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[identity, state of mind, common design and scheme, course of conduct, motive, and intent], a lesser degree of similarity is required than when such evidence is introduced to prove [only] identity. [Cits.]’ Smith v. State, 273 Ga. 356, 357(2) (541 S.E.2d 362) (2001).” Accord, Barnes v. State , 287 Ga. 423, 696 S.E.2d 629 (June 28, 2010); Brinson v. State , 289 Ga. 150, 709 S.E.2d 789 (April 26, 2011) (lesser degree of similarity required to show bent of mind than identity); Neal v. State , 290 Ga. 563, 722 S.E.2d 765 (February 27, 2012). Lampkin v. State, 277 Ga.App. 237, 626 S.E.2d 199 (January 17, 2006). Defendant was accused of aggravated assault and armed robbery against victim at an ATM. Victim could not identify defendant. Evidence was presented showing that, immediately before the robbery of victim, someone tried to use a stolen ATM card at that location; and that defendant had stolen the ATM card, and raped its owner, earlier that morning in a neighboring county. Held, the evidence was properly admissible to prove identity in the pending case. “See Hefner v. State, 224 Ga.App. 612, 613-614(2) (481 S.E.2d 599) (1997) (‘Absolute proof is not required that a defendant committed the offense in a similar transaction. What is required is that there be evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator of the independent crime.’ (punctuation omitted)).” Tubbs v. State, 263 Ga.App. 270, 587 S.E.2d 329 (September 18, 2003). “While a greater degree of similarity is required when the similar transaction is introduced to show identity, where it is also introduced to show other elements of the crime, including course of conduct and bent of mind, the greater standard is not required.” Jones v. State , 243 Ga.App. 374, 533 S.E.2d 437 (April 6, 2000). Convictions for cocaine selling and distribution affirmed; no error in jury instruction on similar transaction evidence, despite erroneous inclusion of “identity” as one of the purposes of the evidence. “In its general charge, the trial court instructed the jury that the similar transaction evidence was ‘admitted for the limited purpose of showing, if it did show, the defendant's identity, bent of mind or course of conduct as it relates to the criminal charges in this case.’ As Graham notes, his identity was not at issue, because he stipulated that he was one of the men captured in the videotape of the crime. Thus, Graham argues that the limiting instruction was overbroad. But we fail to see how this legally accurate, if overbroad, instruction harmed Graham. See Jones [ v. State, 236 Ga.App. 330, 333-334(2)(b), 511 S.E.2d 883 (1999)] (unnecessary inclusion of phrase ‘state of mind’ in limiting instruction was unlikely to have misled jury and, thus, did not require reversal). The jury was still authorized to consider the similar transaction evidence to establish Graham's course of conduct and bent of mind. We find it highly unlikely that the inclusion of the word ‘identity’ confused the jury. Accordingly, this claim of error presents no basis for reversal.” Jones v. State, 236 Ga.App. 330, 511 S.E.2d 883 (February 9, 1999). Trial court erred in admitting defendant’s “long list of armed robbery convictions” to show identity in this armed robbery prosecution. “‘ A much greater degree of similarity between the charged crime and the uncharged crime is required when the evidence of the other crime is introduced to prove identity than when it is introduced to prove a state of mind. Much more is demanded than the mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class, such as repeated murders, robberies or rapes. The pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cole v. State, 216 Ga.App. 68, 69(1), 70, 453 S.E.2d 495 (1994). The State failed to prove that defendant’s repeated guilty pleas to armed robbery offered characteristics so unusual and nearly identical in method as to earmark this offense as the handiwork of any particular person. Robbing a convenience store at gunpoint is not in the nature of a signature so as to be proof of the perpetrator’s identity. Id.” Harmless error, however, inasmuch as defendant admitted he committed the act on trial. Accord, Usher v. State , 290 Ga.App. 710, 659 S.E.2d 920 (April 2, 2008) (physical precedent only) (error to admit prior burglaries of homes where victims weren’t home, in defendant’s trial for burglary, attempted rape, and theft by taking); Amey v. State , 331 Ga.App. 244, 770 S.E.2d 321 (March 18, 2015) (armed robbery; quoting bold language above as still true under 2013 Evidence Code). 24. PURPOSE – IMPEACHMENT See WITNESSES – IMPEACHMENT – PRIOR MISCONDUCT – REBUTTING DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY, below 25. PURPOSE – INTENT/KNOWLEDGE New case! Olds v. State, S15G1610, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 2946361 (May 23, 2016). Vacating and remanding 332 Ga.App. 612, 774 S.E.2d 186 (2015) for reconsideration of admission of other acts evidence in defendant’s prosecution for false imprisonment and battery. Charges here stemmed from defendant’s assault of his former girlfriend; other acts evidence came from prior assaulted girlfriends. Court of Appeals upheld trial court’s admission of the evidence to show intent, but Supreme Court remands for reconsideration in light of their commentary on Bradshaw (March 27, 2015), below. “Although Bradshaw correctly identified the general requirements for the admission of