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admitting that he had choked and killed his wife. “[Defendant] argues that the text message to his sister was only an incriminating admission, not a confession, that the evidence of his guilt is, therefore, only circumstantial … But the text message was not a mere admission. In it, Merritt admitted the ‘main fact’ of the crime of which he was convicted, namely that he choked and caused the death of Alesha. See Robinson v. State, 232 Ga. 123, 126(2), 205 S.E.2d 210 (1974) (a confession is ‘[a]n admission of the main fact, from which the essential elements of the criminal act may be inferred,’ without ‘a qualifying exclusion of a necessary ingredient of the crime charged,’ such as ‘facts or circumstances which show excuse or justification’) (citations and punctuation omitted). The text message did not qualify this admission, was not exculpatory, and contained no proof of justification or excuse.[fn] Accordingly, the text message ‘is not a mere incriminating admission, but is a confession.’ Yarn v. State, 265 Ga. 787, 788(2), 462 S.E.2d 359 (1995) (citations omitted). This is not, therefore, a purely circumstantial case. See id.” “The confession in this case was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence that Alesha was found dead on the floor, that she died from manual strangulation, that Merritt was present at the time of her death, and that Merritt previously had threatened to kill her in her sleep.” McMahon v. State, 308 Ga.App. 292, 707 S.E.2d 528 (March 8, 2011). Conviction for making a false statement affirmed; evidence of defendant’s conversation with assistant DA didn’t violate rule against admission of plea negotiations. “McMahon argues that this testimony violates OCGA § 24-3-50, which, she contends, makes inadmissible any statements made during the course of plea negotiations. But the statute provides, ‘[t]o make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.’ We have interpreted the statute to mean that ‘confessions made during plea negotiations with the prosecutor are not admissible, because they are made in the hope that the defendant will get a better deal than he would otherwise. [Cit.]’ Gray v. State, 240 Ga.App. 716, 718(1) (523 S.E.2d 626) (1999). Here, however, the record does not show that McMahon made her request in the context of plea negotiations. And McMahon's request not to be prosecuted is not a confession.” Overruled, State v. Chulpayev , 296 Ga. 764, 770 S.E.2d 808 (March 27, 2015). 6. CORROBORATION, SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE Norman v. State, 298 Ga. 344, 781 S.E.2d 784 (January 19, 2016). Convictions for malice murder and necrophilia affirmed; under pre-2013 Evidence Code, evidence was sufficient to corroborate defendant’s confession to having sex with the victim’s body after killing her. “Under Georgia statutory law, a defendant’s entirely uncorroborated confession cannot support a conviction. See former OCGA § 24–3–53 (‘A confession alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.’). [FN2: Appellant was tried under the Georgia’s old Evidence Code, this provision is found at OCGA § 24–8–823. ] For a confession to be sufficiently supported, however, other evidence need only corroborate it in any particular. See Moore v. State, 285 Ga. 157, 161 (674 S.E.2d 315) (2009). Moreover, when the jury finds that a confession is corroborated, ‘it need not find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt “from evidence separate from and wholly independent of the confession, and [it] instead may consider the confession along with other facts and circumstances independent of and separate from it.”’ Merritt v. State, 292 Ga. 327, 329–330 (737 S.E.2d 673) (2013) (citation omitted). In this case, the State presented evidence corroborating Appellant’s confession in many particulars. The victim’s body was found in the room registered to Appellant at the ‘United’ hotel, where he told the police he took her. The testifying guests from the hotel corroborated Appellant’s account of the noise he and the victim made as they struggled in the room; his and the victim’s appearing naked when the guests knocked at their door; and his aggressive attitude towards the interruption. Physical evidence found at the crime scene and testimony from the medical examiner corroborated Appellant’s statements about the manner in which he killed the victim; the items used to kill the victim; the multiple days he spent with the victim’s body after he killed her; the condition in which he left her body; and the items he left on top of her body. This corroboration was more than sufficient. See Moore, 285 Ga. at 161.” Griffin v. State, 302 Ga.App. 807, 692 S.E.2d 7 (February 16, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s probation revocation based on driving with a suspended license where officer saw defendant driving and defendant admitted that his license was suspended. “ Griffin's statement to the officer that his license was suspended was an admission and not a confession requiring corroboration under OCGA § 24-3-53, because Griffin's statement was not so comprehensive as to include every essential element of the offense – he did not admit to driving a motor vehicle on a highway of the state.” Lewis v. State, 292 Ga.App. 257, 663 S.E.2d 721 (May 27, 2008). Convictions for voluntary manslaughter and related offenses affirmed in part, reversed in part. Defendant’s statement was sufficiently corroborated to support conviction. Defendant “argues that because his statement to his mother and trial testimony were coupled with his exculpatory explanation that the victim was trying to kill him and that the firearm discharged accidentally, the jury was not permitted