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Miller and Johnson). Hurston v. State, 278 Ga.App. 472, 629 S.E.2d 18 (March 7, 2006). “Hurston is mistaken in his contention that ‘bent of mind’ and ‘course of conduct’ are the ‘only proper purposes for which similar transaction evidence could be admitted.’ While the case cited by Hurston notes that similar transaction evidence may be ‘relevant to prove bent of mind or course of conduct’ in a DUI prosecution, Kirkland v. State, 206 Ga.App. 27, 28(3) (424 S.E.2d 638) (1992), as the State points out, such evidence has also been admitted for the purpose of showing ‘the intent to drive while’ under the influence of alcohol to the extent of impairment, Tam v. State, 232 Ga.App. 15(1) (501 S.E.2d 51) (1998), state of mind, and knowledge. [footnote: We assume for the purposes of Hurston’s argument, but do not decide, that a legally significant distinction may be drawn between the terms ‘bent of mind,’ ‘state of mind,’ and ‘intent.’] Walker v. State, 208 Ga.App. 690, 692(2) (431 S.E.2d 459) (1993). This enumeration of error is without merit.” Moody v. State, 273 Ga.App. 670, 615 S.E.2d 803 (June 15, 2005). “It is well settled that previous DUI convictions are admissible as similar transaction evidence and relevant to show bent of mind and course of conduct. See, e.g., Noble v. State, 275 Ga. 635, 636(2) (570 S.E.2d 296) (2002); Kirkland v. State, 206 Ga.App. 27, 28(3) (424 S.E.2d 638) (1992)…. While one of the previous convictions occurred almost fifteen years earlier, it was the most similar, as Moody’s intoxication in that case was also discovered after he was stopped for speeding. The lapse of time was not sufficient to render this previous DUI inadmissible; instead, it went to the weight of the evidence. See Scott v. State, 240 Ga.App. 586, 588(2) (524 S.E.2d 287) (1999); Hill v. State, 230 Ga.App. 89, 90 (495 S.E.2d 333) (1998).” Accord, Gamble v. State , 283 Ga.App. 326, 641 S.E.2d 556 (January 10, 2007); Evans v. State , 287 Ga.App. 74, 651 S.E.2d 363 (August 1, 2007) (similar transaction admissible despite 16 year lapse); Massey v. State , 309 Ga.App. 501, 711 S.E.2d 65 (May 5, 2011). Harris v. State, 272 Ga.App. 366, 612 S.E.2d 557 (March 22, 2005). In defendant’s DUI/vehicular homicide prosecution, fact that his prior DUI resulted in serious injuries was admissible as part of similar transaction evidence. “See Carver v. State, 248 Ga.App. 718, 719(2) (548 S.E.2d 629) (2001); see also Conner v. State, 205 Ga.App. 564, 567(4) (422 S.E.2d 872) (1992) (whether offenses both involved accident or near accident relevant to determine similarity of offenses).” Lowenthal v. State, 265 Ga.App. 266, 593 S.E.2d 726 (January 23, 2004). 1. “[C]ontrary to Lowenthal’s argument, the very fact that he claims he was not driving makes his prior DUI conviction even more relevant. ” 2. Similar transaction evidence was admissible notwithstanding defendant’s offer to stipulate to prior offense. Distinguishes“Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 (117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574) (1997) (when proof of convict status is at issue, ‘a district court abuses its discretion if it spurns [the defendant's offer to concede the fact of the prior conviction] and admits the full record of a prior judgment, when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction’). Here, Lowenthal’s prior conviction was not an element of the pending DUI charge; rather, the prior incident – as distinguished from the prior conviction – was used to show bent of mind. Further, contrary to Lowenthal’s argument, the fact that he had committed a prior similar transaction is not a ‘legal status’ analogous to ‘convicted felon’ status. ” Sanders v. State, 258 Ga.App. 16, 572 S.E.2d 712 (October 15, 2002). In prior prosecution, defendant’s charge of DUI was pled down to reckless driving. Held, prior event was admissible as a similar transaction in subsequent DUI prosecution for DUI (which also involved reckless driving and first degree vehicular homicide based on DUI and reckless driving). Smith v. State, 236 Ga.App. 548, 512 S.E.2d 19 (February 3, 1999). “Prior acts of driving under the influence are relevant to prove bent of mind or course of conduct in a subsequent DUI case. Kirkland v. State, 206 Ga.App. 27, 28(3), 424 S.E.2d 638 (1992). Evidence of a prior DUI offense, regardless of the circumstances surrounding its commission, is logically connected with a pending DUI charge as it is relevant to establish that the defendant has the bent of mind to get behind the wheel of a vehicle when it is less safe for him to do so. McCullough v. State, 230 Ga.App. 98, 495 S.E.2d 338 (1998) (physical precedent only); Fields v. State, 223 Ga.App. 569, 571(2), 479 S.E.2d 393 (1996).” Evidence of defendant’s prior offenses in Oregon was admissible without proof that the Oregon DUI statute is similar to the Georgia statute. OCGA § 40-6-391(h)(3), which requires that foreign statutes be shown to be similar to the Georgia statute prior to using the foreign conviction for aggravated sentencing here, ‘appears to relate to issues of punishment and sentencing, not to the admissibility of evidence in the guilt and innocence phase of a trial.” Accord, Enloe v. State , 239 Ga.App. 513, 520 S.E.2d 925 (July 22, 1999); Green v. State , 244 Ga.App. 565, 536 S.E.2d 240 (June 22, 2000); Christian v. State , 244 Ga.App. 713, 536 S.E.2d 600 (June 29, 2000); Savage v. State , 252 Ga.App. 251, 556 S.E.2d 176 (November 2, 2001); Lanning v. State , 261 Ga.App. 480, 583 S.E.2d 160 (June 4, 2003); Caraway v. State ,