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where defendant, already in custody, spontaneously claimed ownership of marijuana found by officers); Howard v. State , 334 Ga.App. 7, 778 S.E.2d 19 (September 25, 2015) (juvenile defendant’s spontaneous apology to officer properly admitted). Gonzalez v. State, 277 Ga.App. 362, 626 S.E.2d 569 (January 25, 2006). “[T]he trial court did not err in finding that Gonzalez’s statement was spontaneous and not the result of interrogation.” “Evidence adduced at the hearing showed that Gonzalez, whose native language was Spanish, was interviewed by an English-speaking detective. The interviewing detective was accompanied by a second officer, who served as a Spanish language translator. After hearing his Miranda rights, Gonzalez asked for an attorney, and the officers left to question another suspect. Upon their return the interviewing officer picked up Gonzalez’s shoes, which had been removed and placed outside the room, and, referring to the shoes, asked the other officer, in English, ‘does that look like blood to you?’ Gonzalez then stated, in Spanish, ‘that was where [Lopez] hit the man in the head.’ Gonzalez accompanied the statement with a chopping motion. The trial court concluded that the statement was not the result of questioning, but spontaneous and therefore admissible. See Pierce v. State, 255 Ga.App. 194, 196(2) (564 S.E.2d 790) (2002) (‘[v]oluntary, spontaneous outbursts that are not made in response to any form of custodial questioning or interrogation are admissible at trial’) (citation omitted).” “According to the officers’ testimony, they were speaking to each other in reference to the material on Gonzalez’s shoes. There is no evidence that the officers were intentionally engaging in a practice designed to elicit a response from Gonzalez. Compare [Cottingham v. State, 206 Ga.App. 194, 201(4) (424 S.E.2d 797) (1992)] (officer admitted his intent in discussing the case in front of the defendant was to elicit an incriminating response). Furthermore, the officer’s conversation was in English in front of a Spanish-speaking suspect who had been interrogated in Spanish, and under the circumstances we cannot say the officers should have known their actions were likely to elicit an incriminating response from Gonzalez. See generally Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 718(4) (482 S.E.2d 330) (1997) ([defendant’s] statement was not in response to an express question or by actions the detective should have known were likely to elicit an incriminating response).” Tucker v. State, 276 Ga.App. 117, 622 S.E.2d 466 (October 26, 2005). Executing a search warrant at defendant’s residence, “Cason, the commanding officer on the scene, testified that when he entered the residence Tucker already was handcuffed. In the kitchen, Cason asked Tucker to identify his supplier and point out the location of drugs in the residence. When Tucker refused, Cason brought him into the living room and sat him down in a chair. Cason testified that, ‘at that point all of my conversations with him were concluded.’ As Cason was directing other officers to remove [defendant’s girlfriend] Burton from the residence and place her in a patrol car, he heard Tucker say that he ‘would show where the drugs were if we would get her some sweat pants.’ Tucker then stated that ‘the drugs were within six feet of where we were standing.’” Held, trial court did not err in finding that this statement was “voluntary and not the result of custodial interrogation.” Thus, lack of Miranda warnings was no impediment to admission of the statement. Brown v. State, 273 Ga.App. 577, 615 S.E.2d 628 (June 8, 2005). Without reading Miranda warnings, officer sought to interrogate defendant about thefts from vehicles, and aggravated assault, but defendant denied active involvement in the incidents. Officer then “‘pointed out to [Brown] since he obviously didn’t want to talk about the incident, that I already ... had been told that he had fired a weapon and that we would – that he had thrown it out on the side of the road and that we would go back and find the weapon.’ [Officer] testified Brown responded that ‘[the police] wouldn’t be finding any gun, or something to that effect.’” Held, trial court erred in finding that the statement was not the product of interrogation. “The critical inquiry in this case is … whether [Officer’s] statement to Brown that he already knew Brown fired the gun and then threw it out the window was the ‘ functional equivalent’ of an interrogation. We find that on its face, the statement appears to be the type condemned by our Supreme Court as a ‘psychological ploy’ – stating the guilt of the accused as a fact – constituting the functional equivalent of an interrogation.” See Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Kennedy v. State , 246 Ga.App. 236, 238(2), 540 S.E.2d 229 (2000). Statement was voluntary under a due process analysis, however, and its admission was harmless error as it was not, itself, incriminatory, and defendant admitted at trial to firing the weapon. See Metheny v. State , 197 Ga.App. 882, 400 S.E.2d 25 (1990). Evans v. State, 267 Ga.App. 706, 600 S.E.2d 671 (May 25, 2004). “Evans contends that the officer’s inquiry about her age was an improper interrogation likely to produce an incriminating response, since her age was an ‘element’ of the offense of underage DUI (excessive BAC). Thus, without benefit of Miranda, information obtained from the officer’s inquiry was inadmissible at trial. However, questions regarding age, marital status, and address are routine questions that are generally exempted from Miranda. [Cit.] Further, we reject Evans’ contention that the officer’s question was designed to ‘incriminate’ her, when such was asked in order to give Evans the proper implied consent notice.