☢ test - Í

to distribute. In both cases, Scott was accompanied by two males and intended to use a vehicle to transport the contraband.” Sweet v. State, 237 Ga.App. 613, 516 S.E.2d 317 (April 12, 1999). Prior acts of child molestation committed ten years and approximately 30 years earlier were not too remote to be relevant to defendant’s “bent of mind, lustful disposition, scheme and motive or intent” in his current prosecution for child molestation, citing Snow v. State, 213 Ga.App. 571, 572(2), 445 S.E.2d 353 (1994) (“continuous course of identical conduct over a 27-year period”), Nichols v. State, 221 Ga.App. 600, 601-602(3), 473 S.E.2d 491 (1996) (sexual assaults “24 and 27 years prior to trial”). Accord, Pareja v. State , 286 Ga. 117, 686 S.E.2d 232 (November 2, 2009) (prior child molestation incident, 26 years earlier, was not too remote); Godbey v. State , 241 Ga.App. 529, 526 S.E.2d 415 (December 2, 1999) (Physical precedent only) (in child molestation prosecution, incident 18 years prior not too remote); Vehaun v. State, 244 Ga.App. 136, 534 S.E.2d 873 (May 22, 2000) (prior sex offenses 23-24 years earlier not too remote); Collins v. State , 310 Ga.App. 613, 714 S.E.2d 249 (July 7, 2011) (incident 13 years earlier not too remote); Arbegast v. State , 332 Ga.App. 414, 773 S.E.2d 283 (June 3, 2015) (incidents 11 and 15 years earlier not too remote). Usher v. State, 236 Ga.App. 663, 512 S.E.2d 380 (February 17, 1999). In defendant’s trial for trafficking in and selling cocaine, “[t]he fact that [the similar transaction] sales of cocaine occurred approximately eight years earlier does not render them inadmissible. Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798, 799(1)(b), 410 S.E.2d 423 (1991) (lapses of 11 and 19 years do not demand inadmissibility). This is particularly true when a portion of that time was spent in confinement. Gonzalez v. State, 213 Ga.App. 667, 668(1), 445 S.E.2d 769 (1994).” Accord, Starks v. State , 240 Ga.App. 346, 523 S.E.2d 397 (October 13, 1999) (At defendant’s trial for selling cocaine, prior cocaine sale ten years earlier was not too remote.); Wise v. State , 321 Ga.App. 39, 740 S.E.2d 850 (March 28, 2013) (prior drug offense seven years earlier not too remote). 29. “REVERSE” SIMILAR TRANSACTIONS/VICTIM’S ACTS Burden v. State, 332 Ga.App. 811, 775 S.E.2d 183 (July 7, 2015). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence of victim’s alleged acts of violence against third parties, offered merely by reference to victim’s prior criminal record. “Burden has not met his burden of introducing competent evidence that ‘meet[s] the requirements for admission of [specific] violent acts by the victim against third parties[.]’ Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. See Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 804, 811–813(5)(c), 764 S.E.2d 376 (2014) (no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence where defendant proffered only inadmissible hearsay police reports to prove alleged prior acts of violence by victim).” Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga. 532, 773 S.E.2d 755 (June 15, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, no error in “excluding evidence of a violent robbery committed by [victim] Perkins against a third party, despite the fact that, prior to the murder, Mohamud had no knowledge of the robbery.” Under OCGA § 24–4– 405(a), admissible character evidence is limited to opinion or reputation, not specific acts. Chandler v. State , 261 Ga. 402, 407(3)(c) (405 S.E.2d 669) (1991), which allowed specific acts evidence under the pre-2013 Evidence Code, “does not remain viable under the new evidence code.” “We note that one commentator has suggested the possibility of an exception to this rule which would ‘allow specific acts of evidence of a victim's violent disposition of which the defendant had personal knowledge to show the defendant's state of mind.’ Jack Goger, Daniel's Georgia Handbook on Criminal Evidence § 4:42 (2014 ed.). That issue, however, is not presently before us, and we do not reach it.” Dyal v. State, 297 Ga. 184, 773 S.E.2d 249 (June 1, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; under pre- 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly excluded evidence of alleged prior bad acts by victim against third parties, “finding that Appellant failed to give proper notice under Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1, which requires that a defendant notify the State ten days before trial of his intention to introduce evidence of specific acts of violence by the victim against third parties.[fn] Appellant acknowledges that he failed to provide proper notice, however, and it is well- settled that a trial court has ‘[broad] discretion in deciding whether to vary the time for filing [under Rule 31.1], and its decision will not be upset absent abuse.’ Darden v. State, 271 Ga. 449, 450(2) (519 S.E.2d 921) (1999) (citation omitted). Here, the record shows that the trial court understood that it had the discretion to admit evidence of prior bad acts committed against third parties by Appellant's son, but it declined to do so after finding that Appellant had no reason for his failure to provide the State with proper notice. Moreover, the untimely notice that Appellant provided to the State did not include specific information about the alleged prior bad acts as required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.6(B), but it instead merely informed the State that Appellant intended to introduce ‘evidence of [an unspecified] act of violence by the victim.’”