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a reasonable person in Hale's position would believe that his or her freedom of action had been more than temporarily curtailed, which thereby placed him in custody for purposes of Miranda. See Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222, 225(3) (498 S.E.2d 262) (1998) (‘[H]aving been informed that she was going to jail, a reasonable person would have believed that the detention was not temporary. Therefore, the failure to give the Miranda warnings renders evidence regarding the field sobriety tests inadmissible.’); State v. Kirbabas, 232 Ga.App. 474, 476 (502 S.E.2d 314) (1998) (‘[A]bsent the officer making any statement that would cause a reasonable person to believe that she was under arrest and not temporarily detained during an investigation, the officer's “belief” that probable cause exists to make an arrest does not determine when the arrest is effectuated until the officer overtly acts so that a reasonable person would believe she was under arrest.’). Voluntariness. But even though Hale was in custody for purposes of Miranda, the trial court did not err in admitting the results of the portable alco-sensor test because the portable test was administered in response to a demand from Hale, not the officer, thus making this situation clearly distinguishable from other custodial settings triggering the protections of Miranda and more akin to a spontaneous outburst from an unwarned suspect [fn] or a test conducted pursuant to the Georgia Implied Consent Statute. See State v. Carraway, 251 Ga.App. 469, 470 (554 S.E.2d 602) (2001) (noting that breath tests administered under the Georgia Implied Consent Statute do not infringe upon a suspect's right against self-incrimination, making Miranda inapplicable); State v. Lord, 236 Ga.App. 868, 868 (513 S.E.2d 25) (1999) (same); see also Kehinde v. State, 236 Ga.App. 400, 400 (512 S.E.2d 311) (1999) (urine test); State v. Moses, 237 Ga.App. 764, 764 (516 S.E.2d 807) (1999) (blood test). See generally State v. Coe, 243 Ga.App. 232, 233–34(2) (533 S.E.2d 104) (2000) (explaining that the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated ‘by the choice granted by the Georgia Implied Consent Statute whether to submit to a chemical test of bodily substances such as blood, breath, or urine’).” Logan v. State, 309 Ga.App. 95, 709 S.E.2d 302 (March 17, 2011). Convictions for child solicitation, attempted child molestation, and related offenses affirmed; defendant’s spontaneous statement was not a product of interrogation. “Here, the trial court determined that the stop of Logan's car was authorized by the facts before the officers – he arrived at 10:00 p.m. in a isolated location in a vehicle with a Tennessee license plate, which fit the description of the individual whom the task force was investigating. [Cit.] The investigating officer stopped Logan's vehicle and explained the reason for the stop, and these statements would not objectively be understood to be an interrogation. [Cits.] The trial court, therefore, did not err by determining that Logan's response that he was at the park in order to counsel a 14-year-old-girl was spontaneous and voluntary and, thus, admissible.” Silverio v. State, 306 Ga.App. 438, 702 S.E.2d 717 (October 13, 2010). Convictions for various home-invasion related offenses affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress “two statements he made in response to questioning at the time of his arrest regarding whether he lived at the apartment and where his bedroom was located therein.” “The record shows that upon entering Silverio's apartment, [Detective] Restrepo asked whether he lived there, and Silverio replied affirmatively. Restrepo testified at the suppression hearing that he asked Silverio that question in order to determine whether he could give consent to search. ‘Asking questions normally attendant to arrest and custody is not a “custodial interrogation” which requires the administration of Miranda warnings.’ Metts v. State, 270 Ga. 481, 484(3), 511 S.E.2d 508 (1999), citing Mincey v. State, 257 Ga. 500, 506(10), 360 S.E.2d 578 (1987) (no Miranda violation where defendant was asked his street address during booking).” Daniel v. State, 306 Ga.App. 48, 701 S.E.2d 499 (September 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for drug trafficking and possession affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s statements volunteered to officer. “As admitted by Daniel, it was Daniel, not the officer in question, who initiated conversation by asking the officer about his intentions with respect to the female at his residence. And after the officer explained that they would both be arrested in the absence of a claim of ownership to any contraband found in the residence, the record shows that Daniel voluntarily offered to direct the officers to the location of the narcotics. See Oliver v. State, 276 Ga. 665, 667(2), 581 S.E.2d 538 (2003) (‘[S]tatements volunteered by appellant and not in response to questioning seeking to elicit incriminating responses are not inadmissible.’); Walton [ v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 718(4), 482 S.E.2d 330 (1997)] (‘[A]n accused's response to an officer's answer to a question posed by the accused is not the product of custodial interrogation.’). It follows that the trial court's determination that Daniel's statement was given out of concern for his friend as opposed to being given in response to police questioning was not clearly erroneous. See Walton, 267 Ga. at 718(4), 482 S.E.2d 330; Ottis v. State, 269 Ga. 151, 153-154(2), 496 S.E.2d 264 (1998); Mulvaney [ v. State, 281 Ga.App. 620, 621-622, 636 S.E.2d 762 (2006)].” Gomez v. State, 305 Ga.App. 204, 699 S.E.2d 395 (July 13, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for kidnapping, armed robbery, and related offenses affirmed; defendant’s volunteered statements during booking were properly admitted. “[W]hile Gomez was being processed for intake and booking at the county jail and responding to routine questions