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to cross-examine the victim about the victim's prior acts of violence during the presentation of the State's case prejudiced his defense. After the trial court ruled that Green could present evidence of the victim's prior acts of violence, Green could have recalled the victim for purposes of cross-examination. See Yebra v. State, 206 Ga.App. 12, 14(2), 424 S.E.2d 318 (1992). Instead of recalling the victim, however, Green and two other defense witnesses testified about two separate incidents in which the victim threatened a third party with a meat cleaver during an altercation and hit a homeless man with a baseball bat because he began eating leftover food in a restaurant where the victim worked.” Darden v. State, 271 Ga. 449, 519 S.E.2d 921 (September 13, 1999). No abuse of discretion where trial judge disallowed part of defendant’s proffered “evidence of the victim's prior acts of violence against third parties under Uniform Superior Court Rule (‘USCR’) 31.1.” Defendant gave State notice of the proffer just two days before trial, while the Rule requires at least 10 days’ notice. “After hearing argument, the court applied the standard of Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402(3), 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991), and its progeny, and allowed Darden to introduce evidence of certain alleged acts of violence where the State was not unfairly disadvantaged by the lack of advance notice. As to other alleged incidents, the court disallowed the evidence when the State asserted that it had no ability to rebut the evidence in time for trial. It was also established that Darden delayed notifying the State of these alleged prior acts of violence despite knowing of the existence of the witnesses to such acts for several months prior to trial. Thus, he could have made a timely partial disclosure of this information, which would have been in substantial compliance with USCR 31.6. [fn] See Johnson v. State, 229 Ga.App. 586, 590, 494 S.E.2d 382 (1997) (substantial compliance with USCR 31.6 is sufficient). Compare Miller v. State, 263 Ga. 723, 724, 438 S.E.2d 81 (1994) (notice of intent which lacks any information required by USCR 31.6 is insufficient).” 30. SELF-INCRIMINATION Whitman v. State, 316 Ga.App. 655, 729 S.E.2d 409 (June 1, 2012). Theft by receiving conviction affirmed; admission of similar transaction evidence “of a similar pending theft charge” didn’t “deprive[ defendant] of his constitutional right to testify at the trial in this case by endangering his right to remain silent with regard to the similar transaction.” “Whitman argues that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence because he contends that it presented him with an untenable choice: he could either assert his Sixth Amendment right [fn] to testify in his own defense in this case, thus endangering his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in connection with the pending charge in the similar transaction, or he could waive his right to testify in this case in order to preserve his Fifth Amendment rights in the other matter. In other words, Whitman is challenging, ‘the improper impact that the admission of a similar transaction from a pending case had on his Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights at a jury trial under the U.S. Constitution.’ (Emphasis supplied.)” Because the similar transaction was wholly collateral to the offense on trial, however, defendant could have testified as to the offense on trial while asserting his privilege against self-incrimination as to the similar transaction. “In Georgia, ‘[a] party, though introduced as a witness in his own behalf, may, upon cross-examination as to matters not voluntarily testified about on his direct examination, decline to give testimony which would tend to criminate him....’ (Citations omitted.) Bishop v. Bishop, 157 Ga. 408(1) (121 SE 305) (1924). See also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI; OCGA § 24–9–27(a). [fn] A witness, therefore, may assert a privilege against self-incrimination with respect to matters that ‘were wholly collateral to and unrelated to her testimony in chief, and w[ere] with respect to separate transactions, in no way shown by her testimony to be connected with the crime with which the defendant here was charged.’ Smith v. State, 225 Ga. 328, 331(7) (168 S.E.2d 587) (1969) (holding that trial court need not strike entirety of prosecution witness's testimony where witness asserted privilege as to collateral matter), cert. denied, Smith v. Georgia, 396 U.S. 1045 (90 S.Ct. 695, 24 L.Ed.2d 689), rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 970 (90 S.Ct. 1000, 25 L.Ed.2d 264) (1970).” 31. SIMILARITY OF OFFENSES -- ARSON/PROPERTY DAMAGE Scruggs v. State, 295 Ga. 840, 764 S.E.2d 413 (October 6, 2014). Murder and related convictions affirmed. In prosecution for burning girlfriend to death and torching her apartment building, evidence that defendant had previously attempted to burn down his sister’s house was properly admitted as a similar transaction under pre-2013 Evidence Code. In both incidents, “the victims were women with whom appellant had a close relationship; in both cases, appellant acted out of anger; and the choice of a unique weapon, a Molotov cocktail, was the same.” Cherry v. State, 299 Ga.App. 194, 682 S.E.2d 150 (July 15, 2009). At defendant’s trial for arson, trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence: “Each of Cherry's prior acts of property damage, like the arson, occurred after Cherry's anger was provoked either by the behavior of an ex-boyfriend or by an argument with or about an ex-boyfriend. In each prior incident, Cherry expressed her anger and frustration just as she did here, by destroying property belonging to someone with whom her former boyfriend had a close relationship. The prior incidents ‘were sufficiently similar [to the crime charged] to show [Cherry's] course of conduct or bent of mind to react violently when upset with [men] with whom