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evidence. White v. State, 265 Ga.App. 302, 596 S.E.2d 9 (December 10, 2003). Although allegation of prior offenses must be made in the accusation to impose recidivist sentencing under OCGA § 16-8-14(b)(1)(C), see Wainwright v. State , 208 Ga.App. 777, 432 S.E.2d 555 (1993), trial court erred by reading these allegations to the jury. “‘[I]t is error for the jury to be made aware of the prior convictions during the guilty/innocence phase of the trial where there is no other legal basis for the consideration thereof,” quoting Favors v. State , 182 Ga.App. 179, 355 S.E.2d 109 (1987). State did not contend prior transactions were admissible as similar transactions in this case. Taylor v. State, 264 Ga.App. 665, 592 S.E.2d 148 (December 1, 2003). Prosecutor was properly allowed to ask similar transaction victim how her life had been affected by defendant’s attack, where defense counsel opened the door by introducing the subject of “why she was reluctant to go through with a trial at the time of the crime and why she was able now to come and testify.” Also, where defendant “opened the door to a discussion of his criminal history” by raising the issue on direct examination, he could neither “complain that prosecutor followed up on cross-examination” nor object to the admission in evidence of indictments relating thereto. De’Mon v. State, 262 Ga.App. 10, 584 S.E.2d 639 (June 26, 2003). State tendered similar transactions evidence for purposes of showing “bent of mind and course of conduct.” Trial court then charged jury it could consider the evidence “to show motive, intent, course of conduct, and bent of mind.” Held, motive and intent are similar concepts to “bent of mind,” and were “permissible bases for using the similar transaction evidence,” notwithstanding that State didn’t enumerate them when seeking admission of the evidence. In any event, defendant failed to request a limiting instruction. Hurst v. State, 258 Ga.App. 664, 574 S.E.2d 876 (December 3, 2002). Defendant took the stand at trial and testified “that he has never been in trouble and never done anything stupid like this previously.” State then presented a witness in rebuttal who testified about a similar prior incident. Held, trial court properly allowed this testimony to impeach defendant’s testimony, even though it incidentally placed defendant’s character in issue. Accord, Dempsey v. State , 265 Ga.App. 175, 593 S.E.2d 362 (January 15, 2004) (certified copies of defendant’s prior convictions for selling cocaine properly admitted to impeach his testimony that he’d never sold drugs). Colbert v. State, 275 Ga. 525, 570 S.E.2d 321 (September 30, 2002). Trial court admitted evidence, not only of defendant’s prior similar offense, but also of the varying and conflicting statements she gave afterward, which were remarkably similar to the ones she gave after the incident at hand. Held, the statements were properly admitted. “Georgia courts have allowed statements made at or after arrest to be used to show the similarity between prior offense and the offense on trial. See, e.g., Felder v. State , 273 Ga. 844(3) (545 S.E.2d 918) (2001) (defendant claimed in both cases that the victim was the aggressor); Guild v. State , 236 Ga.App. 444(2) (512 S.E.2d 343) (1999) (defendant denied in both cases possession of drugs found in his proximity).” Carr v. State, 251 Ga.App. 117, 553 S.E.2d 674 (August 8, 2001). Burglary conviction reversed over judge’s improper charge that the jury could consider similar transaction evidence – evidence that the defendant committed or attempted to commit other burglaries in the past – as proof of his predisposition to commit the crime. Held, it is improper to instruct a jury that they can consider a similar transaction introduced for the forbidden purpose of inferring a defendant’s predisposition or propensity to commit the crime with which he is charged. Jones v. State , 243 Ga.App. 374, 533 S.E.2d 437 (April 6, 2000). Convictions for cocaine selling and distribution affirmed; no error in jury instruction on similar transaction evidence, despite erroneous inclusion of “identity” as one of the purposes of the evidence. “In its general charge, the trial court instructed the jury that the similar transaction evidence was ‘admitted for the limited purpose of showing, if it did show, the defendant's identity, bent of mind or course of conduct as it relates to the criminal charges in this case.’ As Graham notes, his identity was not at issue, because he stipulated that he was one of the men captured in the videotape of the crime. Thus, Graham argues that the limiting instruction was overbroad. But we fail to see how this legally accurate, if overbroad, instruction harmed Graham. See Jones [ v. State, 236 Ga.App. 330, 333-334(2)(b), 511 S.E.2d 883 (1999)] (unnecessary inclusion of phrase ‘state of mind’ in limiting instruction was unlikely to have misled jury and, thus, did not require reversal). The jury was still authorized to consider the similar transaction evidence to establish Graham's course of conduct and bent of mind. We find it highly unlikely that the inclusion of the word ‘identity’ confused the jury. Accordingly, this claim of error presents no basis for reversal.”