☢ test - Í

addition, Otts did not ask any questions during the conversation; nor did he instruct Grier to make any specific inquiries. Absent any evidence that Grier was acting as an agent of law enforcement or that appellant was restrained or in custody at the time he made the challenged statements, Miranda does not apply. See Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (‘The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion’); … Cook v. State , 270 Ga. 820, 826, 514 S.E.2d 657 (1999) ( Miranda not implicated when accused makes incriminating statements to person other than law enforcement, such as a family member or close friend; Harper v. State , 249 Ga. 519(4)(b), 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982) (witness not agent of law enforcement where she visited defendant of her own initiative and officers did not request that she seek specific information).” Teele v. State, 319 Ga.App. 448, 738 S.E.2d 277 (December 14, 2012). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; defendant was in cutody for Miranda purposes when she spoke to police, but statement wasn’t product of interrogation. As to interrogation: defendant was stopped minutes after an armed robbery; her passenger fled as police approached. “Here, the officer simply asked Teele the name of her passenger in order to obtain the identity of the person the officer observed fleeing the vehicle and who was suspected in an armed robbery. The officer's single, non-accusatory question to Teele was to assist officers' on-the-scene investigation into an armed robbery that had occurred only minutes earlier, and aid in the capture of a potentially armed and dangerous suspect. [fn] The fact that Teele gave a non-responsive incriminating statement does not establish that the officer reasonably knew his statement was likely to elicit such a response. See, e. g., Gonzales v. State, 277 Ga.App. 362, 365–366(2) (626 S.E.2d 569) (2006) (officer would not have known that remark to other officer concerning material on defendant's shoes would elicit incriminating response that accomplice hit victim; response was spontaneous).” Doyle, writing for Phipps, dissents: “Under these circumstances, the officer should have known that asking Teele, who matched the description of one of the armed robbers, to identify the other fleeing suspect was likely to elicit an incriminating response, regardless of whether he intended to elicit such information. Furthermore, the information sought was directly related to the armed robbery and Teele's knowledge of the other suspect's identity, thereby establishing her relationship to him. Based on these circumstances, a reasonable person in Teele's situation would have believed she was being interrogated.” Osei-Owusu v. State, 319 Ga.App. 33, 735 S.E.2d 75 (November 29, 2012). Rape conviction affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in admitting defendant’s un- Mirandized , custodial statement. Officers came upon defendant having sex with an unconscious female outside a bar. Defendant claimed the victim was his girlfriend, but victim, when awakened, said she didn’t know him. After arresting defendant, officer asked him his “girlfriend’s” name. “When asked what her name was, Osei–Owusu did not respond. Osei–Owusu then said that he met her on the side of the club and she approached him, took off her panties and made advances toward him.” “Officer Brown should have known that asking Osei– Owusu his claimed girlfriend's name after the victim had just stated that she did not know Osei–Owusu was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Although we agree that the response was given at a time when Osei–Owusu should have been given a Miranda warning, we find no basis for reversal because the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” given other overwhelming evidence. Flemister v. State, 317 Ga.App. 749, 732 S.E.2d 810 (October 2, 2012). Terroristic threats and arson convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted officer’s statement that defendant requested his jacket from the residence where drugs were found. “[Officer] testified that he had approached Flemister, who was sitting in the back of a patrol car, explained to him that the jail where he was being transported was cold that time of year and had a shortage of blankets, and asked ‘him if he wanted a jacket from his house.’ He denied that his purpose in asking the question was to elicit an incriminating response from Flemister linking him to the searched residence, and testified that he never asked Flemister any questions pertaining to the drugs found at the residence or any of the charges being brought against him. According to the lieutenant, he simply assumed that Flemister would want a jacket ‘[b]ecause it's very cold at the Sheriff's Department in the holding cells and the booking area.’ Additionally, the lieutenant pointed out that when he asked Flemister about the jacket, he and the other agents had already found paperwork addressed to Flemister and a photograph of him inside the residence. Hence, the lieutenant asked Flemister if he wanted a jacket from ‘his house’ because the lieutenant presumed he lived there.” Trial court could find “that the lieutenant's question was not the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation under the totality of the circumstances, ‘but merely an initial inquiry into [Flemister's] well- being.’ Velazquez v. State, 282 Ga. 871, 878(8) (655 S.E.2d 806) (2008).” “[T]he fact that the lieutenant was careful to memorialize in writing what he saw and heard does not mean that, at the time he made the offer to retrieve a jacket for Flemister, he did so with the aim of eliciting an incriminating response or had any reason to believe that Flemister would later deny living at the house that contained paperwork and a photograph clearly linking him to it.” Simmons v. State, 291 Ga. 664, 732 S.E.2d 65 (October 1, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court