☢ test - Í

Accord, Swan v. State , 300 Ga.App. 667, 686 S.E.2d 310 (October 30, 2009) (possession admissible as similar transaction in trafficking case). Salinas-Valdez v. State, 276 Ga.App. 732, 624 S.E.2d 278 (December 8, 2005). In defendant’s prosecution for trafficking in methamphetamine, defendant’s possession of several pounds of marijuana two months earlier was sufficiently similar. Although substances were different, both were “very large quantities of contraband wrapped in pink plastic wrap. The trial court’s holding that the Tennessee [marijuana] incident was admissible to show a course of conduct and bent of mind was not clearly erroneous.” Sutton v. State, 245 Ga.App. 881, 539 S.E.2d 227 (September 13, 2000). Conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; similar transaction evidence was properly admitted: “the prior acts involved the same type of drug, crack cocaine; one of the acts occurred at precisely the same location as the charged offense, outside 1126 Osborne; and both prior acts involved indictments charging Sutton with possession with intent to distribute. Moreover, insofar as Sutton denied that he possessed the cocaine at issue or that he was an active participant in the drug transactions in the present case, evidence that he had engaged in similar conduct in the past was properly admitted to establish his bent of mind and course of conduct.” Tucker v. State, 245 Ga.App. 551, 538 S.E.2d 458 (August 15, 2000). Convictions for aggravated assault on a peace officer and related offenses affirmed. Defendant was also charged with cocaine possession, but the jury deadlocked on that charge. Similar transaction evidence of defendant’s prior drug charge was properly admitted: “both incidents occurred at night and in the same area of town. They both involved possession of cocaine packaged in blue bags and Tucker trying to run from police. The two offenses occurred only months apart. While there may have been some differences, the law does not require the acts be identical in every respect.” Roberts v. State, 241 Ga.App. 259, 526 S.E.2d 597 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine possession affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s prior conviction for sale of cocaine as a similar transaction. Incidents were sufficiently similar: “the defendant is on trial for possessing $10 worth of cocaine while standing near the roadway in a high crime area of Lowndes County. Prior to being arrested, Roberts began to approach the police car with the cocaine powder in his hand, although he dropped the contraband after he apparently recognized the occupants of the vehicle as patrolling officers. The State was allowed to introduce similar transaction evidence of a prior direct hand-to- hand sale of $20 worth of crack cocaine made from a street curb, where, as he did in this case, Roberts approached a car with the contraband in his possession. Although there are differences between these two offenses, it is the similarities and relevance on which we must focus. The same drug was possessed by the defendant in the same city, and, in both cases, the defendant approached a car with the contraband in his possession. As such, the two transactions are similar enough to warrant the admission of the former guilty plea into evidence.” Barnes dissents: “in Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 469, 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991), our Supreme Court reiterated that a similar transaction is not admissible just because it concerned ‘a crime of the same sort.’” “The only issue in this case was whether the jury would believe, based upon the police officer's testimony, that Roberts dropped the plastic bag with the cocaine inside. The reasons found by the trial court for admitting the similar crimes evidence, i.e., identity or state of mind, do not connect logically to issues in this case. The officer's direct testimony proved who allegedly dropped the ziplock bag. This was not a case in which the identity of the alleged perpetrator was unknown and similar transaction evidence was admitted to prove the perpetrator's identity. In the same manner, Roberts' state of mind was not an issue in the case.” Ruffin agrees with Barnes, but would find error harmless. Scott v. State, 240 Ga.App. 586, 524 S.E.2d 287 (November 1, 1999). Conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute affirmed; prior conviction for same offense properly admitted as similar transaction. “The evidence showed that eighteen years earlier [fn: Cooper v. State, 173 Ga.App. 254, 255(1), 325 S.E.2d 877 (1985) (the lapse of 19 years between the prior occurrences and the offenses charged goes to the weight and credibility of such testimony, not its admissibility). Compare Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798, 410 S.E.2d 423 (1991) (where an event 31 years in the past was too remote for similar transaction evidence). ] , Scott was in a vehicle in the same geographic area as this case, when the police searched his car pursuant to information from a reliable confidential informant and found ten pounds of marijuana. Scott argues that the only similarity between the two cases is the marijuana. We do not agree. Both cases occurred in Chatham County, only two miles apart. Both were sales of marijuana to Scott in large enough quantities to indicate intent to distribute. In both cases, Scott was accompanied by two males and intended to use a vehicle to transport the contraband.”