the doctrine of