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to accept the inculpatory part of his statement and testimony that he had shot the victim, but at the same time reject the exculpatory part.” But this rule does not apply “where the state presents other direct or circumstantial evidence that contradicts the exculpatory part of the defendant’s statement or testimony. See Edwards v. State, 271 Ga. 3, 4(1) (514 S.E.2d 833) (1999); Terry [ v. State, 243 Ga. 11, 12-13(1), 252 S.E.2d 429 (1979)]; Price [ v. State, 108 Ga.App. 581, 585(5), 133 S.E.2d 916 (1963)]. In such a case the jury is authorized ‘to believe certain parts only of the defendant’s statement while rejecting other parts, and to combine the parts of the statement thus believed with the evidence of facts and circumstances which they believe in order to arrive at a logical verdict.’ Price , 108 Ga.App. at 585(5).” Accord, Rodriguez-Nova v. State , 295 Ga. 868, 763 S.E.2d 698 (September 22, 2014). Sheffield v. State, 281 Ga. 33, 635 S.E.2d 776 (October 2, 2006). Rule requiring corroboration of confessions does not apply to admissions by defendant which amount to less than a full confession. “‘The reason confessions must be corroborated is to ameliorate the danger of a coerced confession or the confession of a mentally unbalanced person providing the entire proof used to convict a defendant. Admissions, on the other hand, do not admit every element of the offense, leaving on the State the burden of proving some elements of the offense by evidence other than the admissions. That evidence need not corroborate the admissions, but must provide proof of those elements of the offense not admitted.’ Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 180, 181(4) (476 S.E.2d 583) (1996) (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.). Inasmuch as Sheffield did not admit every element of the charged offenses, his statements to police are more accurately characterized as admissions, rather than confessions. [fn] However, even if Sheffield’s statements are deemed to amount to a confession of his guilt, Sheffield’s argument does not prevail because the State nonetheless offered sufficient corroborative evidence. ‘ Proof of the corpus delicti is sufficient corroboration and, in a murder case, the corpus delicti is established by proof that the victim is dead, that the death was caused by violence or the direct criminal agency of another human being, and that the accused caused the death in the manner charged. [Cit.].’ Blackwell v. State, 270 Ga. 509, 510(2) (512 S.E.2d 233) (1999). The State presented sufficient evidence independent of Sheffield’s inculpatory statements that the victim died from manual strangulation inflicted by another human being shortly after Sheffield was in the victim’s company. Id.” Cummings v. State, 272 Ga.App. 886, 614 S.E.2d 121 (April 18, 2005). Confession was adequately corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. “OCGA § 24-3-53 recognizes that ‘[a] confession alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.’ However, ‘evidence of a confession, freely and voluntarily made by the defendant, is direct evidence of the highest character, and, when corroborated by proof of the corpus delicti, is sufficient to authorize [a] conviction.’ [Cit.] Proof of the corpus delicti is sufficient corroboration that a crime has been committed. [Cit.] ‘ The corroborating evidence or circumstances need not connect the defendant definitely with the perpetration of the offense. Corroboration in any material particular satisfies the requirements of the law. The finder of fact must determine the amount of evidence necessary to corroborate a confession.’ [Cit.] In doing so, the factfinder ‘may consider the confession along with other facts and circumstances independent and separate from it in determining whether or not the corpus delicti has been established to their satisfaction.’ [Cit.] In this case, [victim’s] testimony and that of the officers who investigated the crime established the corpus delicti of each crime, thereby providing the requisite corroboration.” Accord, Morris v. State , 274 Ga.App. 41, 616 S.E.2d 829 (June 27, 2005). Blackwell v. State, 270 Ga. 509, 512 S.E.2d 233 (February 8, 1999). “[Defendant] asserts that his inculpatory statements to police were not sufficiently corroborated by other evidence to authorize [defendant’s] convictions. OCGA § 24-3-53 recognizes that ‘[a] confession alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.’ Proof of the corpus delicti is sufficient corroboration and, in a murder case, the corpus delicti is established by proof that the victim is dead, that the death was caused by violence or the direct criminal agency of another human being, and that the accused caused the death in the manner charged. Grimes v. State, 204 Ga. 854(1), 51 S.E.2d 797 (1949).” Holman v. State, 236 Ga.App. 111, 511 S.E.2d 240 (January 27, 1999). “[A]n incriminating statement does not need independent corroboration. An incriminating statement is made where the accused, though admitting to damaging circumstances, nonetheless attempts to deny responsibility for the crime charged by putting forward exculpatory or legally justifying facts. It is not required that admissions or incriminating statements be corroborated as must confessions to a crime. Walsh v. State, 269 Ga. 427, 429, 499 S.E.2d 332 (1998); Plumm v. State, 201 Ga.App. 154, 410 S.E.2d 352 (1991). However, since admissions or incriminating statements do not admit every element of the offense charged, the State has the burden of proving some elements of the offense by evidence other than admissions. Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 180, 182, 476 S.E.2d 583 (1996). The State need not introduce additional elements which corroborate the admissions, but must present additional direct or circumstantial evidence of guilt. Walsh, supra at 429, 499 S.E.2d 332.”