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Watford v. State, 332 Ga.App. 499, 773 S.E.2d 452 (June 15, 2015). Convictions for forgery, false statements, and related offenses affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly admitted evidence of other acts to prove identity. 1. Relevance. “When evidence of other crimes or wrongs ‘is introduced to prove identity, the likeness of the offenses is the crucial consideration. The physical similarity must be such that it marks the offenses as the handiwork of the accused. In other words, the evidence must demonstrate a modus operandi. The extrinsic act must be a signature crime, and the defendant must have used a modus operandi that is uniquely his.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) U.S. v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206, 1217 (11 th Cir., 2013); see also Harper v. State, 330 Ga.App. 561, 566(2)(b) (768 S.E.2d 755) (2015). While there are some differences between the January 2012 and May 2013 stops, they are similar in that both stops occurred in the Atlanta area but the driver, who did not have a license, claimed to have a license from the jurisdictions of Washington D.C. or Maryland. Watford has connections with the Washington D.C./Maryland area, as shown by testimony that Watford and Hayes met in Washington D.C. and that Watford's mother lived in Maryland. In both instances, the driver provided information that was partially accurate. In the January 2012 stop, the driver mispelled Hayes' first name by one letter. In the second stop, Watford provided a phone number that was accurate except for one digit. With respect to the January 2012 stop, the State sought to prove that Watford used the name of a close friend; in the second stop, Watford provided a name apparently connected with his family. The registration information the Atlanta officer obtained for the red Mercedes showed that the vehicle was registered to two Maryland owners, one of whom was Lenora McKenzie Watford. Based on Martin's testimony that Watford's mother lived in Maryland and that his mother gave him a red Mercedes, the jury could infer that the Lenora McKenzie Watford is Watford's mother and that Watford drew on a family name when he identified himself as Stephen McKenzie. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court was authorized to conclude that other crimes/wrongs evidence was relevant to the issue of Watford's identity.” 2. Probative value. The evidence was of particular value given that Watford’s entire defense at trial and on appeal challenged the State’s proof that he was the perpetrator of the offenses. Amey v. State, 331 Ga.App. 244, 770 S.E.2d 321 (March 18, 2015). Armed robbery and related convictions reversed; trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior armed robbery as similar transaction under 2013 Evidence Code. Evidence was offered to prove identity, motive and opportunity. Identity. “‘A much greater degree of similarity between the charged crime and the uncharged crime is required when the evidence of the other crime is introduced to prove identity than when it is introduced to prove a state of mind. Much more is demanded than the mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class, such as repeated murders, robberies, or rapes.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harper v. State, 330 Ga.App. 561(2)(b), 768 S.E.2d 755 (January 28, 2015). The inference of identity flowing from the other crime ‘must be extremely strong’ and ‘bear such peculiar, unique, or bizarre similarities as to mark them as the handiwork of the same individual.’ (Citation and footnote omitted.) United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1045–1046 (5 th Cir., 1977).[fn] See also Usher v. State, 290 Ga.App. 710, 712(1) (659 S.E.2d 920) (2008) (physical precedent only) (‘the prior bad act and the charged offense must be “so nearly identical in method as to earmark both the prior bad act and the charged offense as the handiwork of the accused”’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.)). In this case, the State failed to prove that Amey's prior attempted robbery was so similar to the charged offense that the charged offense must have been his handiwork. Robbery of a woman alone at night after she has parked her car ‘is not in the nature of a signature so as to be proof of the perpetrator's identity.’ Jones v. State, 236 Ga.App. 330, 333(1)(c) (511 S.E.2d 883) (1999) (prior guilty pleas to armed robbery not probative of identity in subsequent robbery).” Duprel v. State, 301 Ga.App. 469, 687 S.E.2d 863 (November 19, 2009). At defendant’s DUI trial, similar transaction evidence sufficiently identified defendant as perpetrator of the prior DUI where the officer “testified that he remembered Duprel's name from his report but never identified him at trial. However, the record shows that [Officer] Maguire testified that he arrested John Michael Dubrel (sic) and that the state introduced into evidence the citation from the prior offense, which contained the same driver's license number for Duprel as was listed on the Intoxilyzer test slip that was introduced into evidence in the instant case. In light of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court's finding that the state presented sufficient evidence that Duprel committed the independent offense was not clearly erroneous. See Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 643(2)(d) (409 S.E.2d 649) (1991) (introduction of certified copy of conviction sufficient to establish the accused committed the independent act).” Fuller v. State, 295 Ga.App. 439, 672 S.E.2d 438 (January 6, 2009). “[S]imilar transaction evidence is highly relevant when a criminal defendant presents an alibi defense because the evidence helps to prove the identity of the perpetrator. See Griggs v. State, 251 Ga.App. 430, 431-432(1) (554 S.E.2d 569) (2001).” Accord, Tatum v. State , 297 Ga.App. 550, 677 S.E.2d 740 (April 17, 2009). Biggs v. State, 281 Ga. 627, 642 S.E.2d 74 (February 26, 2007). “‘When similar transaction evidence is admitted for