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transaction evidence. “ This propensity of Mack to respond to accusations of philandering by shooting at the unarmed accuser made less credible his defense in this case that he accidentally shot his accusing, unarmed girlfriend. See Cotton v. State, 279 Ga. 358, 359(2) (613 S.E.2d 628) (2005). (‘[t]he prior assault evidence showed that, where interference with his relationship with women was concerned, [defendant] had a propensity to initiate a confrontation with an unarmed male victim and then to escalate the argument by drawing and firing a weapon without provocation’); Rittenhouse v. State, 272 Ga. 78, 80(4) (526 S.E.2d 342) (2000) (prior offenses showed defendant would severely attack others over a woman); Ledford v. State, 275 Ga.App. 107, 109 (620 S.E.2d 187) (2005) (‘“[i]t is permissible for the State to introduce a similar crime precisely to show that the accused has a propensity for initiating and continuing unprovoked violent encounters”’). Disproving a defense of accident and showing intent are certainly appropriate purposes for introducing a similar transaction . See Smith v. State, 232 Ga.App. 290, 296(1) (501 S.E.2d 523) (1998).” Ellis v. State, 282 Ga.App. 17, 637 S.E.2d 729 (October 2, 2006). “Ellis contends that the State did not argue that it was introducing the similar transaction evidence to prove identity, and therefore the trial court erred in finding that the transaction was admissible to show modus operandi, which is a term of art for a ‘signature crime’ so unique that the manner of commission speaks to identity. Modus operandi is similar to ‘course of conduct’ – both phrases describe the way the crime was committed, and the State sought to admit the similar transaction for the purpose of showing course of conduct, intent, motive and bent of mind. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 267 Ga. 363, 364(3) (478 S.E.2d 379) (1996). The trial court did not err in ruling that the transaction was admissible to show course of conduct, intent, and modus operandi, and did not err in so charging the jury.” Robertson v. State, 278 Ga.App. 376, 629 S.E.2d 76 (March 23, 2006). State was not required to use similar transaction evidence for all the purposes identified in its original notice. “ It is immaterial … that the State gave notice that it would present the similar transactions for some legitimate purposes it did not subsequently rely upon at trial.” Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 731, 620 S.E.2d 816 (October 11, 2005). In defendant’s prosecution for murder of his former girlfriend, no error in admitting similar transaction testimony of a prior girlfriend who “testified that approximately three years before the murders she had had an extramarital affair with [defendant] and when she attempted to end the relationship [defendant] became obsessive and abusive. [Former girlfriend’s] testimony was properly offered to show intent, motive and bent of mind. See Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640(2)(b) (409 S.E.2d 649) (1991).” “Contrary to [defendant’s] argument, the State was not required to identify a single purpose for which the evidence was offered but correctly offered it for the multiple purposes of proving motive, bent of mind and intent.” Ledford v. State, 275 Ga.App. 107, 620 S.E.2d 187 (August 12, 2005). “We agree with the trial court’s finding that evidence that Ledford had previously used a pocketknife to stab someone in anger, suddenly, unexpectedly, and without provocation, was relevant to whether Ledford intended to threaten or harm the victim when he brandished the knife in the instant case. ‘It is permissible for the State to introduce a similar crime precisely to show that the accused has a propensity for initiating and continuing unprovoked violent encounters. This falls into the category of showing malice, intent, motive, course of conduct, and bent of mind.’ (Footnote omitted.) Hampton v. State, 272 Ga.App. 273, 275(2) (612 S.E.2d 96) (2005).” Robinson v. State, 269 Ga.App. 828, 605 S.E.2d 422 (October 1, 2004). Fact that defendant claimed he was high on cocaine and thought victim consented to sex made it particularly appropriate to admit evidence of prior rapes for purposes of showing bent of mind, “lustful disposition, and to corroborate the victim’s testimony of no consent.” Hopper v. State, 267 Ga.App. 218, 598 S.E.2d 926 (April 30, 2004). Trial court is not required to make an express finding that similar transaction evidence is more probative than prejudicial before admitting the evidence. Based on Farley v. State , 265 Ga. 622, 458 S.E.2d 643 (1995). Accord, Pinson v. State , 266 Ga.App. 254, 596 S.E.2d 734 (March 12, 2004); Owens v. State , 271 Ga.App. 365, 609 S.E.2d 670 (January 21, 2005); Clark v. State , 272 Ga.App. 89, 611 S.E.2d 741 (March 9, 2005) (“A trial court’s finding that ‘other transactions’ evidence is relevant necessarily constitutes an implicit finding that the probative value of that evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact.”) McGuire v. State, 266 Ga.App. 673, 598 S.E.2d 55 (March 30, 2004). Similar transactions were admitted for a proper purpose. Despite defendant’s assertion that intent was not an issue in the case, intent to rape is an essential element of aggravated assault with intent to rape; fact that other evidence also showed the requisite intent, and that “‘the manner in which the assault was committed left little doubt as to his intent,’” does not preclude the State from presenting this