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didn't think he had touched her anymore.’). See also Grant-Farley v. State , 292 Ga.App. 293, 664 S.E.2d 302 (June 26, 2008) (After invoking right to counsel with one officer, Defendant initiated further statement with different officer, with new Miranda warnings. Held, trial court’s finding that this statement was admissible was not “clearly erroneous.”). Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260 (June 25, 2007). Trial court properly admitted recordings of defendant’s telephone conversations from jail with his mother where defendant was aware calls might be recorded. Miranda didn’t apply because no interrogation was involved. Taylor v. State, 285 Ga.App. 697, 647 S.E.2d 381 (June 6, 2007). After arrest, officers took defendant to his apartment to witness execution of search warrant for drugs. As they were entering the apartment he screamed “Lord, please save me. Don’t let them take me in here.” Defendant had already invoked his Miranda rights. “Taylor contends that, when the officers led him to the door of the apartment, this was the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation in violation of his Miranda rights because the officers knew this action was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297) (1980). In Rhode Island, the Supreme Court held that custodial interrogation includes ‘express questioning or its functional equivalent’ and that, although the police cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the ‘functional equivalent’ of express questioning includes ‘any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ Id. at 300- 301. Taking Taylor back to the apartment while the search warrant was being executed did not amount to action that the police should have known was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Taylor. Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 839, 842 (295 S.E.2d 74) (1982). We conclude that Taylor was not being interrogated by words or actions when he spontaneously volunteered the statements, and that there was no violation of his Miranda rights.” See also Keith (May 18, 2006), and Brown (June 8, 2005), below. Tennyson v. State, 282 Ga. 92, 646 S.E.2d 219 (June 4, 2007). “After being advised of his constitutional rights, Tennyson elected to remain silent and declined to make a formal statement. However, when one of the arresting officers informed him during the booking procedure that the charge was murder, he responded that ‘I didn’t kill that man. He was trying to rob me.’ Over objection, the trial court allowed the officer to testify on direct examination that Tennyson made this comment, and that evidentiary ruling is enumerated as error.” Held, defendant’s “statement was not the product of police interrogation,” but was admissible as a “[v]oluntary, spontaneous outburst .” Accord, Bettis v. State , 285 Ga.App. 643, 647 S.E.2d 340 (June 4, 2007) (No error admitting defendant’s spontaneous remark when served with his arrest warrant for robbery: “That was a robbery?”); Winfrey v. State , 286 Ga.App. 718, 650 S.E.2d 262 (June 20, 2007) (Defendant’s statements made to officer transporting him, who was not interrogating defendant, were voluntary, though made while in custody); Velazquez v. State , 282 Ga. 871, 655 S.E.2d 806 (January 8, 2008) (defendant made statements after detective asked “are you okay?”); Ventura (June 30, 2008), above; Flemister (October 2, 2012), above (officer asked defendant if he wanted his jacket from house where drugs were found; statement later used to rebut defendant’s claim that he had no connection to the house). Lopez v. State, 285 Ga.App. 355, 646 S.E.2d 271 (April 13, 2007). When officer told defendant he was being charged with possession of the cocaine found in his car because none of the other passengers claimed it, defendant “interrupted the officer and said, ‘[t]hat cocaine is mine. I don’t want my home boys to get in trouble for my cocaine.’” Held, statement was not product of “interrogation;” although defendant claimed he took the officer’s statement as a threat to arrest his friends, “[a] A reasonable person in Lopez’ position would not have believed that the officer’s statement was subjecting him to ‘interrogation’ or requiring an incriminating response. As a result, the trial court properly denied Lopez’ motion to suppress.” Ellis v. State, 283 Ga.App. 808, 642 S.E.2d 869 (March 1, 2007). 1. Police were called to defendant’s home, where he had left small children alone unattended long enough for one to wander outside and develop hypothermia. While police were present, defendant returned and commented, “I don’t know what the big deal is here.” “‘One who is under an investigative detention pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889) (1968), or is the subject of a general on-the-scene investigation is not within “custody.”’ Bailey v. State, 153 Ga.App. 178, 180(1) (264 S.E.2d 710) (1980).” (Statement also was not made in response to questioning, but was spontaneous.) 2. Comment made during booking after arrest, “volunteered that he had only been gone from the house for two to three minutes,” was spontaneous, not product of interrogation. “We have held many times that the asking of general booking questions such as one’s name, address, and birth date does not constitute an interrogation. See e .g. Edwards v. State, [220 Ga.App. 74, 77(2) (467 S.E.2d 379) (1996)]; Hibbert v. State, 195 Ga.App. 235, 236-237 (393 S.E.2d 96) (1990).”