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McMullen v. State, 316 Ga.App. 684, 730 S.E.2d 151 (July 9, 2012). Convictions for vehicular homicide reversed; trial court erred in admitting, as similar transaction, evidence of defendant’s prior conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. “Other than the fact that both crimes involved methamphetamine, there are virtually no similarities between the two crimes. … Here, we can discern no relevance that a ten-plus year old conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute would have to the determination of whether McMullen was under the influence of a combination of drugs to the extent that it rendered her a less safe driver during the accident at issue. See King v. State, 230 Ga.App. 301, 302–03(1) (496 S.E.2d 312) (1998) (holding that proof that a defendant possessed drugs on one occasion does not tend to prove that he was under the influence of drugs on a different, unrelated occasion). The only arguably relevant information to be gleaned from the prior offense—and it comes from the circumstances surrounding the incident and not the conviction itself—is that McMullen may have a propensity to ingest methamphetamine, because it appears that she had done so on a prior (albeit remote) occasion. [fn] But in the absence of any similarity or logical connection between the two crimes, this is exactly the type of inadmissible character evidence that the safeguards set forth supra are designed to protect against.” Shy v. State, 309 Ga.App. 274, 709 S.E.2d 869 (March 29, 2011). Convictions for vehicular homicide, reckless driving and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s four prior DUI offenses as similar transactions. In the present case, witnesses noted “a strong smell of alcohol” on defendant’s breath, and defendant told doctors he had been “drinking alcohol that day,” but a blood test was negative for alcohol and defendant wasn’t charged with DUI. Nevertheless, applies rule that “‘it is the simple act of driving while under the influence that establishes the commission of the crime. Evidence of a prior DUI offense, regardless of the circumstances surrounding its commission, is logically connected with a pending DUI charge as it is relevant to establish that the defendant has the bent of mind to get behind the wheel of a vehicle when it is less safe for him to do so.’ (Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted) Sanders v. State, 258 Ga.App. 16, 20(4), 572 S.E.2d 712 (2002); See Shockley v. State, 256 Ga.App. 892, 896(5), 570 S.E.2d 67 (2002) (in DUI case, ‘unlike crimes against persons or property which might occur under various factual circumstances, it is the simple act of driving while under the influence that establishes the commission of the crime’). This court has also previously held that where an accused is charged with reckless driving, test results showing his use of drugs are admissible because the reckless driving violation could have been precipitated by the drug usage. Nash v. State, 179 Ga.App. 702(4), 347 S.E.2d 651 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Atlanta Ind. School Sys. v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657, 658, 469 S.E.2d 22 (1996).” Accord, Sullivan v. State , 326 Ga.App. 441, 756 S.E.2d 671 (March 21, 2014) (decided under pre-2013 code. “We decline Sullivan's request that we find all similar transaction evidence inadmissible for acts committed prior to enactment of this new code.”). Duprel v. State, 301 Ga.App. 469, 687 S.E.2d 863 (November 19, 2009). At defendant’s DUI trial, similar transaction evidence sufficiently identified defendant as perpetrator of the prior DUI where the officer “testified that he remembered Duprel's name from his report but never identified him at trial. However, the record shows that [Officer] Maguire testified that he arrested John Michael Dubrel (sic) and that the state introduced into evidence the citation from the prior offense, which contained the same driver's license number for Duprel as was listed on the Intoxilyzer test slip that was introduced into evidence in the instant case. In light of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court's finding that the state presented sufficient evidence that Duprel committed the independent offense was not clearly erroneous. See Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 643(2)(d) (409 S.E.2d 649) (1991) (introduction of certified copy of conviction sufficient to establish the accused committed the independent act).” Wade v. State, 295 Ga.App. 45, 670 S.E.2d 864 (December 2, 2008). Three-judge panel (Blackburn, writing for Miller and Ellington) criticizes case law holding that prior DUI convictions may be admitted in a DUI prosecution to show “bent of mind,” but follows that holding as binding on them. “The bent of Wade's mind or her intent at the time of her current charge is not a necessary element of proof by the State in the trial of this DUI case. It is not probative, is not needed by the State, and is inherently prejudicial. See Cawthon v. State, 119 Ga. 395, 409(4-6)(46 S.E. 897) (1904).” “Wade argues that because our courts have accepted the bent of mind rationale for admitting evidence of prior acts, courts have deprived defendants of their due process right to a fair trial on the accused offense. Indeed, Wade points out that Georgia is the only state to recognize the bent of mind exception, and we have found no authority to the contrary. Professor Paul S. Milich has studied the topic and observed that ‘“[b]ent of mind” is neither a traditional nor widely accepted category for the admission of independent crimes or acts. Indeed, no other American jurisdiction uses it.’ … Nevertheless, we are not authorized to depart from the precedent of the Supreme Court of Georgia authorizing the bent of mind rationale for admitting similar transaction evidence here. See, e.g., [ Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 626(2) (458 S.E.2d 643) (1995)]; Pecina v. State , 274 Ga. 416, 420(4), 554 S.E.2d 167 (2001) ; Cunningham v. State, [255 Ga. 35, 37(4) (334 S.E.2d 656) (1985)].” Accord, Steele v. State , 306 Ga.App. 870, 703 S.E.2d 5 (September 16, 2010) (Phipps, writing for