☢ test - Í

physically restrained); Reaves [ v. State, 292 Ga. 582, 584-585, 740 S.E.2d 141 (2013)] (defendant was not in custody at outset of interview, where, inter alia, she voluntarily agreed to ride to police station in front seat of unmarked patrol car).” Walker v. State, 296 Ga. 161, 766 S.E.2d 28 (November 17, 2014). Murder conviction affirmed (but other convictions reversed on other grounds); no ineffective assistance based on failure to seek suppression of defendant’s statement to officers. Defendant wasn’t in custody, so no Miranda warning was required. Defendant approached officers outside victim’s apartment, “identified himself as her boyfriend,” and adamantly insisted on giving a statement to help in their investigation. “[O]nce he was brought to the station, they had to ask him to be patient while they first spoke with [other witnesses;] Walker was not handcuffed or restrained in any way,[fn] and … the police officer who interviewed Walker made it clear to Walker that he was not under arrest but was being interviewed only because he had expressed an interest in helping the police in their investigation.” Teasley v. State, 293 Ga. 758, 749 S.E.2d 710 (October 7, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in admitting defendant’s statements to police. “Appellant cannot rely on evidence presented after trial to show that the trial court erred in admitting his statement at trial—a decision the court had to make based on the evidence it had at that time. The evidence Appellant offered after trial is relevant only to his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in not presenting that evidence at trial.” Counsel wasn’t ineffective in that strategic decision. Pugh v. State, 323 Ga.App. 31, 747 S.E.2d 101 (July 15, 2013). Armed robbery convictions affirmed; statement wasn’t custodial, hence no ineffective assistance for failure to file motion to suppress. “In this case, the investigators interviewed Pugh at the Atlanta Police Department's office located within the airport. At the time of the interview, Pugh was accompanied by his supervisor and another employee. Pugh was advised that he was not under arrest. The officers were conducting a general investigation into the use of Pugh's vehicle in the armed robbery and the circumstances surrounding the theft of his vehicle. At the start of the interview, the investigators did not consider Pugh a suspect. Pugh was never told that he was not free to leave during the interview, nor was there evidence that Pugh was restrained in any way. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that a reasonable person in Pugh's circumstances would not have concluded that he was in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom.” “Furthermore, although the officers' suspicions as to Pugh's involvement in the armed robbery were aroused by Pugh's statements during the interview, the officers never communicated to Pugh that he was under arrest or that he was not free to leave.” Accord, Teasley v. State , 293 Ga. 758, 749 S.E.2d 710 (October 7, 2013) (defendant wasn’t told he wasn’t in custody or that he couldn’t leave police interview). Pressley v. State, 322 Ga.App. 243, 744 S.E.2d 439 (June 13, 2013). Conviction for child cruelty, second degree, affirmed; trial court properly admitted pre- Miranda statement to police. Notwithstanding officer’s testimony “that once Pressley was brought into the interview room, the investigator considered Pressley to be in custody,” trial court properly found that pre- Miranda statement wasn’t custodial. “It is undisputed that Pressley appeared at the sheriff's office for the purpose of taking a polygraph test, that he made incriminating statements to the polygraph examiner, and that he was escorted into an interview room and remained there, unrestrained and with the door open, for some time. Pressley has not argued or shown that his original statement to the examiner was coerced, and the videotape shows that Pressley agreed without reservation to the examiner's brief account of their previous and unrecorded conversation, at which point the police investigator read Pressley his Miranda warnings and obtained his initials and signature on the form bearing the warnings before beginning the interrogation. Because the evidence thus supported a conclusion that a reasonable person would not have perceived Pressley to be in custody when he made the videotaped statement agreeing to the examiner's summary of his prior, unrecorded confession, and because Pressley confessed to the attacks again while left alone in the interview room after the Mirandized portion of his interview, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred when it admitted all of the videotaped statement.” Bryant v. State, 320 Ga.App. 838, 740 S.E.2d 772 (March 27, 2013). Cocaine possession and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress statements made during traffic stop. Defendant wasn’t automatically in custody for Miranda purposes “at the point the officer discovered his license was suspended. … Notably, there is no evidence that, at any time between the initial stop and the actual arrest, the officer made any statement or took any action that would cause a reasonable person in Bryant's position to believe that his freedom was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Bryant was not handcuffed, secured in the back of a police vehicle, or treated in any manner that would raise the investigative stop to the level of an arrest. Consequently, the trial court was authorized to conclude that Bryant was not in custody at the time the officer asked Bryant about his driver's license, and that Miranda warnings were not required at this time. See Brown v. State, 299 Ga.App. 402, 405(1), 683 S.E.2d 614 (2009).”