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regarding medical information, he interrupted the officer and asked his own questions. He wanted to know where he was and why he was there because he had never been on ‘this side’ of Georgia before. He then asked whether ‘the female [would] be in the courtroom’ and stated that he did not know anything ‘except that the female was sleeping in the other room ... and then the next thing he knew, the cops hit him in the back of the neck.’ The trial court held that the statements were freely and voluntarily given and that they were admissible. We find no clear error. See Franks v. State, 268 Ga. 238, 242 (486 S.E.2d 594) (1997) (clearly erroneous standard). The information here was not solicited. The officer was only asking routine questions for intake purposes. Mincey v. State, 257 Ga. 500, 506(10) (360 S.E.2d 578) (1987) (questioning ‘during a routine booking procedure’ ‘was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response so as to constitute police interrogation’). And Gomez volunteered the information. ‘Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by (the) holding (in Miranda ).’ State v. Davison, 280 Ga. 84, 87(2) (623 S.E.2d 500) (2005), citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478(III) (86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) (1966).” State v. Brown, 287 Ga. 473, 697 S.E.2d 192 (July 5, 2010). In defendant’s prosecution for murder and related offenses, trial court erred in suppressing defendant’s custodial statement; although defendant clearly invoked right to counsel, his subsequent statements were volunteered, not the product of continued interrogation. “The record of the interview reveals that Brown repeatedly initiated conversation and interrupted the detectives to discuss various topics, including his concern for the victim and his account of what had happened at the crime scene. At no point in the interview, however, did the detectives expressly question Brown about the crimes, even after Brown invited such discussion by beginning to talk about them.” “The record of the interview shows that, after Brown invoked his right to counsel, the detectives' words and actions were of two types. Detective Ord answered, or deflected, a number of direct questions from Brown regarding what he would be charged with, when he could go home, whether he would be arrested, when he could use the phone, how the victim was doing, and where he would go next. Such responses do not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent. See Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 718 (482 S.E.2d 330) (1997) (‘[A]n accused's response to an officer's answer to a question posed by the accused is not the product of custodial interrogation’); United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 740-741 (7 th Cir., 2001) (‘A police officer's response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute “interrogation.”’). The detectives' other statements and actions were aimed at effectuating Brown's invocation of his right to have counsel present before questioning. Thus, Detective Ord tried to help Brown contact the attorney who had represented him in the past and whom he preferred-the lawyer Brown said he ‘would rather have than anybody else.’ Detective Ord also cautioned Brown not to speak without his attorney present.” Rejects suggestion from dissent (Hunstein, writing for Benham and Hines) that officers had duty to leave the room after defendant invoked right to counsel. “After a suspect invokes his rights, the police may be in a situation where they choose to, and appropriately and safely can, leave the suspect, but in other situations the police may need to transport the suspect from the crime or arrest scene to a detention center, or from an interrogation room to a detention center, or arrange for the suspect to contact his lawyer or family, or deal with other logistical issues.” “The police were not obliged … to stop listening to what Brown chose to say or to immediately leave the room so that they could not hear him. See Tennyson v. State, 282 Ga. 92, 93 (646 S.E.2d 219) (2007) (‘“There is no burden on State officials to prevent [a] defendant from talking about the incident if he wishes to do so. Simply stated they must not interrogate but they need not refuse to listen.”’ (citation omitted)).” Accord, Thompson v. State , 295 Ga. 96, 757 S.E.2d 846 (April 22, 2014) (spontaneous statements properly admitted; leaving defendant guarded after he terminated interrogation wasn’t “functional equivalent” of interrogation). Wells v. State, 297 Ga.App. 153, 625 S.E.2d 821 (March 27, 2009). Intake officer’s question to defendant, “something like, what are you doing back, or why are you here?” and incriminating response, “falls outside the booking exception to Miranda ,” citing Nash , and is more like interrogation than a “general greeting,” as found by trial court. “Asking an individual – handcuffed, under police escort, and in the intake area of a jail – why he is there is patently distinguishable from a general greeting. [fn] Such question is far more likely to elicit an incriminating statement because the circumstances that landed the suspect in his situation are almost certainly directly related to the crime(s) for which he obviously is under arrest. Nash, supra (‘questions concerning how a suspect came to be in police custody are likely to elicit an incriminating response’); see also Franks [ v. State, 268 Ga. 238, 240 (486 S.E.2d 594) (1997)].” This is so regardless of intake officer’s subjective intent: “the intake officer should have known that asking Wells why he was there was likely delving into Wells's recent, suspected illegal conduct.” Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 675 S.E.2d 1 (February 9, 2009). Detective elicited response from defendant prior to Miranda by telling him “that [defendant’s] friend (and, ultimately, his co-indictee) had implicated [defendant] in the murder and identified him as the triggerman.” Supreme Court does not resolve whether this constituted