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Indeed, Evans had not yet taken an intoxilyzer test, and her BAC was unknown; accordingly, her age in relation to the quantum of proof necessary to demonstrate underage DUI (excessive BAC) was not relevant at the time of the officer’s inquiry. At the time of inquiry, the officer was arresting Evans for DUI--less safe driver, and her age is not an ‘element’ of such offense.” Alwin v. State, 267 Ga.App. 236, 599 S.E.2d 216 (April 23, 2004). While investigating an assault and looking for the perpetrators, one of whom had been stabbed during the altercation, officer was notified that a man with a stab wound was at the local hospital seeking treatment. “When [officer] arrived at the hospital, he did not tell Alwin he was investigating the case, but simply ‘asked him what happened to him.’” Defendant gave him an exculpatory statement. Trial court properly held the statement was not custodial: “‘[A] statement is not inadmissible simply because an interviewing officer harbors a “secret intention of charging the suspect at a future time.” (Footnote omitted.) Taylor v. State, 259 Ga.App. 457, 459 (576 S.E.2d 916) (2003). Instead, although a court must examine all circumstances surrounding the interrogation in deciding whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes, “the ultimate inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (Footnote omitted.) Id.’ Thomas v. State, 262 Ga.App. 492, 498(3) (589 S.E.2d 243) (2003).” In any event, no harm because the statement was exculpatory. Singleton v. State, 266 Ga.App. 795, 598 S.E.2d 80 (April 6, 2004). “[O]fficers drove to a motel to execute a search warrant on room 38. Singleton stood in the doorway of room 38. When officers identified themselves, Singleton turned and ran into the room. Officers chased him as he ran directly to the bathroom. Officers observed Singleton throw something into the toilet and flush it. One of the officers grabbed the object, a plastic bag containing several pieces of crack cocaine, from the toilet before it flushed. Simultaneously, another officer grabbed Singleton and subdued him on the bathroom floor. While the officer restrained Singleton on the floor, Singleton declared, ‘You don’t have anything on me.’ But when the officer held up the plastic bag he had retrieved from the toilet, Singleton responded, ‘You got me.’” Defendant sought to suppress these two statements as non-Mirandized, custodial statements. Held, while defendant was in fact in custody when he made the statements, neither was “given in response to a question posed by police.” Particularly regarding the second statement, “[a]fter Singleton made the first statement, the officer who had rescued the cocaine from the flushing toilet showed the drugs to Singleton and said, ‘I got what you tried to flush.’ Singleton then responded, ‘You got me.’ We find no error in the admission of this statement. While there are circumstances where the conduct or statement of an officer may amount to an interrogation, this is not one of them…. We find nothing in the officer’s statement or actions which amounted to the type of tricks or psychological ploys normally cited as interrogation techniques or which otherwise indicated this was a practice designed to elicit an incriminating response. [Cit.] The officer’s statement and actions did not call for any response, and we find under the facts of this case that the officer’s statement and actions were not the functional equivalent of express questioning. Singleton’s statement was volunteered, and the trial court properly admitted the statement even though Singleton had not received Miranda warnings.” Zackery v. State, 262 Ga.App. 646, 586 S.E.2d 346 (August 4, 2003). Conviction for cocaine possession affirmed. Defendant was neither under arrest nor being interrogated, but was being detained pending the execution of a search warrant when he uttered those fateful words, “You’ve got me.” Defendant made the statement when officer reached for a jacket hanging on a wall. The statement was admissible. Madge v. State, 245 Ga.App. 848, 538 S.E.2d 907 (September 11, 2000). Convictions for selling marijuana and giving false name affirmed; no Miranda violation in asking defendant his name after arrest. “Asking for a person’s name and birth date during the process of an arrest is not reasonably likely to elicit a response which incriminates one in the commission of a crime and, therefore, is not interrogation. “‘The definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301–302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).’ (Punctuation omitted.) Edwards v. State , 220 Ga.App. 74, 77(2), 467 S.E.2d 379 (1996).” Smith v. State, 245 Ga.App. 743, 538 S.E.2d 825 (August 31, 2000). Burglary conviction affirmed but remanded for sentencing on other grounds. 1. Trial court erred, but harmless, in admitting defendant’s non- Mirandized “custodial statement,” elicited by “words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” First officer handcuffed Smith (but told him he was not under arrest) when he found him “carrying a television toward a car parked on the side of the road near an apartment complex.” When defendant explained that he found the television and a VCR in the woods, second officer “told Smith that ‘it doesn't look good for you being as you were loading [the television] up’ and that he wanted to talk further with Smith at the police department. [Second Officer] Guest