☢ test - Í

interrogation,’ Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322–323, 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam), a ‘reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ Thompson v . Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). And in order to determine how a suspect would have ‘gauge[d]’ his ‘freedom of movement,’ courts must examine ‘all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’ Stansbury, supra, at 322, 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant factors include the location of the questioning, see Shatzer, supra, at 112-115, 130 S.Ct., at 1223–1226, its duration , see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437–438, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), statements made during the interview , see [ Oregon v . Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam)]; Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004); Stansbury, supra, at 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984), and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning , see California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122–1123, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam) . Determining whether an individual's freedom of movement was curtailed, however, is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last. Not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda . We have ‘decline[d] to accord talismanic power’ to the freedom-of-movement inquiry, Berkemer, supra, at 437, 104 S.Ct. 3138, and have instead asked the additional question whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda . ‘Our cases make clear ... that the freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.’ Shatzer, 559 U.S., at 112, 130 S.Ct., at 1224.” Accord, Mays (March 4, 2016), above. State v. Hammond, 313 Ga.App. 882, 723 S.E.2d 89 (February 3, 2012). In cocaine possession prosecution, trial court erred in granting motion to suppress. Contrary to trial court’s holding, non-Mirandized statements made during Terry stop weren’t subject to suppression. A reasonable person wouldn’t have believed his detention was more than temporary : “the question regarding whether Hammond was in possession of contraband occurred within a few seconds of the stop, such that ‘no reasonable person could believe that they were under arrest and that they were not free to leave after the officer had been afforded a reasonable time to finish conducting a traffic investigation.’ Brown [ v. State, 223 Ga.App. 364, 367 (477 S.E.2d 623) (1996)]. Additionally, the officer informed Hammond that he would not be arrested if he merely possessed a crack pipe. No reasonable person, having been told that he or she would not be arrested (denoting a future occurrence), could believe that he or she was currently in custody. And although the officer testified that Hammond was not free to leave during the investigation, there is no indication that the officer made ‘any statement or otherwise act[ed] in such a way that would cause a reasonable person to believe that he was under arrest and not simply temporarily detained for further investigation....’ Loden v. State, 271 Ga.App. 632, 633(1) (610 S.E.2d 593) (2005). Compare [ State v. Wintker, 223 Ga.App. 65, 68-69 (476 S.E.2d 835) (1996)] (detainee was ‘in custody’ for purposes of Miranda after observing arrest of car's driver; being placed in locked patrol car while other passengers remained outside; observing drug sniff by police dog; and watching as police thoroughly searched her parents' car after she refused consent to search).” Anguiano v. State, 313 Ga.App. 449, 721 S.E.2d 652 (December 28, 2011). Convictions for attempted child molestation and enticement affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress non- Mirandized statements made by defendant to television correspondent for “Dateline NBC.” Defendant was caught in internet child molestation sting set up by television producers, with knowledge of sheriff’s department. “According to [Sheriff’s Lieutenant] Armbrust's testimony, no law enforcement officers were visible to Anguiano when he arrived at the house; Anguiano had no contact with law enforcement until after he exited the house; and the arresting officers left the carport room and took position outside the residence only after Anguiano had already gone inside. Armbrust testified that he had no conversations with [television correspondent] Hansen at all; that the police officers ‘didn't have any direct contact with what NBC was to do’; and that the police had no prior arrangement with Chris Hansen as to whether Hansen would interview Anguiano at all or, if an interview took place, what questions Hansen might ask. Based on his familiarity with the television show, however, Armbrust anticipated that the event would be videotaped and that an interview with the suspect would take place.” Trial court found that the reporter “was not acting as an agent of the police” despite defendant’s contention “that he was ‘in custody’ … because Hansen was working on a joint venture run by NBC, [the show’s producer] PJ and the sheriff’s office; and because, as it turned out, Anguiano was arrested once he left the house.” Defendant wasn’t in custody during interview. Defendant came freely to the house, was told he was free to leave the television interview and did so, and was only arrested after he exited the house. “In this case, police were solicitous not to show their presence before Anguiano entered the house, and they certainly did not disclose their view that he was a suspect or that they intended to arrest him later. See Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 281(1)(a)(1) (695 S.E.2d 604) (2010). Also, Anguiano's subjective view of his situation, based on having seen the NBC television show previously, was not determinative of whether he was in