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us when we were looking for you. You did turn yourself in, though? I want to make that part of the record. You did turn yourself in.’ Nash responded, ‘Yeah, I could have ran,’ and the agent noted Nash had a number of places to which he could have gone had he run. Nash then alluded to reasons why altercations happen, and the agent said, ‘That’s why I wanted to talk to you. That’s why I wanted to talk to you.’ Nash responded, ‘You can talk to me. I told you, you can talk to me now .’ Nash noted that statements can be harmful, and the agent told him officers had only one side of the story after talking to a number of persons. Nash then said he wanted the agent and lieutenant to listen to him.”] Held, trial court could find that agent improperly continued interrogation after defendant invoked his right to counsel and right to silence, and that agent’s questions were not mere booking information requests. “As we observed in Franks v. State, 268 Ga. 238, 239-40 (486 S.E.2d 594) (1997), ‘ Georgia courts have confined the booking exception to requests for basic biographical data such as the suspect’s name, age, address, educational background, marital status, and other information required to complete an arrest form.... Like most federal and state courts, we are unwilling to create a broad exception to the Fifth Amendment for police questions asked during booking “without investigative intent” or pursuant to “administrative procedure” once an accused has invoked his rights.’” Agent’s question about whether defendant turned himself in was not a routine booking question. “Inasmuch as questions concerning how a suspect came to be in police custody are likely to elicit an incriminating response, they are not exempt from Miranda as questions seeking routine biographical data for booking purposes. See Franks, supra, 268 Ga. at 240.” Accord, Wells v. State , 297 Ga.App. 153, 625 S.E.2d 821 (March 27, 2009) (intake officer’s question to defendant, “something like, what are you doing back, or why are you here?” and incriminating response, “falls outside the booking exception to Miranda ,” citing Nash .). Al-Amin v. State, 278 Ga. 74, 597 S.E.2d 332 (May 24, 2004) Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Defendant’s response to medic who, upon arrest, asked defendant if he was injured, was not the product of interrogation and did not require exclusion under Miranda . “See also Colon v. State, 256 Ga.App. 505(1), 568 S.E.2d 811 (2002) (police officers have the responsibility to ask medical questions as part of routine booking in order to fulfill the government’s obligation to provide medical treatment to one in custody, and such routine booking questions are generally considered exempt from Miranda .).” Accord, Dorsey v. State , 285 Ga.App. 510, 646 S.E.2d 713 (May 23, 2007) (“pre- Miranda statements in response to officers’ requests for biographical data and questions about his physical condition … did not implicate Miranda ”). English v. State, 260 Ga.App. 620, 580 S.E.2d 351 (March 27, 2003). Defendant was arrested for selling drugs. Over $500 cash was found on his person. At trial, state tendered the testimony of the arresting officer, who asked defendant about his employment and the source of the funds on his person as part of “administrative processing.” Defendant was not Mirandized before asking these questions. Held, trial court could conclude that these statements were not “a response to custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda ;” “even though the questions in this case were not asked during English’s booking, the questions were asked during administrative processing, and nothing in the questions indicate that the officer was seeking an incriminating response.” See also Al-Amin (May 24, 2004),above. Slaughter v. State, 240 Ga.App. 758, 525 S.E.2d 130 (November 10, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, giving a false name, and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of identifying information defendant gave to police. “Slaughter complains that evidence was admitted showing that, in response to police questioning after he had asserted his right to remain silent, he stated his name (a false name), age, address, and Social Security number. These questions sought only biographical information of the type attendant to routine booking procedures and were not designed to elicit incriminating responses. Franks v. State, 268 Ga. 238-240, 486 S.E.2d 594 (1997). Moreover, since the questions asked were not interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), there is no merit to Slaughter's claim that the questions violated his Miranda rights because he had previously invoked his right to remain silent. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of his answers to the questions, including his giving of a false name. Franks, 268 Ga. at 238-240, 486 S.E.2d 594.” Metts v. State, 270 Ga. 481, 511 S.E.2d 508 (February 8, 1999). Defendant’s confession while being booked into jail was not the product of custodial interrogation. “Asking questions normally attendant to arrest and custody is not a ‘custodial interrogation’ which requires the administration of Miranda warnings. Mincey v. State, 257 Ga. 500(10), 360 S.E.2d 578 (1987).” Accord, Brooks v. State , 237 Ga.App. 546, 515 S.E.2d 851 (April 8, 1999). 5. CONFESSION, WHAT CONSTITUTES Merritt v. State, 292 Ga. 327, 737 S.E.2d 673 (January 22, 2013). Evidence supported murder conviction. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the case against him wasn’t entirely circumstantial; it included his text message to his sister,