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court properly admitted similar transaction evidence. “In both of the incidents at issue, appellants were traveling together on interstates in southern states, and were driving in vehicles (1) registered in Massachusetts, (2) with dark-tinted windows, (3) with a single key in the ignition, (4) containing religious insignia throughout, and (5) containing special compartments hiding shrink-wrapped items. Moreover, the North Carolina traffic stop occurred as appellants were heading southbound on an interstate merging into Interstate 85—a major drug thoroughfare—with a sum of hidden cash (nearly $200,000) large enough to purchase a significant quantity of narcotics. And during the stop at issue, appellants were headed northbound on Interstate 85 with a significant quantity of hidden narcotics valued at approximately $125,000. And since one of the main issues presented in the case sub judice is whether appellants knew that the drugs were hidden in their vehicle, we have little trouble concluding that the North Carolina incident was sufficiently similar to the current crime such ‘that proof of the former tends to prove the latter,’ and the trial court's ruling in that regard is not clearly erroneous. [fn] Finally, we flatly reject Betancourt's contention that the State's failure to prove that the North Carolina K9 alerted specifically to the recent presence of cocaine, as opposed to some other kind of narcotic, rendered it impossible to prove the requisite degree of similarity.” Affirmed on other grounds, sub nom. Hernandez v. State , 294 Ga. 903, 757 S.E.2d 109 (March 28, 2014). Davis v. State, 318 Ga.App. 166, 733 S.E.2d 453 (October 23, 2012). Conviction for felony marijuana possession affirmed; prior convictions for manufacturing marijuana were sufficiently similar to admit as similar transactions for purposes of showing bent of mind or intent. “[W]hen, as here, the State is entering similar transaction evidence to prove bent of mind or intent, ‘it requires a lesser degree of similarity to meet the test of admissibility than when such evidence is being introduced to prove identity. Similar transaction evidence can be introduced to prove bent of mind when there exists some logical connection between the similar transaction evidence and the charged offense so that the similar transaction evidence tends to establish the charged offense.’ (Citations omitted.) Fields v. State, 223 Ga.App. 569, 571(2) (479 S.E.2d 393) (1996). Here, there was such a logical connection, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the offenses were sufficiently similar. [fn] One of the prior manufacturing charge and the current possession charge both involved possession of marijuana in a plastic bag kept in Davis' car, as well as a large amount of money found on Davis' person. The other prior manufacturing charge also involved a large amount of ‘bagged up’ marijuana. ‘While there are differences between the ... offenses, the proper focus is on the similarities, not the differences, between them.’ [Cit.]” Accord, Stover v. State , 322 Ga.App. 142, 744 S.E.2d 119 (June 6, 2013) (prior drug offenses properly admitted despite differences in location, concealment, quantity, etc.). McMullen v. State, 316 Ga.App. 684, 730 S.E.2d 151 (July 9, 2012). Convictions for vehicular homicide reversed; trial court erred in admitting, as similar transaction, evidence of defendant’s prior conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. “Other than the fact that both crimes involved methamphetamine, there are virtually no similarities between the two crimes. … Here, we can discern no relevance that a ten-plus year old conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute would have to the determination of whether McMullen was under the influence of a combination of drugs to the extent that it rendered her a less safe driver during the accident at issue. See King v. State, 230 Ga.App. 301, 302–03(1) (496 S.E.2d 312) (1998) (holding that proof that a defendant possessed drugs on one occasion does not tend to prove that he was under the influence of drugs on a different, unrelated occasion). The only arguably relevant information to be gleaned from the prior offense—and it comes from the circumstances surrounding the incident and not the conviction itself—is that McMullen may have a propensity to ingest methamphetamine, because it appears that she had done so on a prior (albeit remote) occasion. [fn] But in the absence of any similarity or logical connection between the two crimes, this is exactly the type of inadmissible character evidence that the safeguards set forth supra are designed to protect against.” Cox v. State, 306 Ga.App. 190, 702 S.E.2d 25 (September 23, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for felony marijuana possession affirmed; prior felony marijuana conviction properly admitted as similar transaction. Distinguishing Vaughan v. State, 251 Ga.App. 221 (553 S.E.2d 335) (2001) (conviction for personal use of crack pipe not similar to charge of sale of cocaine) and King v. State, 230 Ga.App. 301 (496 S.E.2d 312) (1998) (conviction for sale of meth not similar to charge for personal use). Duvall v. State, 305 Ga.App. 545, 699 S.E.2d 761 (July 19, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance affirmed; where defendant was charged with possession of sleeping pills without a prescription, admission of his prior conviction for cocaine possession as a similar transaction was error, but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Reversed on other grounds, 289 Ga. 540, 712 S.E.2d 850 (July 11, 2011). Price v. State, 303 Ga.App. 867, 694 S.E.2d 712 (April 7, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for possession of marijuana and