☢ test - Í

State v. Mosley, 321 Ga.App. 236, 739 S.E.2d 106 (March 19, 2013). In DUI prosecution, trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress field sobriety results. Contrary to trial court’s ruling, defendant wasn’t under arrest when asked to perform field sobriety: “while it is certainly true that Mosley was not permitted to leave the scene during the course of the first deputy's questioning, there is nothing in the deputy's words or actions that would cause a reasonable person to conclude that Mosley's freedom of action was more than temporarily curtailed pending the outcome of the investigation. Indeed, at no time did the deputy tell Mosley that he was under arrest. To the contrary, when Mosley asked the deputy during his investigation whether he was under arrest, the deputy explicitly answered this question in the negative … . Moreover, the deputy never placed Mosley in handcuffs or in the back of the patrol car during his questioning. In fact, the deputy even turned his back on Mosley at one point in his investigation ( i.e., when he stepped away to engage in a private conversation with the second deputy), walking in the opposite direction of Mosley and leaving him standing alone at the back of the vehicle.” Reaves v. State, 292 Ga. 582, 740 S.E.2d 141 (March 18, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly admitted portions of defendant’s statement to police as non-custodial. “Reaves voluntarily agreed to ride with Sergeant Smith to the police station, that she rode in the front seat of an unmarked patrol car, that she was not handcuffed, and that she was not formally arrested. When they arrived at the police station around 11:00 a.m., Sergeant Smith, who then was unaware that [defendant’s husband] had implicated Reaves, asked Reaves to write a statement about the victim [defendant’s daughter]'s medical condition and related events. No one was in the room with her, the door to the room was left open, she could move about freely, and she had full access to a restroom and refreshments. … [W]e conclude that a reasonable person in Reaves's position would not have perceived herself to be in custody before Sergeant Smith read the Miranda warnings and instead would have felt at liberty to end the questioning and leave.” Accord, Jones v. State , 292 Ga. 593, 740 S.E.2d 147 (March 18, 2013) (statement wasn’t custodial where defendant voluntarily came to office for interview, wasn’t restrained, was never told he couldn’t leave); Fennell v. State , 292 Ga. 834, 741 S.E.2d 877 (April 29, 2013) (“[Fennell] voluntarily went to the police station for his interview; he chose to ride with police from his home rather than with his father; he was specifically informed he was not under arrest at that time; and he was not handcuffed or frisked before getting into the police vehicle. In addition, during the interview, appellant was in an unlocked room where he was allowed to answer his cellular telephone, was given a drink and offered food, and was never restrained. Although one detective told appellant that they knew he was not being completely truthful, the detective was neither hostile nor accusatory toward appellant such that a reasonable person would have thought he was not free to leave.”); Smith v. State , 297 Ga. 667, 777 S.E.2d 453 (September 14, 2015) (defendant went to sheriff’s office in his own vehicle, was not under arrest and was free to leave, was given water and used his phone). Teele v. State, 319 Ga.App. 448, 738 S.E.2d 277 (December 14, 2012). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; defendant was in cutody for Miranda purposes when she spoke to police, but statement wasn’t product of interrogation. “Here, Teele was approached at gunpoint, ordered to lie on the ground, handcuffed, and placed in the back seat of a marked patrol car. Under these circumstances, ‘a reasonable person in [Teele's] position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.’ [ State v. Wintker, 223 Ga.App. 65, 67 (476 S.E.2d 835) (1996)]. See also Waters [ v. State, 281 Ga. 119, 121(4) (636 S.E.2d 538) (2006)] (suspect was in custody where he was approached at gunpoint, handcuffed, and placed on ground while guarded by three officers).” Tobias v. State, 319 Ga.App. 320, 735 S.E.2d 113 (November 30, 2012). Vehicular homicide and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly found that defendant wasn’t in custody during traffic investigation, and thus her statements were admissible. “The record shows that it took Corporal Barrett approximately one hour to arrive at the accident scene, during which time Tobias received medical treatment for symptoms of shock. After arriving on the scene, Corporal Barrett spent approximately 45 minutes investigating the accident before speaking with Tobias. This Court has identified no particular length of time in which a temporary detention must be considered ‘unreasonable.’ See Harper v. State, 243 Ga.App. 705, 706(1), 534 S.E.2d 157 (2000) (where evidence showed that the length of time from the traffic stop to the arrival of the investigating officer was approximately one hour, the temporary detention of defendant pending completion of the investigation was not unreasonable. Although the defendant was not free to leave the scene, he was allowed to walk around). Accord Aldridge v. State, 237 Ga.App. 209, 213(3), 515 S.E.2d 397 (1999) (a wait of 45 to 50 minutes from the time of the traffic stop to the commencement of the investigation did not convert the investigation into a custodial situation). Under the circumstances presented in this case, we cannot say that the time period between the accident and Tobias's questioning was an unreasonable detention. Further, Tobias was not isolated in a police-dominated atmosphere while she remained in the residence. She was accompanied by her mother and her aunt, who were also present during her interview with the police.”