☢ test - Í

United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 959, 976 (9 th Cir., 2008) (holding that evidence of the defendant's prior stabbing of someone who insulted his gang status was admissible to prove motive under Rule 404(b) in his trial for attempted murder of someone else who also insulted his gang status).” Same quote from Beechum, many cases including Anthony v. State , S16A0059, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1290786 (April 4, 2016). Chynoweth v. State, 331 Ga.App. 123, 768 S.E.2d 536 (February 11, 2015). Convictions for rioting in a penal institution and felony obstruction affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s later attack on fellow inmate to show intent in his assault on an officer. Intent was made an issue by defendant’s notice of intent to raise an insanity defense. “Chynoweth asserts that the defense of insanity ‘never materialized,’ there was evidence presented that he had earlier been prescribed antipsychotic medication, overdosed on methamphetamine, and had been sent to a mental health facility for evaluation. And he requested jury instructions concerning lack of mental capacity and mentally ill, while the trial court gave various instructions on mental illness and insanity. This was sufficient to raise an issue concerning his state of mind, and it created a danger that a jury could have concluded that while he committed the charged act, he did not intend to do so. See [Paul S. Milich, Ga. Rules of Evidence, § 11:13 p. 321 (2014–2015)]. Intent is therefore at issue in this case. [ United States v. Zapata, 139 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11 th Cir., 1998)]. The subsequent act of attacking a cellmate without warning is therefore probative of his criminal intent in the crime charged, and the trial court did not err in allowing it for that purpose. [fn] Id.” Curry v. State, 330 Ga.App. 610, 768 S.E.2d 791 (February 5, 2015). Sex trafficking and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence under 2013 Evidence Code. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, intent was at issue. “[Defendant] argues that his intent was not at issue because his defense strategy was to show that the victims were not credible, not that he did not intend to commit the crimes charged. This argument, however, is belied by the record. Indeed, contrary to Curry's argument, a defendant who enters a not-guilty plea ‘makes intent a material issue which imposes a substantial burden on the government to prove intent, which it may prove by qualifying Rule 404(b) evidence absent affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent as an issue.’ [FN9. [ United States v. Edouard, 485 F3d 1324, 1345 II(C)(1) (11 th Cir., 2007)] (punctuation omitted); accord United States v. Delgado, 56 F3d 1357, 1365(III)(B) (11 th Cir., 1995); see United States v. Cardenas, 895 F.2d 1338, 1342(II)(A) (11 th Cir., 1990) (explaining that ‘when a defendant charged with conspiracy enters a not guilty plea, he makes intent a material issue in the case and imposes a substantial burden on the government’); Johnson v. State, 276 Ga.App. 505, 510(4) (623 S.E.2d 706) (2005) (finding that by pleading guilty, defendant required the State to prove his intent to commit theft, and therefore, similar-transaction evidence was properly admitted).” “In fact, contrary to Curry's contention that his defense strategy was not to show that he lacked intent to commit the offenses, his defense counsel argued to the jury that the victims were ‘very close friends’ who took advantage of Curry when he was only trying to help them. Suffice it to say, Curry's position that he intended only to help the victims, but not to commit any criminal offenses, squarely challenges the element of intent.” Accord, Jones (June 1, 2015), above; McCoy v. State , 332 Ga.App. 626, 774 S.E.2d 179 (June 26, 2015) (prior car theft properly used to show intent where “McCoy did not employ any affirmative steps to remove intent as an issue.”). See Olds (May 23, 2016), above. 26. PURPOSE – MOTIVE Brooks v. State, S15A1480, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 854929 (March 7, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions reversed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court erred by admitting other acts evidence (of a prior murder committed by defendant) “to prove identity, motive and course of conduct.” Case on trial: Brooks and an accomplice shot and killed a security guard in 1976 while robbing a vending machine at a meat packing plant. Victim was shot in the back while tied up and lying face down on the floor. Other acts evidence: Brooks and a different accomplice shot a Mississippi state trooper during a traffic stop in 1983. The trooper was shot twice in the back of the head while lying on the ground. Defendant pled guilty to the crime, but claimed that his accomplice fired the shots. The evidence was offered to show “identity, motive and course of conduct.” Motive. “‘ Overall similarity between the charged crime and the extrinsic offense is not required when the offense is introduced to show motive. [Cit.]’ Id. Even so, to be admitted to prove motive, extrinsic evidence must be ‘logically relevant and necessary to prove something other than the accused’s propensity to commit the crime charged.’ Milich, § 11.3 at p. 244. See also Bradshaw, (March 2, 2015), below, at 657 (admissibility of other acts evidence calls for common sense approach, which includes prosecutorial need). To rule otherwise ‘“would make all prior robberies admissible in any robbery case, all prior murders admissible in any murder case, and so on.’” Milich, § 11.13 at p. 318, 769 S.E.2d 892. The other acts evidence in this case does not meet the logically relevant and necessary test. Simply put, evidence of the 1983 murder of a Mississippi state trooper during a prison escape is unrelated and unnecessary to prove why appellant murdered a security guard in the course of a theft seven years earlier.”