☢ test - Í

custodial interrogation, but cites with approval Gardner v. State, 261 Ga.App. 10, 11 (582 S.E.2d 7) (2003), wherein “our Court of Appeals ruled that a trial court erred when it did not suppress a defendant's un-Mirandized statements made in response to a detective's summary of evidence against him because the detective ‘ should have known that if he advised [the defendant] of the incriminating evidence against him, it was reasonably likely that [the defendant's] response would prove incriminating to some degree.’ Gardner is in keeping with appellate decisions holding that the disclosure of incriminating evidence to a suspect constitutes interrogation within the meaning of Rhode Island v. Innis, [446 U.S. 291, 302 n. 5 (100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297) (1980)],” citing cases from other jurisdictions. No harm here, however, even if officer’s “words and actions constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation,” as defendant’s statement was not directly incriminating but merely helped authenticate letters allegedly written by defendant, and the letters were corroborated by other non-expert evidence. Linto v. State, 292 Ga.App. 482, 664 S.E.2d 856 (July 7, 2008). Statement was not a product of interrogation: “[investigator] Woodrum was attempting to review the Miranda warning when Linto interrupted him to say that it would be no use for them to talk because Linto had no memory of the incident. There is no indication that Woodrum ever began interrogating Linto about the incident or the charges against him.” Ventura v. State, 284 Ga. 215, 663 S.E.2d 149 (June 30, 2008). “[A]s a police officer was closing the door to Ventura’s jail cell, Ventura spontaneously started making references to ‘guys [who] had stolen his .40 pistol,’ the fact that the police had not been helpful when he called them, the fact that he had ‘put [the guy] in his truck and [had gone to get] the little gun,’ and the fact that ‘he was in the army ... [and] needed to protect his family.’ Because Ventura spontaneously made these statements, and because the statements were not made in connection with any police interrogation, the trial court did not err in admitting them into evidence. Tennyson v. State, 282 Ga. 92(3) (646 S.E.2d 219) (2007).” Accord, State v, Carder , 301 Ga.App. 901, 689 S.E.2d 347 (December 11, 2009) (defendant’s statement to nurse, “I know why you want my blood, I’m not giving you my blood,” was a spontaneous outburst, admissible at her trial for DUI and vehicular homicide.); Hatcher v. State , 286 Ga. 491, 690 S.E.2d 174 (February 8, 2010) ( reversed on other grounds, State v. Kelly , 290 Ga. 29, 718 S.E.2d 232 (November 7, 2011)) (spontaneous comments made at arrest properly admitted); Boyd v. State , 302 Ga.App. 455, 691 S.E.2d 325 (February 23, 2010) (spontaneous statements to court transport deputy properly admitted). In re: T.A.G., 292 Ga.App. 48, 663 S.E.2d 392 (June 18, 2008). Trial court properly suppressed juvenile’s statement to school administrator, finding that assistant principal was acting as agent for police, and that police officer/school resource officer was not merely present, but a participant, even though the principal asked the questions. 1. School official as agent of police. “The … administrator … admitted that, in conjunction with such investigations, she often conferred with the officer about possible criminal charges, as well as questions to ask during an interview. As she testified: ‘[N]ormally I’ll ask the questions and if I miss something or if I didn’t ask a good question then ... [the officer will] tell me later or I can ask him later about it, ... go back and ask them another question to get more information or something that ... I missed.’ Furthermore, she and the officer knew that different ‘rules’ would apply if the police became involved, so they decided that the officer should not ask questions. And the fruits of the investigation were ultimately turned over to the police. Given the totality of these circumstances, we cannot reverse the juvenile court’s finding that the second assistant principal acted as an agent or instrument of the police in interviewing T.A.G.” 2. Police officer a “participant” in interrogation. Officer was brought in to juvenile’s second consecutive interview, having already admitted to robbing another student, but denying a second robbery. “During the interview, and in front of T.A.G., the officer advised the assistant principal on what type of criminal charges might be brought against T.A.G.” “Police involvement … need not be substantial to remove the case from the intermediate group of governmental actors described by Young [ see below ] . See [ State v. K.L.M., 278 Ga.App. 219, 220-221, 628 S.E.2d 651 (2006)]. On the contrary, any involvement or participation by law enforcement officers brings a case within Young’ s third category, implicating the exclusionary rule. See id. Although an officer’s mere presence in the room, without more, might not constitute police participation, at least some evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the officer was more involved here.” Based on “ State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488 (216 S.E.2d 586) (1975), which addressed the application of Fourth Amendment search and seizure law – and the associated exclusionary rule – in the public school setting. Analyzing whether evidence seized by a high school principal should be excluded from a student’s criminal trial, the Court noted that three groups of persons exist: private individuals; governmental agents whose conduct constitutes state action covered by the Fourth Amendment; and law enforcement personnel who are governed by both the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule. Young, supra, 234 Ga. at 493(2). The Court explained: ‘With reference to searches by private persons, there is no Fourth Amendment prohibition and therefore no occasion for applying the exclusionary rule. [Cite] The third group, law enforcement officers, of course, are bound by the full panoply of Fourth Amendment rights and are subject to the