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Mulvaney v. State, 281 Ga.App. 620, 636 S.E.2d 762 (September 20, 2006). Trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement, finding that it was not the product of police questioning. Defendant drove himself to police station at police request, to discuss injuries to his girlfriend’s child. “[T]he interviewing officer began by asking Mulvaney if he would spell his last name. Rather than answer the question, Mulvaney asked ‘[w]hat are we doing here?’ and ‘what’s that got to do with us?’” The officer explained that they were investigating the child’s injuries. “Mulvaney told the officer that C.R. fell off the toilet, slipped in the bathtub, and fell out of the front door. After additional statements, during which the officer’s only question to Mulvaney was ‘[h]ow old is she?,’ Mulvaney asked the officer what was wrong with the child. The officer responded ‘that is partly what I need to ask you.’” Defendant volunteered other statements about the child’s condition although the officer only asked for directory information. When the officer read Miranda rights, defendant at first said he wanted a lawyer, but continued to make unsolicited statements about the child’s condition. “‘In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297) (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court defined the ‘interrogation’ which must be preceded by Miranda warnings as the ‘express questioning [of a person in custody] or its functional equivalent ... that is, ... any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect....’ The court went on to note, however, that ‘the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions....’ The Innis definition of ‘interrogation’ is applicable to cases presenting an Edwards question....’ [on whether defendant’s right to counsel has been violated]. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 717(4) (482 S.E.2d 330 (1997).” “As noted by our Supreme Court in Walton, ‘an accused’s response to an officer’s answer to a question posed by the accused is not the product of custodial interrogation.’ 267 Ga. at 718(4). Mulvaney continued to talk without being questioned by the officer.” Distinguishing State v. Nash , 279 Ga. 646, 619 S.E.2d 684 (September 19, 2005) (officer questioned defendant after right to counsel invoked; statement inadmissible). “When Mulvaney expressed a desire not to say any more, the officer asked Mulvaney to sign a form showing that he had read Mulvaney his rights. Mulvaney then began to make additional statements without prompting or questioning by the officer. The officer reminded Mulvaney on several occasions that Mulvaney had asked for an attorney, but Mulvaney continued to talk. Under these circumstances, the officer was not interrogating Mulvaney by choosing to listen. ‘Only words or actions that the police should have known were likely to elicit an incriminating response constitute interrogation.’ Caldwell v. State, 249 Ga.App. 885, 887-888(2) (549 S.E.2d 449) (2001). See Oliver v. State, 276 Ga. 665, 667(2) (581 S.E.2d 538) (2003) (‘[s]tatements volunteered by [defendant] and not in response to questioning seeking to elicit incriminating responses are not inadmissible’). The trial court’s determination that Mulvaney’s statement was not made in response to interrogation is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the statement into evidence.” Accord, Bowling v. State , 289 Ga. 881, 717 S.E.2d 190 (October 17, 2011). Keith v. State, 279 Ga.App. 819, 632 S.E.2d 669 (May 18, 2006). “The term ‘interrogation’ refers not only to express questioning, but also to ‘any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (footnotes omitted).” Officers’ actions in obtaining hair and blood samples pursuant to search warrant were not such “actions ... reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Studiemeyer v. State, 278 Ga.App. 756, 629 S.E.2d 593 (April 12, 2006). Defendant’s exculpatory statement, “volunteered by Studiemeyer, and unprompted by police questioning,” was admissible regardless of whether he was in custody and without evidence of Miranda warnings. “[W]ithout regard to whether Studiemeyer was in custody, we find that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the spontaneous statement. ‘The State is not required to show that Miranda warnings were given before introducing evidence of a custodial statement which was not obtained through interrogation but was volunteered by the suspect.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Collins v. State, 267 Ga.App. 784, 788(4) (600 S.E.2d 802) (2004); Jones v. State, 258 Ga.App. 229, 230 (573 S.E.2d 470) (2002).” Haggins v. State, 277 Ga.App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (February 24, 2006). Trial court properly admitted defendant’s “spontaneous utterance” to officer, “[W]hat if I was with the shooter and I wasn’t the shooter.” Defendant was in custody and was being transported to the police station, but statement was not in response to any questioning by officer. “A defendant’s spontaneous, voluntary, unprompted utterance to a police officer is admissible against him at trial. See Jackson v. State, 270 Ga. 494, 497(6) (512 S.E.2d 241) (1999); [other cits.].” Likewise, defendant’s voluntary comments made during booking, not prompted by questioning, were admissible. See also Quedens (March 27, 2006), under subheading CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION – WHEN IS DEFENDANT “IN CUSTODY” FOR MIRANDA PURPOSES?, below. Accord, Owens v. State , 332 Ga.App. 525, 773 S.E.2d 783 (June 16, 2015) ( Miranda not required