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and supplied him with enough pain killers to cause him to become addicted, ultimately leading to his death by overdose. At trial, two other young men testified that defendant cultivated relationships with them, one of them involving prescriptions for pain killers. “[T]he evidence showed a course of conduct by which Chua would use his position as a physician, and his access to prescription drugs, to facilitate relationships with young men, such as the one cultivated with [victim] Carter, during which Chua acted beyond his role as a physician when writing prescriptions for Carter. The trial court did not err in admitting the evidence.” Phillips v. State, 287 Ga. 560, 697 S.E.2d 818 (July 12, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and related offenses affirmed; similar transaction evidence properly admitted to show course of conduct. “The similar transaction evidence admitted in this case consists of convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault with intent to rape committed in 1988. Phillips argues that a high degree of similarity is necessary to prove modus operandi, such that the crime on trial bears the defendant's ‘criminal signature’ and thereby shows his identity. However, ‘[m]odus operandi is similar to “course of conduct” – both phrases describe the way the crime was committed, and the State sought to admit the similar transaction for the purpose of showing course of conduct’ and other purposes besides identity. Ellis v. State, 282 Ga.App. 17, 25(3)(d) (637 S.E.2d 729) (2006).” 23. PURPOSE – IDENTITY Brooks v. State, S15A1480, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 854929 (March 7, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions reversed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court erred by admitting other acts evidence (of a prior murder committed by defendant) “to prove identity, motive and course of conduct.” Case on trial: Brooks and an accomplice shot and killed a security guard in 1976 while robbing a vending machine at a meat packing plant. Victim was shot in the back while tied up and lying face down on the floor. Other acts evidence: Brooks and a different accomplice shot a Mississippi state trooper during a traffic stop in 1983. The trooper was shot twice in the back of the head while lying on the ground. Defendant pled guilty to the crime, but claimed that his accomplice fired the shots. The evidence was offered to show “identity, motive and course of conduct.” Identity. The other act was insufficiently similar to prove identity. “‘[E]vidence offered to prove identity must satisfy a particularly stringent analysis. When extrinsic offense evidence is introduced to prove identity, the likeness of the offenses is the crucial consideration. The physical similarity must be such that it marks the offenses as the handiwork of the accused. In other words, the evidence must demonstrate a modus operandi. The extrinsic act must be a “signature” crime, and the defendant must have used a modus operandi that is uniquely his. The signature trait requirement is imposed to insure that the government is not relying on an inference based on mere character—that a defendant has a propensity for criminal behavior. Evidence cannot be used to prove identity simply because the defendant has at other times committed the same commonplace variety of criminal act.’ United States v. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1108 (11 th Cir., 2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Following these principles, we conclude that, although the Mississippi murder and the murder of Carter bore some similarities, evidence of the Mississippi murder was not admissible to prove identity because the crimes were not so similar as to mark the murders as the handiwork of appellant. On the contrary, the modus operandi for each murder was relatively commonplace—these were not signature crimes. [Cits.] Moreover, under our new Evidence Code we are charged to consider the dissimilarities as well as similarities in determining whether other acts evidence is admissible to show identity. See United States v. Lail, 846 F.2d 1299, 1301 (11 th Cir., 1988). [FN10: This is a major difference from the old law in which we focused on the similarities, not the dissimilarities between the charged and uncharged acts. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 22, 24, 709 S.E.2d 217 (2011) (‘In assessing the admissibility of similar transaction evidence, the proper focus is on the similarities, not the differences, between the separate act and the crimes in question.’) ] In this regard, we note the murders in this case were committed seven years and hundreds of miles apart. One victim was bound before he was forced to lie down and shot seven times; the other victim was not bound and only shot twice. One murder stemmed from an attempted theft; the other came on the heels of a prison break. In sum, the dissimilarities are stark and militate against the supposition that the murders were committed by the same person.” Brannon v. State, S15A1724, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 867555 (March 7, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted other acts evidence. “Here, both crimes, which occurred 13 days apart in neighboring counties, involved the same two defendants stealing a car with distinctive tire rims after shooting the vehicle’s owner. In each case, appellant used one of his mother’s cars to drive Rounsoville to the scene of the crime, waited while Rounsoville shot the car’s owner and took the vehicle, and then followed Rounsoville as he drove the stolen car from the scene. We find that the modus operandi for each carjacking was sufficiently similar to mark the offenses as appellant’s handiwork.” “ By presenting an alibi defense at trial, appellant made identity a pivotal consideration for the jury to resolve.”