☢ test - Í

Ecstasy with intent to distribute affirmed; trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence of defendant’s prior guilty pleas to sale of cocaine. “Although there are some differences between the circumstances resulting in Price's 1995 arrest (when he was conducting hand-to-hand sales of crack cocaine) and the 2006 arrest (when officers found crack cocaine, marijuana, Ecstacy tablets, scales, and a large amount of cash in and around his home, but did not actually witness any hand-to-hand drug sales), we must focus on the similarities between the crimes, not on those differences, and the relevance of the prior crimes to the issues before the jury. [ Roberts v. State, 241 Ga.App. 259, 261(3), 526 S.E.2d 597 (1999).] So viewed, the 1995 transactions were relevant to demonstrate not only that Price knowingly possessed illegal drugs, but also that Price had the motive, bent of mind, and intent to sell those drugs from the same Churchill Road property. Id. Therefore, we find the trial court did not err in concluding that the similar transaction evidence was admissible in this case for those limited purposes. Id.” Cotton v. State, 297 Ga.App. 664, 678 S.E.2d 128 (May 1, 2009). At defendant’s trial for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s prior conviction for a similar offense: “In both instances, Cotton was arrested in possession of cocaine and ‘sale-sized’ baggies after seeking to avoid police.” Not material that one offense occurred in residence, the other “outside a commercial establishment,” nor that in one offense the cocaine was not yet bagged for individual sales. Ware v. State, 297 Ga.App. 400, 677 S.E.2d 423 (April 8, 2009). Cocaine charges were sufficiently similar, although one involved a sale and the other mere possession. Accord, Barnes v. State , 287 Ga. 423, 696 S.E.2d 629 (June 28, 2010) (“Because defendant was charged with conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, the trial court allowed as similar transaction evidence proof that defendant previously pled guilty to felony possession of cocaine and misdemeanor possession of marijuana.”). Celestin v. State, 296 Ga.App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480 (February 18, 2009). At defendant’s trial for trafficking in cocaine, evidence of prior cocaine trafficking offense was properly admitted: “in 2004, Celestin was driving a rental car, and in the instant case, he was found in a rented motel room; that the transactions involved the same substance, powder cocaine, with nearly identical purity; and that in both cases, Celestin possessed an amount far in excess of 28 grams of cocaine.” White v. State, 291 Ga.App. 646, 662 S.E.2d 757 (May 22, 2008). At defendant’s trial for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, prior conviction for same offense was admissible to show course of conduct and intent. Martin v. State, 291 Ga.App. 363, 662 S.E.2d 185 (May 2, 2008). Where defendant denied knowledge of the meth found in his truck, trial court properly admitted evidence of his previous meth conviction as “relevant to Martin’s intent and bent of mind.” Hinton v. State, 290 Ga.App. 479, 659 S.E.2d 841 (March 24, 2008). Trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s prior drug offense. “At the hearing, the State argued that it offered the evidence to show Hinton’s course of conduct, in particular, to show that when he is caught with drugs to sell, he throws them down; that the arresting officer would testify that Hinton committed the prior act; and that the offenses were similar, both involving the possession of drugs with the intent to distribute.” Jackson v. State, 284 Ga.App. 619, 644 S.E.2d 491 (March 28, 2007). “‘If the defendant is proven to be the perpetrator of another drug crime and the facts of that crime are sufficiently similar or connected to the facts of the crime charged, the separate crime will be admissible to prove identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, or course of conduct.’ Bailey v. State, 259 Ga.App. 293, 297(5) (576 S.E.2d 668) (2003). This is true even when similar transaction evidence involves a smaller amount or a different illegal drug. See Smith v. State, 263 Ga.App. 76, 80(2) (587 S.E.2d 226) (2003).” Multiple drug offenses here involved possession of cocaine, scales, and giving false name. “Although Jackson points to a number of differences between the crimes, our Supreme Court has held that ‘[t]he proper focus is on the similarity, not the differences, between the separate crime and the crime in question.’ Wayne v. State, 269 Ga. 36, 39(3) (495 S.E.2d 34) (1998).” Accord, Sherrer v. State , 289 Ga.App. 156, 656 S.E.2d 258 (January 9, 2008). Slaughter v. State, 282 Ga.App. 276, 638 S.E.2d 417 (November 6, 2006). No error in admitting prior possession offense as similar transaction evidence in defnedant’s trafficking prosecution: “Although the first crime involved simple possession, both that instance and the present case involved crack cocaine. And the circumstances surrounding the first incident as described by the officer involved in the arrest were at least suggestive of a drug sale. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the similar transaction evidence under these circumstances [Cit.].”