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acknowledged that his intent during this conversation with Smith was to ‘cause him to rethink his statement and to give what [Guest] believed to be a more forthright statement.’ Guest also explained that through this conversation, he was able to convince Smith to be honest with him.” Smith then admitted that he stole the items from an apartment because he “was desperate for money.” “‘Where law enforcement officers conduct custodial interrogation of a suspect without the benefit of Miranda warnings, there is a presumption that the suspect's answers are compelled.’ Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402, 407(6), 444 S.E.2d 748 (1994). Such statements must be suppressed. Id. at 407–408, 444 S.E.2d 748. And Smith's on- the-scene statement was made in response to custodial interrogation. ‘The term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Cottingham v. State, 206 Ga.App. 197, 200(4), 424 S.E.2d 794 (1992). An officer's intent may bear on whether the officer should have known that his ‘words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response.’ Id. at 201(4), 424 S.E.2d 794. Guest admitted he intended to invoke a ‘more forthright statement’ when he told Smith that ‘it doesn't look good.’ In this circumstance, we must conclude Guest knew or should have known that his words to Smith were ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’ from Smith. Smith's initial incriminating statement, made without the benefit of Miranda warnings, should have been suppressed.” No analysis of whether defendant was in custody at the time the statement was made. 2. Subsequent Mirandized statement wasn’t made involuntary, however. “Guest testified he made no promises or threats to Smith in an effort to obtain a statement, that Smith did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and that after he informed Smith of the charge against him and read Miranda warnings to Smith, Smith appeared willing to talk and did not request a lawyer. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Smith's statement made after he was administered Miranda warnings was freely and voluntarily given, and any error in admitting his previous statement was therefore harmless. See Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 191, 194–195(3), 528 S.E.2d 232 (2000).” Jack v. State, 245 Ga.App. 216, 536 S.E.2d 235 (June 22, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s spontaneous post-arrest comment, “I should have shot all four of them.” Detective commented that defendant’s statement “come out of nowhere—he just said that. I don't know why he said it, but we was [sic] not talking about the incident.” Jackson v. State , 272 Ga. 191, 528 S.E.2d 232 (March 13, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in admitting defendant’s non- Mirandized custodial statement to police admitting to being the shooter. “[Officer] Jordan noted that any statement by Jackson that he was not the shooter would not make sense if it were shown that Jackson had gunpowder residue on his hands. It was in response to this comment that Jackson stated that he was the shooter, and Jordan's remark must be considered ‘words or actions ... that [he] should [have] know[n] [were] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Walton [ v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 717(4), 482 S.E.2d 330 (1997)]. Consequently, Jackson's statement that he, and not Jack, was the shooter must be considered to have been made in a custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings and was wrongly admitted.” Harmless, however, in light of fuller confession given after Miranda warnings. Accord, Smith (August 31, 2000), above. Cummings v. State, 242 Ga.App. 657, 530 S.E.2d 782 (March 9, 2000). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted testimony that defendant claimed ownership of a jacket found in motel room searched by police as not being the product of “interrogation.” “ Not all questioning constitutes interrogation for Miranda purposes. Routine questioning ‘not related to the investigation of the case nor designed, expected, or likely to elicit information relevant to guilt’ does not amount to a custodial interrogation. Shy v. State, 234 Ga. 816, 822(I), 218 S.E.2d 599 (1975). Some initial on-the-scene inquiry is permissible before Miranda warnings are given if the questioning is not aimed at establishing a suspect's guilt but is instead aimed at determining the nature of the situation. Lolley v. State, 259 Ga. 605, 606–607(2)(b), 385 S.E.2d 285 (1989).” Here, police had already searched the room, in which defendant was otherwise alone, and had found crack cocaine in the dresser. “A black jacket was also in the room, and a deputy asked Cummings if it belonged to him. When he said that it did, the deputy searched the jacket and found another piece of crack cocaine.” Brooks v. State, 237 Ga.App. 546, 515 S.E.2d 851 (April 8, 1999). In response to defendant’s question, officer “told Brooks he was being charged with possession of two pounds of marijuana found in his truck. Brooks blurted out that it was only a pound of marijuana and that it had been there for over a week. Brooks contends the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his statement about the marijuana, asserting that the statement was the product of improper interrogation after he had invoked his right to counsel 'and therefore should have been excluded. The trial court