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UUUUU. STATEMENTS BY DEFENDANT See also CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – SILENCE/TESTIMONY BY DEFENDANT and DUI – MIRANDA , above, and PROCEDURE – JACKSON-DENNO HEARING, below 1. ADMISSION BY CONDUCT

Bowling v. State, 289 Ga. 881, 717 S.E.2d 190 (October 17, 2011). Murder and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; seizure of defendant’s hospital medical records by search warrant didn’t result in self-incrimination. “[N]either the taking nor the chemical analysis of Bowling's blood and urine compelled him to provide testimony or evidence of a communicative nature, the results of the analyses performed on his blood and urine are not within the scope of the Self– Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 765(II). [fn: Bowling argues that the privilege against self- incrimination sweeps more broadly under Georgia law. While Art. I, Sec. I., Para. XVI of the Georgia Constitution and OCGA § 24–9–20(a) apply to oral or real evidence as opposed to testimony alone, see Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 516 (192 S.E.2d 350) (1972), this Court has held that ‘[t]he removal of a substance from the body through a minor intrusion does not cause the person to be a witness against himself within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and similar provisions of Georgia law.’ Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 519 (202 S.E.2d 428) (1973). See also Fortune v. State, 300 Ga.App. 550(2)(b) (685 S.E.2d 466) (2009). ] . Further, ‘coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a statement is not voluntary.’ (Punctuation and citation omitted.) United States v. Romero, 897 F.2d 47, 52(II)(B)(1) (2 nd Cir., 1990) (defendant's statement to nurse in emergency room was voluntary absent evidence of police coercion). Because Bowling does not assert that he divulged information to medical personnel or consented to tests as a result of coercive police activity, he has no basis for asserting a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination.” Strong overruled by Williams v. State , 296 Ga. 817, 771 S.E.2d 373 (March 27, 2015) to the extent Strong holds that dissipating blood alcohol is always an exigent circumstance justifying nonconsensual, warrantless blood draws in DUI cases. Davis v. State, 279 Ga. 786, 621 S.E.2d 446 (October 24, 2005). “The court did not err in admitting letters written by [defendant] to another of [defendant]’s accomplices, Carlos Johnson, while they were under investigation in connection with each of the three murders. In the letter, [defendant] attempted to persuade his accomplice not to talk to the police and to join him in a story he fabricated about their involvement with [victims]. The letter highlighting [defendant]’s attempt to obstruct the investigation, was relevant and admissible as an admission by conduct. See Collins v. State, 273 Ga. 93(3) (538 S.E.2d 47) (2000).” 2. ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST Bostic v. State, 294 Ga. 845, 757 S.E.2d 59 (March 28, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted “the testimony of a fellow inmate to the effect that Bostic had said to another prisoner that Bostic would ‘win his case,’ because ‘his people [would] put the guy that ID'd him at the scene of the crime ... to sleep,’ which would mean that the State would ‘not be able to go to the grand jury and indict him and he will walk free.’” “The testimony was, at the very least, relevant to show Bostic's consciousness of his guilt, and ‘“[a]ny statement or conduct of a person, indicating a consciousness of guilt, where such person is, at the time or thereafter, charged with or suspected of crime, is admissible against him upon his trial for committing it.” [Cit.]’ Lewis v. State, 293 Ga. 110, 114(2)(a), 744 S.E.2d 21 (2013). This is true even if it incidentally placed Bostic's character into evidence. Id.” Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 708 S.E.2d 362 (March 18, 2011). Capital murder conviction affirmed (but sentence reversed); defendant’s jailhouse statement to a cellmate, about another robbery he wished he’d committed instead of the one that got him arrested, was not a “similar transaction,” but a properly admitted “admission against his penal interest,” which is “‘the admission of a party-opponent.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 327(3) (647 S.E.2d 15) (2007). See Stanford v. State, 272 Ga. 267, 269-270(4) (528 S.E.2d 246) (2000) (in a malice murder prosecution, police officer's testimony as to what the defendant told him in connection with a woman's death in an unrelated incident was admissible over a hearsay objection as a party opponent's admission against his own penal interest).” Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 647 S.E.2d 15 (June 25, 2007). Murder defendant’s statement to doctor that his finger was injured when victim bit it was admissible under OCGA § 24-3-34 as an admission against penal interest. 3. ADOPTIVE ADMISSIONS Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26, 608 S.E.2d 634 (February 7, 2005). Witness testified that she heard a conversation where her boyfriend said to defendant “‘All you kept saying was “you gonna kill that boy Danielle.”’ Wallace responded, ‘Yeah,