☢ test - Í

evidence of other acts, we now acknowledge that our application of those requirements in Bradshaw may have caused some confusion” because Bradshaw relied heavily on United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1345 (11 th Cir., 2007) and its line of conspiracy cases, which “frequently present especially difficult problems of proof for the prosecution with respect to intent.” “By our reliance on Edouard, … we inadvertently may have intimated too much about the probative value of such evidence when offered to prove intent. We cited Edouard for the propositions, among others, that a plea of not guilty ‘imposes a substantial burden on the government to prove intent’ and that the prosecution ordinarily ‘ may prove [intent] by qualifying Rule 404(b) evidence absent affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent as an issue.’ Bradshaw, 296 Ga. at 656–657(3), 769 S.E.2d 892 (quoting Edouard ) (emphasis supplied). Read in isolation, the statements from Edouard that we quoted in Bradshaw reasonably could be understood to suggest that the burden of proving intent always and inevitably is an especially difficult burden for the prosecution and that evidence of other acts that tend in any way to prove intent ordinarily will be admissible for that purpose. … The notion that the prosecution inevitably has an especially difficult burden to prove intent, and the suggestion that any relevant evidence of other acts ordinarily should be admitted for the purpose of proving intent (unless intent is affirmatively taken out of the case), do not necessarily hold in other contexts.” Thus, Bradshaw may have overstated the probative value (though not the relevance) of intent evidence in non-conspiracy cases such as this one, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in that light. New case! Hood v. State, S16A0064, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 2946398 (May 23, 2016). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. Under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court erred, but harmless, in allowing other acts evidence. Defendant was charged with murder and drug possession with intent to distribute. Trial court allowed State to present witnesses who testified that defendant had sold them drugs on other, unrelated occasions, to show defendant’s intent to sell drugs. Defendant offered to stipulate that he committed the drug offense, but State insisted on presenting the evidence. 1. “ Again following the Eleventh Circuit’s lead, Georgia courts evaluate the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence using a three-part test that requires the party offering the evidence to show that ‘(1) the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case other than the defendant’s character, (2) the probative value is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice, and (3) there is sufficient proof for a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the [other] act,’” quoting Brannon (Marcy 7, 2016), below. “An unaccepted offer to stipulate does not eliminate the relevance of other acts evidence, because it does not ‘lift the Government’s burden of proving’ every element of the crimes charged,” but “the availability of the stipulation diminishes the probative value of the extrinsic evidence. [Cits.] The decrease in probative value was significant here, as Appellant offered to stipulate unconditionally that he committed the entire charged crime of possessing oxycodone with intent to distribute.” The probative value was further diminished as defense counsel conceded the drug charge in both opening statement and closing argument. And “the evidence proving this uncontested point was abundant without the two drug-buyers’ testimony,” including physical evidence and the defendant’s statement to police. “In this way, this case is different from the many cases in which evidence going to the same point as an offered stipulation retains significant probative value because it helps complete the story of the events resulting in the crimes charged. [Cit.] A proposed stipulation to a single element of a crime that the defendant otherwise claims that he did not commit may also be confusing for the jury, which must then figure out which elements of the crime are left to be determined and when and how the limited stipulation applies.” Other acts testimony here “did not complete the picture of what happened on the night Coon died; their testimony expanded the picture to depict Appellant as a frequent and degenerate drug dealer” and “had a tendency to suggest that Appellant should be convicted because he was a seasoned drug dealer, the kind of man who preys on people’s addictions, who repeatedly breaks the law, and who deserves to be punished.” Clearly harmless, however, in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Brannon v. State, S15A1724, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 867555 (March 7, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly admitted other acts evidence. “Here, both crimes, which occurred 13 days apart in neighboring counties, involved the same two defendants stealing a car with distinctive tire rims after shooting the vehicle’s owner. In each case, appellant used one of his mother’s cars to drive Rounsoville to the scene of the crime, waited while Rounsoville shot the car’s owner and took the vehicle, and then followed Rounsoville as he drove the stolen car from the scene. We find that the modus operandi for each carjacking was sufficiently similar to mark the offenses as appellant’s handiwork.” “Where appellant was prosecuted as a party to the murder and did not admit to knowing what Rounsoville did to the victim in the storage bay, the State had the burden to prove appellant and Rounsoville shared a common criminal intent.” Wilson v. State, A15A1848, 336 Ga.App. 60, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 822832 (March 3, 2016). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly admitted other acts evidence to prove