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and killed a security guard in 1976 while robbing a vending machine at a meat packing plant. Victim was shot in the back while tied up and lying face down on the floor. Other acts evidence: Brooks and a different accomplice shot a Mississippi state trooper during a traffic stop in 1983. The trooper was shot twice in the back of the head while lying on the ground. Defendant pled guilty to the crime, but claimed that his accomplice fired the shots. The evidence was offered to show “identity, motive and course of conduct.” Course of conduct. “The term ‘course of conduct’ is noticeably absent from the list of purposes set forth in OCGA § 24–4–404(b), and, although by its own terms that list is not exhaustive, our Court of Appeals has correctly observed that the “course of conduct” and “bent-of-mind” exceptions, formerly an integral part of our law of evidence, have been eliminated from the new Evidence Code. McMullen v. State, 316 Ga.App. 684, 692, n. 30, 730 S.E.2d 151 (2012). … It was error for the trial court to admit evidence of the Mississippi murder to show course of conduct.” Paschal v. State, 335 Ga.App. 411, 780 S.E.2d 681 (November 18, 2015). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court erred, but harmless, in admitting evidence of prior armed robbery to show defendant’s “course of conduct.” “We note that Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion that contains a non-exhaustive list of purposes for which other acts may be admitted, other than to prove character. See State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296, 300, 773 S.E.2d 700 (2015). Nevertheless, the General Assembly is presumed to enact all statutes with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. State v. Johnson, 292 Ga. 409, 412, 738 S.E.2d 86 (2013). Since other acts evidence was admissible to show course of conduct under the old Evidence Code and the Legislature omitted course of conduct in enacting OCGA § 24–4–404(b), we ‘discern that the absence of such language was a matter of considered choice.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Gordon v. State, 316 Ga.App. 42, 46(1)(a), 728 S.E.2d 720 (2012). Consequently, we hold that course of conduct is no longer a viable exception with regard to the admissibility of other acts under the new Evidence Code and the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Paschal’s 1989 convictions for that purpose. Nevertheless, we need not reverse Paschal’s convictions, because the trial court’s error in admitting Paschal’s 1989 convictions was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.” Wilson v. State, 293 Ga. 508, 748 S.E.2d 385 (September 9, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; evidence of prior aggravated assault was properly admitted under pre-2013 rules to prove defendant’s course of conduct: “the evidence reflected that both incidents involved the shooting and pistol-whipping of unarmed victims who were targeted for robbery due to their known propensity to carry substantial cash; both incidents took place in the neighborhood in which Wilson was living at the time, and in both instances Wilson fled the scene and later admitted being present but denied being the attacker.” Thompson v. State, 323 Ga.App. 790, 748 S.E.2d 465 (September 4, 2013). Forgery and related convictions affirmed; similar transaction evidence properly admitted under pre-2013 rules. In this 2009 incident, and two 2008 incidents, defendant “was a participant with others in attempts to cash fraudulent payroll checks at small convenience stores. The fraudulent checks were for similar amounts and were purportedly drawn from bank accounts held by Mexican food restaurants. All three occurrences were committed within a 15–month time frame.” Trial court could find this evidence wasn’t more prejudicial than probative. “Thompson's defense was that he was not involved in the forgeries and that the only evidence implicating him to the fraudulent checks was the presumably biased testimony of McDowell and Russell. Therefore, the State's need for extrinsic evidence was relevant to the disputed issue of Thompson's participation in the forgeries. As the trial court noted in its ruling to allow the similar transaction evidence, the prior acts were probative and relevant because they indicated that Thompson participated in a ‘continuing enterprise’ of negotiating fraudulent checks over a relatively short period of time. As the similar transaction evidence shows a course of conduct very similar to the scheme used in this case such that proof of the former tended to prove the latter, there was no error in permitting this testimony. See Grant v. State, 248 Ga.App. 203, 205(2), 546 S.E.2d 339 (2001).” Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 401, 721 S.E.2d 864 (January 23, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; where defendant was charged with murdering youths after having sexual relationships with them, no error in admitting evidence of “sexual misconduct” involving defendant and other young black males. “[E]ven though two of the relationships did not ultimately result in the victim's death, the evidence was properly tendered and admitted, not to show that Appellant committed the crimes charged, but for the appropriate purposes of showing a course of conduct and pattern of behavior. Humphrey v. State, 281 Ga. 596, 598(2) (642 S.E.2d 23) (2007); Hinton v. State, [280 Ga. 811, 818(6) (631 S.E.2d 365) (2006)]; Head v. State, 276 Ga. 131, 135(5) (575 S.E.2d 883) (2003).” Chua v. State, 289 Ga. 220, 710 S.E.2d 540 (May 31, 2011). Felony murder and VGCSA convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence. Defendant physician allowed victim, a young man, to move into his home,