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inference about the presence of an intoxicant is more warranted than it otherwise would be,” and this is true regardless of whether defendant took prior tests or offers excuses for his refusal in the case on trial. Accord, Hammond v. State , 334 Ga.App. 781, 780 S.E.2d 440 (November 20, 2015) (where defendant refused breath test, her two prior DUIs were admitted pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-417); State v. Tittle , 335 Ga.App. 588, 782 S.E.2d 487 (February 5, 2016). 3. “ We have no occasion in this case to decide whether Rule 403 (excluding evidence of other acts that is substantially more prejudicial than probative) applies to evidence that ‘shall be admissible’ under Rule 417.” Powell v. State, 332 Ga.App. 437, 773 S.E.2d 399 (June 8, 2015). Convictions for family violence battery and related offenses affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence. In the case on trial and the other acts, defendant threatened to kill a family member with a knife she was then holding. Defendant contends that the other acts are so similar as to be more prejudicial than probative. Court of Appeals finds the evidence properly admitted to show intent, especially here, where “Powell told the investigator that she just stood up with the knife in her hand while cutting onions, which would suggest a lack of intent that the State was entitled to rebut.” “Our Supreme Court has quoted with approval cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit holding that a trial court's discretion to exclude evidence of other acts because of undue prejudice ‘is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly since it permits the trial court to exclude concededly probative evidence.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bradshaw [ v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 658, 769 S.E.2d 892 (2015)]. Balancing the prejudicial effect against the probative value ‘lies within the discretion of the [trial] court and calls for a common sense assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic offense, including prosecutorial need, overall similarity between the extrinsic act and the charged offense, as well as temporal remoteness.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bradshaw, 296 Ga. at 657–658(3), 769 S.E.2d 892.” State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 773 S.E.2d 170 (June 1, 2015). Reversing 326 Ga.App. 658, 757 S.E.2d 261 (2014). Under 2013 Evidence Code, Court of Appeals erred by holding that evidence of defendant’s prior DUI wasn’t relevant to show knowledge and intent in defendant’s current DUI prosecution. 1. Under the “liberal” relevance standard of new OCGA § 24–4-401, “which deems evidence relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence,’” evidence that defendant intentionally drove while under the influence on a prior occasion was relevant to his intent on this occasion; and contrary to the Court of Appeals’ holding, the fact that DUI is a general intent crime doesn’t make the defendant’s intent irrelevant. “[W]e hold, consistent with the underlying principles of the rule prohibiting other acts evidence offered for an impermissible purpose, that other acts evidence may be relevant under Rule 404(b), without regard to whether the charged crime is one requiring a specific or general intent, when it is offered for the permissible purpose of showing a criminal defendant's intent and knowledge.” “[T]he Court of Appeals' holding in this case failed to give any legal significance to the State's burden of proving as an essential element Jones' general intent to do the prohibited acts. … Intent, therefore, was a material issue in the State's prosecution and because the same state of mind was required for committing the prior act and the charged crimes, i.e., the general intent to drive while under the influence of alcohol, evidence of Jones' prior conviction was relevant under Rule 404(b) to show Jones' intent on this occasion. [FN4: Although Jones suggests evidence of his prior conviction was not relevant because his intent was not placed in issue at trial, a defendant puts his intent in issue when he pleads not guilty unless he takes affirmative steps to withdraw intent as an element to be proved by the State. See Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 901– 902(2) (537 S.E.2d 80) (2000) (essential elements are challenged whenever criminal defendant pleads not guilty to indictment's charges). ] Accord, Wilson (March 3, 2016), above. 2. “[A]lthough the State was not required to prove Jones knew that he was driving less safe or with an illegal blood alcohol level, [FN5 : To the extent the trial court may have erred by admitting evidence of Jones' prior DUI conviction to show that he knew he was driving less safe or with an illegal blood alcohol level, any such error was harmless because this evidence was admissible to show Jones' intent and any indication to the jury that the State had to prove Jones' knowledge would have only added to the State's burden of proof in this case. ] see [ State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 8–9 (734 S.E.2d 50) (2012)], the relevancy of his prior conviction evidence was heightened by his defense in which he vehemently challenged the State's allegation that he was under the influence of alcohol and argued that his physical reactions and poor performance on field tests, behavior which he claims the officer misconstrued as evidence of his being under the influence of alcohol, were attributable to the fact that he had previously suffered a serious head trauma. A genuine issue regarding whether Jones was voluntarily driving while under the influence of alcohol was raised by this defense, making evidence that he had voluntarily driven under the influence of alcohol on a previous occasion all the more relevant because it tended to show that it was more likely that he intentionally did so on this occasion.[fn] … The jury also could infer from Jones' prior conviction his awareness that drinking caused him to be a less safe driver in order to explain why, after being stopped by police, he attempted to mitigate his physical condition by concealing and minimizing the amount of alcohol that he had consumed. The relevancy of evidence of a