☢ test - Í

Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 725 S.E.2d 260 (March 19, 2012). Interim review of capital murder prosecution; trial court properly found that statements made by defendant to officer in hospital were custodial . “Considering the facts that Clay awoke to find a police officer in his treatment room and that that officer avoided Clay's questions regarding whether he was going to be charged, told Clay that he ‘needed’ to come down to the police station to talk with the police, never told Clay that he was not under arrest or that he was free to leave, and called for a patrol vehicle to transport Clay to the police station, we conclude that the trial court was authorized to find that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Clay's position would have perceived that he was in custody at the time he made Statement 1. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that Statement 1 was obtained in violation of Miranda. See McDougal v. State, 277 Ga. 493, 498(1)(A) (591 S.E.2d 788) (2004) (considering the fact that police would make no commitments to the defendant about whether he would be arrested as a factor in favor of custody). Compare Gabriel v. State, 280 Ga. 237, 237–238(2) (626 S.E.2d 491) (2006) (considering the facts that the defendant was asked whether he would go to the sheriff's office and that he was told that he was not under arrest and was free to leave as factors weighing in favor of not finding custody).” Howes v. Fields, 10-680, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17, 2012 WL 538280 (February 21, 2012). Reversing Sixth Circuit. Federal district court erroneously granted habeas relief from Michigan child molestation conviction. 1. State trial court properly admitted defendant’s un-Mirandized statement to police, finding that defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes although he was then a state prison inmate on unrelated charges. Contrary to federal habeas court’s holding, “we have repeatedly declined to adopt any categorical rule with respect to whether the questioning of a prison inmate is custodial,” citing Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) (upholding “the admission of un-Mirandized statements elicited from an inmate by an undercover officer masquerading as another inmate”), and Maryland v. Shatzer , 559 U.S. 98, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (February 24, 2010) (after three years in prison, officers were free to again question Shatzer despite his earlier invocation of right to counsel; the intervening period counts as a “break in custody” for Miranda purposes, even though the defendant was in prison in the meantime). “If a break in custody can occur while a prisoner is serving an uninterrupted term of imprisonment [as in Shatzer ], it must follow that imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation within the meaning of Miranda .” “When a prisoner is questioned, the determination of custody should focus on all of the features of the interrogation. These include the language that is used in summoning the prisoner to the interview and the manner in which the interrogation is conducted. See Yarborough [ v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004)]. An inmate who is removed from the general prison population for questioning and is ‘thereafter ... subjected to treatment’ in connection with the interrogation ‘that renders him “in custody” for practical purposes ... will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda, ’” quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). “ The record in this case reveals that respondent was not taken into custody for purposes of Miranda . To be sure, respondent did not invite the interview or consent to it in advance, and he was not advised that he was free to decline to speak with the deputies. The following facts also lend some support to respondent's argument that Miranda 's custody requirement was met: The interview lasted for between five and seven hours in the evening and continued well past the hour when respondent generally went to bed; the deputies who questioned respondent were armed; and one of the deputies, according to respondent, ‘[u]sed a very sharp tone,’ [cit.], and, on one occasion, profanity, [cit.]. These circumstances, however, were offset by others. Most important, respondent was told at the outset of the interrogation, and was reminded again thereafter, that he could leave and go back to his cell whenever he wanted. … Moreover, respondent was not physically restrained or threatened and was interviewed in a well-lit, average-sized conference room, where he was ‘not uncomfortable.’ [cits.]. He was offered food and water, and the door to the conference room was sometimes left open. [cits.]. ‘All of these objective facts are consistent with an interrogation environment in which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave.’ Yarborough, supra, at 664–665, 124 S.Ct. 2140.” Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor would find defendant in custody under these facts: “I would not train, as the Court does, on the question whether there can be custody within custody. Instead, I would ask, as Miranda put it, whether Fields was subjected to ‘incommunicado interrogation ... in a police-dominated atmosphere,’ 384 U.S., at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602, whether he was placed, against his will, in an inherently stressful situation, see id., at 468, 86 S.Ct. 1602, and whether his ‘freedom of action [was] curtailed in any significant way,’ id., at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Those should be the key questions, and to each I would answer ‘Yes.’ … Today, for people already in prison, the Court finds it adequate for the police to say: ‘You are free to terminate this interrogation and return to your cell.’ Such a statement is no substitute for one ensuring that an individual is aware of his rights.” 2. Useful discussion of framework for Miranda custody analysis: “ As used in our Miranda case law, ‘custody’ is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion. In determining whether a person is in custody in this sense, the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of ‘the objective circumstances of the