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collateral estoppel where the defendant has been tried and acquitted of the alleged prior offense.’ Banks v. State, 185 Ga.App. 851, 852 (366 S.E.2d 228) (1988) (quoting Moore v. State, 254 Ga. 674, 675 (333 S.E.2d 605) (1985). ‘Although some jurisdictions have adopted a per se rule prohibiting any evidentiary use of independent offenses where an acquittal was obtained, [our courts have] not. Instead, the application of collateral estoppel requires an examination of what facts were in issue and necessarily resolved in the defendant's favor at the first trial.’ (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Salcedo v. State, 258 Ga. 870 (376 S.E.2d 360) (1989). Specifically, ‘it must be determined whether an issue that was in dispute in the previous trial—and resolved in the defendant's favor — is what the state is now trying to establish in this trial, notwithstanding the previous acquittal.’ Id. at 870–871.” Evidence here was introduced to prove identity, which “was not an issue in the 1996 case, as Bell had claimed the act was consensual. Thus, as identity and commission of the act were not at issue in the first trial, the prior transaction evidence was proper and not foreclosed by collateral estoppel, and the evidence of the prior transaction was admissible. See Cartwright v. State, 242 Ga.App. 825, 827(1) (531 S.E.2d 399) (2000).” Accord, Faniel v. State , 291 Ga. 559, 731 S.E.2d 750 (September 10, 2012) (no per se prohibition on admission of similar transaction based on prior acquittal). Cartwright v. State , 242 Ga.App. 825, 531 S.E.2d 399 (March 16, 2000). In defendant’s prosecution for forcible rape and statutory rape, collateral estoppel didn’t bar evidence of similar transaction despite acquittal of that offense. “‘“[T]he application of collateral estoppel requires an examination of what facts were in issue and necessarily resolved in the defendant's favor at the first trial.” [ Moore v. State, 254 Ga. 674, 676, 333 S.E.2d 605 (1985) .] ... [I]t must be determined whether an issue that was in dispute in the previous trial—and resolved in the defendant's favor—is what the state is now trying to establish in this trial, notwithstanding the previous acquittal.’ (Emphasis in original.) Salcedo v. State, 258 Ga. 870, 870–71, 376 S.E.2d 360 (1989); accord Moore v. State, 254 Ga. 674, 333 S.E.2d 605 (1985); Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 361–362(1)(b), 314 S.E.2d 621 (1984).” In prior trial, defense was based on consent; use of evidence here was to establish identity, not lack of consent. The State “asserted that the modus operandi of the prior transaction was so distinctively similar to that in this case that evidence of the prior matter aided in proving Cartwright was the perpetrator of the present offenses. That use of the prior transaction evidence was proper and not foreclosed by collateral estoppel.” Conviction reversed on other grounds. Same rule applies to prior difficulties with same victim, Scott v. State, 243 Ga.App. 383, 532 S.E.2d 141 (March 22, 2000). 20. PURPOSE Walley v. State, 298 Ga.App. 483, 680 S.E.2d 550 (June 23, 2009). At defendant’s trial for aggravated sexual battery and child molestation, trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence. “Georgia cases authorize the use of similar transaction evidence to corroborate a victim's testimony and related argument on this issue during the State's closing argument. See Howse v. State, 273 Ga.App. 252, 255(2) (614 S.E.2d 869) (2005); Rash v. State, 207 Ga.App. 585, 586(3) (428 S.E.2d 799) (1993).” Payne v. State, 285 Ga. 137, 674 S.E.2d 298 (March 9, 2009). Affirming 290 Ga.App. 589, 660 S.E.2d 405 (March 26, 2008). Prior incident involving rape of an adult woman was properly admitted as similar transaction in child molesting trial. “Both victims were females with whom Payne had a personal relationship, as opposed to randomly chosen strangers. Both crimes were committed in the home where Payne was residing or had recently resided, and where he likely felt more comfortable than in public or a less familiar place. Both victims described similar sexual acts, including oral sodomy. Finally, both victims were physically restrained and threatened with physical violence.” Important that the child molestation case on trial involved physical force: “This is not the type of child molestation which depends upon mental manipulation, trickery or cajoling to adduce the child's consent. This was a series of violent acts in which the child victim was restrained, threatened, and physically forced to commit sexual acts. To hold that these cases are too dissimilar to constitute similar transaction evidence based solely on the difference in the victims' ages would ignore our precedent.” Citing with approval Kingsley (July 26, 2004), below. Hunstein, writing for Sears and Carley, dissents, criticizing admission of similar transaction evidence to prove “bent of mind” and “course of conduct.” Accord, Walley v. State , 298 Ga.App. 483, 680 S.E.2d 550 (June 23, 2009). Borders v. State, 285 Ga.App. 337, 646 S.E.2d 319 (May 10, 2007). In defendant’s prosecution for child molestation, evidence that victim had previously seen defendant hit victim’s mother “was admissible to explain the victim’s delay in reporting” the molestation. Mack v. State, 283 Ga.App. 172, 641 S.E.2d 194 (January 4, 2007). Defendant shot his girlfriend after she accused him of cheating on her. At trial, similar transaction evidence was presented to show that previously, defendant had shot at a man who accused him of an illicit relationship with the man’s wife. Held, the trial court properly admitted the similar