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yeah.’ The trial court allowed the testimony as an ‘adoptive admission’ under Carruthers v. State, 272 Ga. 306(14) (528 S.E.2d 217) (2000). A ‘declarant’s statements are admissible “where the defendant adopts the statements as his own by his responses.” Gordon v. State, 273 Ga. 373, 374(2)(a) (541 S.E.2d 376) (2001), citing Carruthers v. State, [supra].’ White v. State, 276 Ga. 583, 587(1)(b) (581 S.E.2d 18) (2003). Here Wallace affirmatively acknowledged that the inculpatory statements were true. Thus, the statements ‘were admissible as substantive evidence because [Wallace] directly responded to them in a manner that adopted their substance.’ Carruthers, supra at 316(14).” 4. BOOKING QUESTIONS Pinkney v. State, 332 Ga.App. 727, 774 S.E.2d 770 (July 2, 2015). Convictions for attempted armed robbery and related offenses affirmed. Asks but doesn’t answer whether police may ask a suspect for his phone number as a “booking question.” Defendant’s phone number here was used to connect him to the crimes, but police were able to obtain it from an independent source, so no Miranda violation in any event, citing “ Merritt v. State, 288 Ga.App. 89, 98(2), 653 S.E.2d 368 (2007) (any error in admitting defendant's statement during booking that he drank alcohol on the day of the accident was harmless given other evidence that defendant had been drinking).” Wells v. State, 297 Ga.App. 153, 625 S.E.2d 821 (March 27, 2009). Intake officer’s question to defendant, “something like, what are you doing back, or why are you here?” and incriminating response, “falls outside the booking exception to Miranda ,” citing Nash , and is more like interrogation than a “general greeting,” as found by trial court. “Asking an individual – handcuffed, under police escort, and in the intake area of a jail – why he is there is patently distinguishable from a general greeting. [fn] Such question is far more likely to elicit an incriminating statement because the circumstances that landed the suspect in his situation are almost certainly directly related to the crime(s) for which he obviously is under arrest. Nash, supra (‘questions concerning how a suspect came to be in police custody are likely to elicit an incriminating response’); see also Franks [ v. State, 268 Ga. 238, 240 (486 S.E.2d 594) (1997)].” This is so regardless of intake officer’s subjective intent: “the intake officer should have known that asking Wells why he was there was likely delving into Wells's recent, suspected illegal conduct.” Merritt v State, 288 Ga.App. 89, 653 S.E.2d 368 (October 26, 2007). Defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide while DUI. Trial court admitted defendant’s “statement he made to the booking officer at the Hall County Detention Center that he had drunk a half gallon of vodka on June 3, 2002.” Court of Appeals expresses concern about admissibility of the statement under the “booking exception,” but finds any error harmless. “ We are concerned … with the relationship of the question and answer to the crimes for which Merritt was convicted. ‘[T]he relationship of the information sought to the crime is highly relevant in determining whether the question was equivalent to ‘interrogation .’ Booking questions generally have little to do with evidence adduced at trial,’” quoting Franks v. State, 268 Ga. 238, 241 (486 S.E.2d 594) (1997). “The questions of how much an accused had to drink, and when he last had a drink, are more likely to elicit an incriminating response from a person charged with vehicular homicide and DUI than are questions designed to secure ‘basic biographical data essential to the booking process.’ Franks, supra at 240.” Haggins v. State, 277 Ga.App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (February 24, 2006). Defendant’s responses to requests “for basic biographical data and whether he was right or left-handed, so that [officer] would know which hand to uncuff to permit Haggins to sign paperwork. ... were related to legitimate administrative needs and therefore fell within the well- recognized ‘booking exception’ to the Miranda rule,” citing Franks v. State, 268 Ga. 238, 239-240, 486 S.E.2d 594 (1997). State v. Nash, 279 Ga. 646, 619 S.E.2d 684 (September 19, 2005). “The trial court found that [defendant], when asked whether he wanted to talk without an attorney present, said, ‘No,’ and clearly shook his head in the negative when the GBI agent asked, ‘You don’t want to talk about it?’ The trial court ruled the interview should have been terminated immediately when Nash told the investigators that he did not wish to talk without an attorney present and invoked his right to remain silent. Instead, as reflected in the videotape and the transcript thereof, stipulated as accurate by Nash and the State, the GBI agent said, ‘There'll be some small talk. We’ll talk about, you know, your mama and what’s going on in Cairo, if that’s what you’re talking about.... I’m going to ... put refused to talk [on the waiver of rights form].’ The GBI agent then proceeded to ask Nash a series of questions [fn] which culminated in Nash saying, ‘You can talk to me now,’ and giving an inculpatory statement. [Footnote: The agent then asked Nash the number, gender, age, and location of any children he had; where Nash was born; his hair color, height, and weight; the state of his teeth; the source and descriptions of the tattoos covering Nash’s arms, chest, and back; his facial hair; the status of his driver’s license; his marital status; his father’s name; and whether he had siblings. He then told Nash he would be returned to the sheriff’s office after Nash signed a sheet containing the information the agent had obtained. The agent then said ‘That’s the picture your mama gave