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prior state of mind and the introduction of evidence of repetitive conduct to allow a jury to draw logical inferences about a defendant's knowledge and state of mind from such conduct is well-established. [fn] See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771) (1988) (‘extrinsic acts evidence may be critical to the establishment of the truth as to a disputed issue, especially when that issue involves the actor's state of mind and the only means of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing inferences from conduct’); [other cits].” 3. Remanded for consideration of whether the evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative. “Our holding … does not signify that evidence of other acts will be admissible in every criminal prosecution to prove intent and knowledge. We caution that the potential for prejudice caused by the introduction of other acts evidence is great and the often subtle distinctions between the permissible purposes of intent and knowledge and the impermissible purpose of proving character may sometimes be difficult to discern. … [A] trial court must undertake in each case a considered evaluation of the proffered justification for the admission of such evidence and make an independent determination of whether the probative value of the evidence ‘is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’ OCGA § 24–4–403.” Accord, State v. Brown , 333 Ga.App. 643, 777 S.E.2d 27 (July 30, 2015) (exclusion of other acts evidence vacated and remanded for application of principles outlined in Jones ). Ashley v. State, 331 Ga.App. 794, 771 S.E.2d 462 (March 30, 2015). Kidnapping and related convictions reversed; under pre-2013 Evidence Code, trial court erred by admitting improper character evidence as similar transactions. Defendant was convicted for attempting to abduct two small children from their family van; to show intent, State offered, and trial court allowed, evidence that “Ashley had engaged in questionable conduct around children at the mobile home park swimming pool. There was evidence that Ashley squirted a young boy with a water gun so hard that he made the boy cry. There was evidence that he looked at young girls in a manner that made one girl's mother uncomfortable and gave another onlooker a ‘very bad vibe.’ Finally, there was evidence that Ashley often picked at and teased children in his family, making them cry. One of the children he picked at was his ten-year-old niece, whom he would flick with his finger on the back of the head or ribcage, even though she strongly disliked this behavior. The niece testified to a specific incident at the pool where Ashley flicked her on her side and she threatened to hit him.” “The trial court admitted the similar transaction evidence in this case for the sole purpose of showing Ashley's criminal intent. The evidence, however, was not relevant to show that purpose. The state has not argued that Ashley's behavior in the earlier incidents was criminal. While a similar transaction need not be a crime, see Chua [ v. State, 289 Ga. 220, 232(2), 710 S.E.2d 540 (2011)], the fact that a person engaged in a non-criminal behavior does not evince criminal intent. The state sought to use acts in which Ashley lacked criminal intent to prove that he had criminal intent in another instance. Our Supreme Court has held that, ‘[w]here the extrinsic offense is offered to prove intent, its relevance is determined by comparing the defendant's state of mind in perpetrating both the extrinsic and charged offenses.’ Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650(3), 769 S.E.2d 892 (March 2, 2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). … This case, in contrast, involves instances where Ashley had different mental states—lacking criminal intent on the one hand and allegedly possessing criminal intent on the other hand.” Majority finds that the evidence in this case sheds no light on criminal intent, but “merely raised an inference about Ashley's character—that he is a person who engages in annoying and disturbing behavior around children.” Ray, writing for Boggs and Branch, dissents, arguing that Georgia’s pre-2013 Code didn’t require “that the extrinsic offense ‘requires the same intent as the charged offense.’” Cert. granted on this issue, case no. S15G1207, September 8, 2015. Logan-Goodlaw v. State, 331 Ga.App. 671, 770 S.E.2d 899 (March 27, 2015). Physical precedent only. Armed robbery conviction affirmed; no error in admitting independent crimes evidence under 2013 Evidence Code. Given defendant’s contention that he was merely present at the crime on trial, his participation in a similar crime was properly admitted to show intent. “Logan–Goodlaw's defense theory, that he was present during the underlying armed robbery, but had not participated in robbing the victim ‘squarely challenges the element of intent,’” quoting Curry (February 5, 2015), below. Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 769 S.E.2d 892 (March 2, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, evidence of prior murder was properly admitted as a similar transaction to prove intent and motive. Defendant thought both murder victims had tried to cheat him in drug deals. 1. Intent is made an issue by entry of a not guilty plea. Accord, State v. Jones , 297 Ga. 156, 773 S.E.2d 170 (June 1, 2015); Silvey v. State , 335 Ga.App. 383, 780 S.E.2d 708 (November 20, 2015). See Olds (May 23, 2016), above. 2. Motive. “Motive has been defined as ‘“the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent.”’ United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 912 n. 15 (5 th Cir., 1978) (citation omitted). In this case, the evidence of the Ohio murder was relevant to motive because it demonstrated appellant's willingness to use violence when he or someone close to him is cheated in a drug deal. See