☢ test - Í

Bryant v. State, 283 Ga.App. 295, 641 S.E.2d 277 (January 19, 2007). “Although a defendant can introduce evidence of a victim’s prior acts of violence, he must first make a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, that the victim assaulted him, and that he was honestly seeking to defend himself. In other words, defendant must demonstrate that the prior acts would be relevant to a defense of justification.’ (Citations omitted and punctuation omitted.) Felder v. State, 273 Ga. 844, 846(4) (545 S.E.2d 918) (2001).” Here, however, evidence failed to show that victim was the aggressor – although victim did attack defendant, that fight was broken up and “had been over for at least ten minutes” before defendant came after victim with a gun. Accord, Milner v. State , 281 Ga. 612, 641 S.E.2d 517 (January 22, 2007); Cross v. State , 285 Ga.App. 518, 646 S.E.2d 723 (May 23, 2007); Jones v. State , 304 Ga.App. 21, 695 S.E.2d 359 (May 11, 2010) (victim’s threats against defendant and his family properly excluded where no evidence they were communicated to defendant and no evidence that victim was aggressor). Hill v. State, 271 Ga.App. 431, 609 S.E.2d 654 (January 10, 2005). Trial court did not err in refusing to admit defendant’s “reverse similar transactions” evidence, that “a nearly identical armed robbery occurred at the same location, two weeks earlier, while Hill was in Arkansas.” While defendant correctly points out that “having the name of a specific individual [who committed the other offense] is not a litmus test for allowing evidence of a ‘reverse similar transaction,’” “‘the proffered evidence must also raise a reasonable inference of the defendant’s own innocence,’” quoting Palmer v. State, 274 Ga. 796, 797(3) (560 S.E.2d 11) (2002). “‘Nothing in the proffer that was made by [defendant], however, would indicate that the perpetrator of the subsequent “similar” offense was also the perpetrator of those crimes for which [defendant] was being tried and that [defendant] had been misidentified by the victims. [Cit.] The most that [defendant’s] proffer showed was that, subsequent to the commission of the crimes for which he was to be tried, someone, who bore no close physical resemblance to him, had employed a similar modus operandi in the commission of a crime. Evidence merely that a subsequent “copy cat” crime had been committed by someone else would not cast doubt upon the credibility of the identification of [defendant] that had been made by the victims of those crimes for which [defendant] was being tried. Since the excluded testimony was neither relevant nor material to [defendant’s] guilt or innocence, the trial court did not err in excluding it.’ Burton v. State, 191 Ga.App. 822(2) (383 S.E.2d 187) (1989).” Graham v. State, 274 Ga. 696, 558 S.E.2d 395 (January 14, 2002). Defendant was convicted of the malice murder of the victim. Defendant contended that he acted in self-defense, based on prior acts and threats of the victim towards him and his family. This night, when the defendant was using a pay phone, he saw victim stop his car nearby and approach him. Fearing the victim had a gun, defendant testified that he (defendant) fired at victim twice. Victim reached defendant, they struggled for defendant’s gun, the gun discharged, and victim was killed. At trial, defendant sought to present evidence of victim’s prior violent acts against 1) defendant, and 2) others. Held, evidence of prior difficulties between defendant and victim are admissible as evidence of the relationship between the two and may show the defendant’s motive, intent and bent of mind in committing the act for which he is accused; however, victim's prior acts of violence against third parties are not admissible unless a prima facie case of justification is first made out by showing that in the instant matter, the victim was the aggressor, the victim assaulted the defendant, and the defendant was honestly trying to defend himself. Defendant’s testimony here as outlined above did not establish a prima facie case that victim was the aggressor; thus, trial court properly excluded evidence of victim’s prior acts of violence against others. Accord, Knight v. State , 271 Ga. 557, 521 S.E.2d 819 (October 18, 1999); Robinson v. State , 277 Ga. 75, 586 S.E.2d 313 (September 15, 2003); Sims v. State , 280 Ga. 606, 631 S.E.2d 656 (June 12, 2006). Stobbart v. State, 272 Ga. 608, 533 S.E.2d 379 (July 10, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions reversed; trial court erred by barring evidence of victim’s prior violent acts. “There was evidence showing each of the elements of the prima facie case [showing that victim was the aggressor in the incident with defendant]. It could be concluded that by barring the door, [victim] DeFranks was the aggressor. In fact, it could be inferred he was committing the crime of false imprisonment. See OCGA § 16-5-41(a); Herrin v. State, 229 Ga.App. 260, 263(3), 493 S.E.2d 634 (1997). His acts of threatening Stobbart while placing his hand behind his back and on his pistol could be deemed to be an assault. See OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2); Hall v. State, 189 Ga.App. 107, 108(1), 375 S.E.2d 50 (1988). Finally, on cross-examination, Stobbart testified that when he fired, DeFranks had his hand behind his back. This is evidence from which it could be concluded that Stobbart was honestly trying to defend himself when he shot DeFranks. Justification was Stobbart's sole defense and that defense was largely dependent on what Stobbart knew about DeFranks. Thus, the excluded evidence was highly relevant to his defense, and it cannot be said that the error in refusing the admission of this evidence was harmless. See Barber v. State, 268 Ga. 156, 158(2), 486 S.E.2d 353 (1997).” Green v. State, 240 Ga.App. 650, 523 S.E.2d 632 (October 19, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and damage to property affirmed; no prejudice to defendant where trial court didn’t rule on motion to introduce prior violent acts of victim against third parties until after State rested. “We find no merit in Green's claim that his inability