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7. COURT-ORDERED MENTAL EVALUATION See CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – SILENCE/TESTIMONY BY DEFENDANT – WHEN APPLICABLE, above 8. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION – WHAT IS CONSIDERED “INTERROGATION” FOR MIRANDA PURPOSES? Wilson v. State, 325 Ga.App. 859, 755 S.E.2d 253 (February 28, 2014). Drug convictions reversed on other grounds, but trial court properly denied motion to suppress defendant’s statement to police. Officers encountered defendant sleeping in a car “and knocked on the Camry window. When Wilson awoke, Officer Mercado opened the back door and asked him ‘what he was doing [t]here.’ Wilson responded that he ‘was just trying to make some money to feed [his] family.’ Officer Mercado asked Wilson what he meant, and Wilson responded that he was selling drugs.” “Here, Wilson's statements to the officers ‘were not subject to suppression because they were not the product of an interrogation or its functional equivalent.... [Officer Mercado's] inquiry ... as to “what was going on” ... [did not amount] to a “custodial interrogation” requiring the administration of Miranda warnings.’ (Footnote omitted). Jones, 258 Ga.App. at 230, 573 S.E.2d 470, citing Metts v. State, 270 Ga. 481, 483–484(3), 511 S.E.2d 508 (1999). Thus, the trial court's determination that Wilson was not in custody until after he made his statements to the officers and placed under arrest was not clearly erroneous, and the trial court did not err by denying his motion to suppress.” Cody v. State, 324 Ga.App. 815, 752 S.E.2d 36 (November 19, 2013). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. Even if defendant’s question “Can I get a lawyer now? Right now?” is construed as a request for counsel, defendant reinitiated conversation with officer. 1. Request for counsel. “See Taylor [ v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 271-272(1), 553 S.E.2d 598 (2001)] (recognizing that a suspect's desire for counsel may not be ambiguous simply because it was articulated in the form of a question, and noting that ‘it is common for people to ask for things by saying “Can I have ... ?”’). See generally Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458–59, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (129 L.Ed.2d 362) (1994) (explaining that whether a defendant has invoked his right to counsel is an objective inquiry).” 2. Defendant initiated further conversation; officer’s response didn’t constitute interrogation. Following defendant’s question about counsel, the officer responded “We won't be able to provide you one right now. We can, uh, we can, you can ask for a public defender and we can do the interview later. That's your choice.” Cody then said “I would rather go on and get this over with, man, ‘cause I don't understand why she is doing this.” “Here, the detective's immediate response to Cody's questions … did not fall within that definition of ‘interrogation.’ [fn: See [ State v. Brown, 287 Ga. 473, 697 S.E.2d 192 (2010)] (determining that, after the suspect invoked his right to counsel, the detectives' words and actions that answered or deflected a number of direct questions from the suspect regarding what he would be charged with, when he could go home, whether he would be arrested, when he could use the phone, how the victim was doing, and where he would go next, did not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent); United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 740– 741 (7 th Cir., 2001) (‘A police officer's response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute “interrogation.”’) (citations and punctuation omitted), cited in Brown, supra at 477(2), 697 S.E.2d 192. See generally Miranda, supra at 474 (rejecting the suggestion ‘that each police station must have a “station house lawyer” present at all times to advise prisoners’). ] The detective's response neither expressly questioned Cody nor equated to words or actions that the detective should have known were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating information from Cody. [fn] Furthermore, the additional questioning that ensued was initiated by Cody. [fn: See Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 716–718(3)(4), 482 S.E.2d 330 (1997) (explaining that an accused may waive his previously-invoked right to counsel if he ‘initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police’ and that ‘an accused's response to an officer's answer to a question posed by the accused is not the product of custodial interrogation’), disapproved on other grounds, Toomer v. State, 292 Ga. 49, 57(2)(c), 734 S.E.2d 333 (2012). Cf. Taylor, supra at 271–272(1), 553 S.E.2d 598 (2001) (determining that the arrested suspect's statement, ‘Can I have a lawyer present when I [tell police my version of what happened]?’ followed by ‘Okay’ when told she could, was an unambiguous request for counsel). ] ” “Here, after Cody revealed that he ‘would rather go on and get this over with,’ the detective's statements and actions were permissibly aimed at clarifying Cody's apparent decision to waive the right to counsel and the right to remain silent, and thus proceed with the interrogation without counsel. [fn] Indeed, Cody thereupon affirmed his decision—orally and by executing a written waiver—to give up those rights and proceed with un-counseled interrogation.[fn]” Jordan v. State, 293 Ga. 619, 748 S.E.2d 876 (September 23, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; Miranda didn’t prohibit admission of defendant’s statements to friend who wasn’t acting as State agent. “Appellant’s statements were made during a telephone conversation initiated by Grier at her insistence because she wanted to know why police thought her car had been involved in a murder and because she did not want her son, who was driving the car at the time of the stop, to be wrongfully implicated. [Officer] Otts did not ask Grier to call appellant, but in fact, discouraged her from making the call because he feared she would alert appellant that police were looking for him. In