☢ test - Í

Johnson v. State, 331 Ga.App. 134, 770 S.E.2d 236 (March 12, 2015). Armed robbery convictions affirmed; trial court properly declined to allow defendant to present evidence of his guilty pleas to robbery by intimidation in another county, “in order to create an inference that he did not use a gun in any of the robberies.” Trial court properly reasoned that the guilty pleas didn’t raise such an inference, as other factors may have induced the prosecutor to agree to a reduction in the original armed robbery charge. “Although the trial court stated that it would allow Johnson to testify that he was charged with armed robbery in connection with the first DeKalb County robbery and robbery by intimidation on the second, the court would not allow Johnson to take ‘the next step’ and say that he entered a plea of robbery by intimidation to each crime. … Under the circumstances here, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that evidence of Johnson's plea was not admissible. As the United States Supreme Court has found, ‘[p]lea bargaining flows from “the mutuality of advantage” to defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for wanting to avoid trial.’ (Citation omitted.) Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363(IV) (98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604) (1978). Therefore, the plea bargain struck between Johnson and DeKalb County may have been based on any number of reasons. The reasoning behind the plea does not appear on the face of the document itself, and Johnson would not have been able to testify as to the prosecutor's reasons for accepting his plea,[fn] leaving the jury to speculate why the deal was struck. Thus, evidence regarding Johnson's plea would not have made Johnson's desired inference—that he did not use a gun during the Gwinnett County robbery—any more probable than it would have been without the evidence.” Oliver v. State, 329 Ga.App. 377, 765 S.E.2d 606 (October 29, 2014). Voluntary manslaughter and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence of victim’s alleged propensity for violence absent a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor here. New Evidence Code didn’t change common law requirement of showing that victim was the aggressor before admitting evidence of victim’s reputation for violence or specific bad acts. “[U]nder the new Evidence Code, ‘[e]xcept as modified by statute, the common law as expounded by Georgia courts shall continue to be applied to the admission and exclusion of evidence and to procedures at trial.’ OCGA § 24–1–2(e). In this instance, we find no reason to construe OCGA §§ 24–4–404 and 24–4–405 as a modification of Georgia's long-standing requirement that a defendant must first make a prima facie showing of self-defense before requiring a trial court to determine whether evidence pertaining to the victim's character is admissible. And here, Oliver failed to make a prima facie showing that he acted in self-defense.” Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 804, 764 S.E.2d 376 (October 6, 2014). Murder and firearms convictions affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence that the other party in the gun battle, Richardson, “broke into a car and was arrested as he fled with a stolen CD player and a 9mm gun in his possession” in 1999. Trial court properly ruled that the incident “did not involve an act of violence. … This Court has held that merely possessing a firearm—even an illegal sawed-off shotgun—is not a ‘specific act of violence’ against a third party, without proof of a specific victim. Smith v. State, 270 Ga. 240, 243–244 (510 S.E.2d 1) (1998), overruled on other grounds by O'Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758 (670 S.E.2d 388) (2008). And [co-defendant] McKinney's assertion that the evidence related to the 1999 incident proved that Richardson pointed the gun at a police officer is not supported by that evidence.” Grant v. State, 326 Ga.App. 121, 756 S.E.2d 255 (March 12, 2014). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence of victim’s violent acts toward third parties, as defendant failed to establish that victim was the aggressor. “Here, the initial argument ended before Grant retrieved his gun, returned to the kitchen, and shot the victim. Further, Grant never said he thought that the victim had a knife in his hand, only that he thought the victim had ‘something’ in his hand which could possibly have been a knife. Given the evidence outlined above, the trial court did not clearly err by denying the introduction of the evidence that Grant sought. See Slaughter v. State, 292 Ga. 573, 576(2), 740 S.E.2d 119 (2013).” Smith v. State, 292 Ga. 316, 737 S.E.2d 677 (January 22, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence of victim’s alleged violent acts against third parties, as there was no evidence that victim was the aggressor in the incident at issue. “‘To make a prima facie showing of justification so as to allow evidence of violent acts of the victim against third parties, “the defendant must show that the victim was the aggressor, the victim assaulted the defendant, and the defendant was honestly trying to defend himself.” [Cit.].’ Ludy v. State, 283 Ga. 322(3), 658 S.E.2d 745(2008). See also USCR 31.6. ‘[T]he key showing must be that the victim was the aggressor in the fatal encounter.’ State v. Hodges, 291 Ga. 413, 418, 728 S.E.2d 582 (2012).” Payne v. State, 289 Ga. 691, 715 S.E.2d 104 (September 12, 2011). Malice murder conviction affirmed; USCR 31.1 requirement of notice of intent to introduce evidence of victim’s bad acts against third persons didn’t apply to victim’s threats against defendant. That rule, and Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991), “applies to ‘evidence of